Adonis Donnell Holbrooks, Defendant, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in a superseding indictment for one count of attempted rape of a child, one count of solicitation of a minor, one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor via electronic means. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. As a result of the convictions, Defendant received an effective sentence of twelve years in incarceration with 100% release eligibility. The trial court denied a motion for new trial and motion to reconsider the denial of the motion for new trial. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for attempted rape of a child and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

MERRITT, Circuit Judge. This appeal involves an issue of first impression regarding the administrative procedure under the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. Plaintiff appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Because Plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies under the Exchange Act, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint and do not address the merits of Plaintiff’s arguments.

SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge. In this wire fraud and mail fraud conspiracy case against employees of a multibillion-dollar gas company, Pilot Flying J (Pilot), the district court allowed the government to play audio recordings in which one of the defendants, Pilot President Mark Hazelwood, is heard using deeply offensive racist and misogynistic language. The district court admitted the recordings on the theory that if the defendant was reckless enough to use language that could risk public outrage against the company, he was a “bad businessman,” and as a bad businessman, he was also reckless enough to commit fraud. This is vintage bad character evidence—and precisely the type of reasoning the Federal Rules of Evidence forbid.

The use of the audio recordings in this case jumped the rails of those rules. First, none of the Rules of Evidence support the recordings’ admissibility. Second, and more importantly, even if somehow otherwise admissible, the recordings are a textbook violation of Rule 403, because the risk of unfair prejudice eviscerates any purported probative value. For these reasons, we reverse the convictions of all three defendants.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. The Merit Systems Protection Board is a federal agency that adjudicates disputes between other federal agencies and their employees. Usually, employees must appeal the Board’s decisions to the Federal Circuit. But Angela Fuerst chose to appeal a Board order to a federal district court. That court found that it lacked jurisdiction. We agree and affirm.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff DaVita, Inc. and its subsidiary, DVA Renal Healthcare, Inc., appeal the district court’s dismissal of their lawsuit alleging various violations of the Medicare Secondary Payer Act and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 by an employee health benefit plan and its administrators. According to DaVita, the plan unlawfully treated a plan participant and DaVita patient—known as Patient A in this lawsuit—differently because this patient suffers from end-stage renal disease. In particular, the plan allegedly targeted renal dialysis services, which DaVita provides to Patient A, with poor reimbursement rates, in the hopes that dialysis patients like Patient A would switch to Medicare, which they are legally entitled to do three months after being diagnosed with the disease. Upon the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the district court dismissed all of DaVita’s claims with prejudice, and DaVita appealed. For the following reasons, we are persuaded that, as to Counts I, II, and VII of its complaint, DaVita has plausibly alleged that the defendants have engaged in unlawful discrimination. As to the rest of its claims, DaVita lacks a sufficient interest to prosecute them. Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for discovery and further proceedings on Counts I, II, and VII of DaVita’s complaint.

Sarah E. (“Mother”) and Scott W. (“Father”) appeal the termination of their parental rights to their minor child, Roslyn W. (“the Child”). In September 2018, Michael D. (“Uncle”) and Megan D. (“Aunt”) (collectively, “Petitioners”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the parents to the Child in the Hawkins County Chancery Court (“Trial Court”). The Trial Court conducted a trial in August 2019. Following the close of Petitioners’ proof, the Trial Court involuntarily dismissed the statutory ground of abandonment for failure to visit against both parents upon oral motion by the parents, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02. At the conclusion of the trial, the Trial Court terminated Mother’s parental rights based on the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to support the Child and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the Child. The Trial Court terminated Father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to support the Child. The Trial Court further found that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child was in the Child’s best interest. Upon its termination of the parents’ rights to the Child, the Trial Court ordered that Petitioners and the parents must enter into an agreed order or a “preadoption contract” that will survive the adoption to allow for reasonable visitation between the Child and the parents to continue their relationship. Both Mother and Father timely appealed the Trial Court’s judgment. The Petitioners raise two additional issues. We reverse the Trial Court’s involuntary dismissal of the statutory ground of abandonment by failure to visit pertaining to Father at the conclusion of Petitioner’s proof, as well as the requirement that the parties enter into an agreed order or “preadoption contract” allowing reasonable visitation between the parents and the Child after the adoption. We affirm the Trial Court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.

The Marshall County Grand Jury indicted Patrick Dean Armstrong, Defendant, for one count of first degree premeditated murder in the death of the victim, James Dockery. Following a trial, the jury convicted Defendant of the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault resulting in death. The trial court denied alternative sentencing, citing the seriousness of the offense and the need for deterrence, and sentenced Defendant as a Range I standard offender to five years and six months’ incarceration at seventy-five percent release eligibility. Following a review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the conviction and the length of the sentence. However, we hold that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following de novo review, Defendant's sentence is modified to one year in confinement to be followed by four years and six months’ supervised probation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for the entry of an amended judgment consistent with this opinion.

Under the majority’s decision, qualified Tennessee voters can now vote by absentee mail ballot if voters, in their discretion, determine they have underlying medical or health conditions that make them more susceptible to contracting COVID-19 or if they are vulnerable to greater health risks should they contract COVID-19, or if they care for someone with such a condition.1 I concur in part because I welcome this result as to those plaintiffs, and I agree with much of what the majority has to say about the rest. This cascade of agreement includes: the presumption of constitutionality afforded to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 2-6-201(5)(C) and (D); the application of the Anderson-Burdick standard of review; the moderate burden on the right to vote of those plaintiffs who do not have (or care for someone with) an underlying condition; and the lack of persuasiveness of the Defendants’ evidence of voter fraud. And yet I must dissent.

The pro se Petitioner, Billy F. Johnson, III, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that he is entitled to relief based on newly discovered evidence of insanity. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court denying the petition.

The Petitioner, Demetree Harris, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his two guilty-pleaded convictions for aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann § 39-14-402. The Petitioner contends that he entered an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea as a result of the ineffective assistance of defense counsel because the Petitioner had not reviewed all of the discovery materials. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post- conviction court.