The Defendant, Dale Richard Bible, was convicted by a jury of criminally negligent homicide and child neglect, for which he received consecutive sentences of six and four years, respectively. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-212, -15-401. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his dual convictions violate double jeopardy. After our review, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for entry of corrected judgments reflecting the merger of the Defendant’s adjudications of guilt into a single conviction for criminally negligent homicide.

This appeal arises from a complaint for breach of a commercial lease agreement brought by the landlord to recover damages from the tenant and its guarantor. The tenant admitted breaching the lease but asserted that the landlord had been made whole prior to the commencement of this action and was not entitled to an award of damages. The tenant also asserted a counterclaim for attorney’s fees as authorized by the lease. The trial was bifurcated. A jury determined that the landlord was not entitled to recover any damages because the landlord recovered its damages in full in a previous proceeding in general sessions court, the landlord failed to mitigate its damages, and its claims were barred by res judicata. Following a bench trial on the parties’ competing claims to recover attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the lease agreement, the court determined that the tenant and guarantor were entitled to recover their attorney’s fees and costs as the prevailing parties. The landlord appeals. We affirm the court’s decision in all respects. Because the lease agreement states the prevailing party in any action, or appeal thereon, shall be entitled to its reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs and Defendants prevailed on all issues on appeal, we remand with instructions for the trial court to award Defendants the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs they incurred in this appeal.

Question:

When a municipal court exercises concurrent jurisdiction with a general sessions court, must the judge of the municipal court have been a resident of the municipality for one year before his or her election to the municipal court in order to satisfy the residency requirements of article VI, section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution?

Opinion:

No. ArticleVI,section4oftheTennesseeConstitutionrequiresonlythatamunicipalcourt judge exercising concurrent jurisdiction with an inferior court, such as a general sessions court, must have been, for one year immediately preceding election to office, a resident of the district or circuit in which the inferior court has jurisdiction.

Defendant, Demarcus J. Love, was indicted by a Rutherford County Grand Jury for six counts of criminal simulation, one count of simple possession of marijuana, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, and one count of driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license. Defendant filed a motion to suppress in which he argued that the officer did not have probable cause to stop him after he made a U-turn. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion. The State appeals the ruling of the trial court. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the officer had probable cause to stop Defendant. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Timothy L. Jefferson, appeals as of right from the Trousdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he contended that his conviction for second degree murder was void because the order transferring his case from juvenile court to criminal court was not file-stamped by the criminal court clerk’s office. The Petitioner argues that the petition stated a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Brodie Bowery, Defendant, admitted that he violated the conditions of his probation, and the trial court fully revoked his probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Employee injured his left shoulder during a training session. He was diagnosed with a tom shoulder ligament which required a surgical repair of the left shoulder. Nine months later, Employee’s treating physician performed a posterior capsular release of the left shoulder. When his symptoms failed to improve, Employer authorized follow up care with a different orthopedic surgeon, who performed another surgery to release the bicep tendon that had been previously repaired. Employer was provided with a letter from Employee’s treating physician that Employee’s restrictions had been lifted. Employee was required to take a return to duty test, which he ultimately failed. Subsequently, Employee developed intermittent violent movements of his head and was diagnosed with conversion disorder. At the request of Employee’s counsel, Employee underwent an independent medical examination by a psychiatrist, who concluded that the conversion disorder arose out of Employee’s work injury. However, because the psychiatrist noted issues regarding symptom magnification, he reduced Employee’s psychiatric impairment rating to ten percent. Following a trial, the court awarded benefits for injuries to Employee’s left shoulder and for the psychiatric injury; however, it found that Employee was not permanently and totally disabled. The trial court also declined to apply a multiplier to the impairment rating for the psychiatric injury and award temporary total disability related to that injury. The Employee appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Lee Blomquist manufactured and distributed marijuana in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula. When the police arrived with a search warrant, Blomquist claimed his growing operation was legal and gave the officers a tour. But there was a problem: It wasn’t. So Blomquist was charged with various federal drug crimes. He pled guilty to distributing and conspiring to distribute marijuana, and a jury convicted him of manufacturing and possessing with intent to distribute between 50 and 100 marijuana plants.

Blomquist now appeals, arguing that the police exceeded the scope of the search warrant. But since Blomquist consented to the more expansive search, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Marcus Vaughn, pleaded guilty to one count of attempted rape, and he received a five-year sentence on probation. The Petitioner filed a petition for post- conviction relief, and the post-conviction court denied his petition on the ground that the statute of limitations barred its consideration of his claims. The Petitioner appeals. After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Eddie Maddle, was convicted by a Putnam County jury of possession with the intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of methamphetamine, a Class C felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II multiple offender to fifteen years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant raises the following four issues on appeal: 1) whether the trial court erred by allowing evidence of crimes committed by the Defendant’s wife; 2) whether the State established a reliable chain of custody for the drugs admitted into evidence at trial; 3) whether the Defendant was entitled to a mistrial on the grounds that a Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) employee entered the courtroom and disrupted his trial; and 4) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.