Kareem Northington, Defendant, appeals from the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this, his second delayed appeal, the defendant, Omari Shakir Davis, appeals the sentence imposed for his Davidson County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded conviction of possession with intent to sell or deliver 15 grams or more of a substance containing heroin, arguing that the trial court erred imposing an 18-year, fully-incarcerative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Grants & Denials List

Week of September 21, 2020 - September 25, 2020

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Pierre Alston received a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 for his prior convictions under Ohio Revised Code § 2925.03(A)(1), which criminalizes offers to sell drugs. Since United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382 (en banc), rehearing denied, 929 F.3d 317 (6th Cir. 2019), we have held that attempt crimes such as offers to sell do not qualify for the § 4B1.1 career-offender enhancement, United States v. Cavazos, 950 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2020). While conceding that Cavazos forecloses the enhancement here, the Government argues that our Havis jurisprudence—Cavazos in particular—is wrong. We accept the Government’s concession, and we consider its arguments preserved for a potential petition for en banc rehearing.

In light of Havis and Cavazos, we REVERSE the district court’s sentence of Alston to 169 months’ imprisonment and REMAND for resentencing.

In this case involving the inheritance of an investment account, the three plaintiffs filed a complaint in September 2016, asserting, inter alia, that a letter executed by their father prior to his 2007 death had operated to create an express trust concerning the account, for which their stepmother had acted as trustee with the understanding that the plaintiffs were to be the beneficiaries of the account after her death. The plaintiffs alternatively sought imposition of a constructive trust. The plaintiffs’ stepmother, who is the subject decedent in this action, had died in April 2016. The plaintiffs initially named as defendants the co- executors of the decedent’s estate, as well as the financial institution holding the investment account. The trial court subsequently entered agreed orders to dismiss the financial institution as a party and to substitute as defendants the decedent’s three adult children from a previous marriage. Upon competing motions for summary judgment and following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that an express trust had been created by the writings of the plaintiffs’ father and that, alternatively, a constructive trust should be imposed based on the combined writings and actions of the plaintiffs’ father and the decedent. The defendants filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the trial court denied following a hearing upon finding in part that new evidence submitted by the defendants should not be considered. The defendants have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a health care liability lawsuit. In 2013, Sandra Kanipe (“Ms. Kanipe”) died from an undiagnosed aortic dissection while in the care of Dr. Pragnesh Patel, M.D. (“Dr. Patel”). Travis Kanipe (“Mr. Kanipe”), Ms. Kanipe’s son, sued Dr. Patel in the Circuit Court for Hamblen County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the jury found in favor of Dr. Patel. The Trial Court granted Mr. Kanipe’s motion for a new trial on grounds that Dr. Patel had, through his testimony, shifted blame to a non-party despite having never pled comparative fault. After a second trial, the jury found in favor of Mr. Kanipe. Dr. Patel appeals, arguing among other things that he never shifted blame. From our review of the record, we conclude that Dr. Patel did, in fact, shift blame to a non-party when he testified in the first trial that the nurses never notified him of Ms. Kanipe’s ongoing chest pain. In view of our Supreme Court’s holding in George v. Alexander, 931 S.W.2d 517 (Tenn. 1996), the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a retrial. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The Petitioner, Paul Wright, pleaded guilty to six counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and seven counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years. The Petitioner timely filed a post- conviction petition, alleging that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, concluding that the Petitioner had not proven Counsel was deficient or shown prejudice. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

In this class action lawsuit involving an association of physicians alleging breach of an agreement by the defendant hospital corporation, a three-week jury trial resulted in a verdict of more than $57 million in damages. The trial court denied the defendant’s post- trial motions and subsequently awarded over $5 million in attorney’s fees and expenses. The defendant has appealed. Determining that the trial court erred in failing to submit the attorney’s fee issue to the jury, we vacate the award of attorney’s fees and expenses and remand the issue to the trial court for determination by a jury. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

PER CURIAM. The COVID-19 pandemic has upended life in many ways. In response to the unfolding public health crisis, states across the country imposed various orders in hopes of containing the virus. Ohio, for its part, asked its citizens to stay at home and restricted the size of gatherings.

This case, which we’ve seen before, involves the intersection of COVID-19, the state’s responses to that pandemic, and some of Ohio’s conditions that must be met before a ballot initiative can get on the ballot for Election Day. See Thompson v. DeWine, 959 F.3d 804, 806 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), mot. to vacate stay denied, --- S. Ct. ----, No. 19A1054, 2020 WL 3456705 (2020).

Plaintiffs say that Ohio’s ballot initiative conditions are unconstitutional as applied during this pandemic and request that the federal courts relax them, at least for the time being. Plaintiffs’ challenge is a curious one. There is no question that Ohio’s ballot initiative conditions are, standing alone, constitutional, there is no question that Ohio is not responsible for COVID-19, and Plaintiffs are not challenging Ohio’s restrictions on public gatherings and the like, which Ohio imposed to address the pandemic—so we assume those are constitutional as well. And yet, Plaintiffs contend that when you put all of this together, in effect, two constitutional rights plus one outside catalyst make one constitutional wrong. The district court agreed and granted a preliminary injunction. We stayed that order because we disagreed. And now, because we still disagree, we reverse the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. A jury found that Officer John Moran used excessive force in arresting Nikos Kidis, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The jury’s conclusions regarding harm and compensatory damages, however, were difficult to square with its conclusion on punitive damages. On the one hand, the jury found that Moran’s conduct did not injure Kidis, and accordingly awarded Kidis $1 in nominal compensatory damages. But on the other, the jury found Moran’s actions so unjustified as to warrant $200,000 in punitive damages. When measured against the jury’s harm and compensatory damage findings, the punitive damages award runs afoul of the due process principles articulated in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). We accordingly reverse the punitive damages portion of the judgment, and remand that portion of the judgment to the district court with instructions to enter an order of remittitur reducing the punitive damages award to no more than $50,000. We affirm the remaining aspects of the judgment.