The Defendant, Robert Thomas, entered guilty pleas to facilitation of attempted especially aggravated robbery and possession of marijuana with intent to sell. The Defendant requested probation and judicial diversion. The trial court held a hearing and sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of six years of probation for the facilitation of attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction and “one year and time served” for the drug conviction. The trial court denied judicial diversion, and the Defendant appeals. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying diversion, and we affirm the judgments and remand for correction of the various judgment forms.

The defendant, Andre Cabrere, appeals the trial court’s entry of corrected judgment forms removing pretrial jail credits from two of the defendant’s consecutive sentences without providing the defendant notice prior to doing the same. The defendant claims the pretrial credits were part of his negotiated plea agreement. However, based on our review of the record and the briefs of the parties, it is unclear whether the awarding of pretrial credits was part of the defendant’s negotiated plea or a clerical error such that the trial court had the authority to amend the judgments under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case to allow the defendant the opportunity to respond and present proof of his claim.

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-Appellants Social Security disability benefit and supplemental security income benefit claimants (“claimants”) appeal from district court orders rejecting their Appointments Clause challenges to the administrative law judges (ALJ) who heard their cases, on the basis that they forfeited the issue by not raising it during their administrative proceedings. For the reasons that follow, we VACATE the judgments of the district courts and REMAND these consolidated cases to the Social Security Administration for new hearings before constitutionally appointed ALJs other than the ALJs who presided over claimants’ first hearings.

SILER, Circuit Judge. Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) creates an insurance program to protect employees’ pension benefits. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”)—a wholly-owned corporation of the United States government—is charged with administering the pension-insurance program.

In this case, PBGC terminated the “Salaried Plan,” a defined-benefit plan sponsored by Delphi Corporation. The termination was executed through an agreement between PBGC and Delphi pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1342(c). The appellants—retirees affected by termination of the Salaried Plan—bring several challenges to the termination. First, the retirees argue that section 1342(c) requires a judicial adjudication before a pension plan may be terminated. Second, the retirees contend that termination of the plan violated their due process rights. Third, the retirees assert that PBGC’s decision to terminate the Salaried Plan was arbitrary and capricious.

But the retirees’ arguments do not require reversal. First, subsection 1342(c) permits termination of distressed pension plans by agreement between PBGC and the plan administrator without court adjudication. Second, the retirees have not demonstrated that they have a property interest in the full amount of their vested, but unfunded, pension benefits. Third, PBGC’s decision to terminate the Salaried Plan was not arbitrary and capricious. We affirm.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Sandra Bailey, Calvin Bailey, and their son Bryan Bailey of conspiring to commit healthcare fraud and other related crimes.1 The district court sentenced Sandra to 120 months’ imprisonment, Calvin to forty-five months’ imprisonment, and Bryan to eighty-four months’ imprisonment. Sandra, Calvin, and Bryan bring a number of challenges to their convictions, and Sandra and Calvin also challenge their sentences. Most of those challenges lack merit. We agree with Sandra, however, that the district court miscalculated her Guidelines-range sentence when it erroneously imposed a two- level increase in her offense level for using “mass marketing” in her scheme. We also agree with Calvin that the district court incorrectly calculated the loss amount for which he was responsible—and by extension, his Guidelines-range sentence—by holding him responsible for losses beyond those he agreed to jointly undertake. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions of Sandra, Calvin, and Bryan. We vacate Sandra’s and Calvin’s sentences, however, and remand to the district court for resentencing.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Tommy Charles Simpson, Jr., Defendant, pled guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor reserving a certified question for appeal in which he asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Defendant argues that a state-licensed private security guard’s seizure of Defendant’s cell phone constituted “state action,” violating his Fourth Amendment rights. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Quantorius Rankins, entered a best interest plea pursuant to Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706 (Tenn. 1997) to statutory rape. The agreement provided that the trial court would conduct a sentencing hearing to determine if Defendant would be granted judicial diversion and to determine if Defendant would be required to register as a sex offender. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion, ordered Defendant to register as a sex offender, and imposed an out-of-range sentence of six years’ probation pursuant to the plea agreement. Defendant appeals the trial court’s decision. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother appeals the trial court’s rulings changing the surname of the child, denying awards of retroactive child support and uncovered medical expenses, and allowing Father to seek modification of the residential schedule without showing a material change in circumstances. We vacate the trial court’s award of a deviation of child support because the trial court did not make the required findings under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-2-311 and the Child Support Guidelines. As to the remaining issues, we reverse.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. This appeal involves claims of national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), Mich. Comp. Laws 37.2101 et seq., and racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The claims were brought by Faisal G. Khalaf, Ph.D., who is of Lebanese descent, against Ford Motor Company, his former employer, and Bennie Fowler and Jay Zhou, his former supervisors at Ford. Specifically, Dr. Khalaf contends that, he was subjected to a hostile work environment because of his race or national origin, and that defendants illegally retaliated against him, after he engaged in protected activities, by demoting him, placing him on a “Performance Enhancement Plan” (PEP), and ultimately terminating his employment.

For the reasons outlined below, we hold that the district court erred in denying defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we REVERSE and direct the district court to enter judgment in favor of defendants. Based on this holding, we need not address remittitur.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. The Fair Labor Standards Act provides minimum wage and overtime protections to a broad range of employees. Davina Hurt and Dominic Hill brought claims for themselves and others alleging that their positions are covered by the protections of the FLSA and parallel provisions of Ohio law. They challenge their designation by Defendants as “outside salesman,” a category that is “exempt” from the FLSA, which means that their position is not covered by the protections of the Act. A trial was held and the jury found that Plaintiffs were not exempt outside salespeople. Just Energy appeals that determination and challenges pre- and post-trial rulings made by the district court, certain instructions given to the jury, and evidentiary rulings made by the court. For the reasons explained below, we AFFIRM.