A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Cordell Ash, of especially aggravated robbery, attempted first-degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty years in confinement. In this delayed appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after the victim made a reference to the defendant’s alleged gang activity. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After Mother failed to timely appeal the final order terminating her parental rights, she sought relief pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the motion, and Mother timely appealed from that order. Because we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Mother’s Rule 60.02 motion, we proceed to consider the correctness of the trial court’s final order terminating Mother’s parental rights. But we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest. We therefore affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

The defendant in a malicious prosecution action moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. He contended that the prior suit that engendered the malicious prosecution action was not terminated on its merits. The plaintiff responded that the prior suit was dismissed on multiple grounds and that one of those grounds was on the merits. The trial court agreed with the defendant and granted the motion to dismiss. We do as well and affirm.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. “It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court.” 3 Debates on the Constitution 533 (J. Elliot ed. 1876) (James Madison). This principle of state sovereign immunity was foundational to the formation of our republic. Certain constitutional provisions and acts of Congress have abrogated the States’ sovereign immunity— and of course the States may waive their immunity at their pleasure. But by and large the States remain protected from private civil suits. We held as much for takings claims brought against states in federal court. DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 526 (6th Cir. 2004). So when the plaintiffs here brought a takings claim against an Ohio official and Ohio asserted its sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense, the district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because DLX remains the law of this circuit, we AFFIRM.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. On April 8, 2019, Daniel B. Fleischer pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor (Minor Victim #1), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2551(a); and one count of receipt and distribution of visual depictions of real minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2552(a)(2). Fleischer’s plea agreement with the Government was made pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(A). The parties agreed to dismiss Count Four of the superseding indictment, charging Fleischer with exploitation of a minor victim (Minor Victim #2), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2551(a). However, his plea agreement did include a section labeled, “RELEVANT CONDUCT,” which contained Fleischer’s admission to the offense conduct involving Minor Victim #2. Following Fleischer’s plea, the district court sentenced Fleischer to a within-Guidelines sentence of 447 months.

Fleischer now appeals the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. Specifically, Fleischer argues the district court committed error in (1) applying to his sentence both a multiple count adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(d)(1), based on his conduct in relation to Minor Victim #2, and a pattern of activity enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(B)(5); and (2)placing an unreasonable amount of weight on the “seriousness” of his conduct as a sentencing factor under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We find Fleischer’s arguments unpersuasive. Because we determine that the district court did not commit error when handing down Fleischer’s sentence, which was both within the Guidelines and based on the factors set forth by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), we AFFIRM the 447-month sentence imposed by the court.

COLE, Chief Judge. Freddie Chase is a habeas petitioner who was sentenced under a Michigan sentencing scheme that allowed judge-found facts to raise his mandatory minimum sentence. The parties agree that this violated Chase’s Sixth Amendment rights as described by the Supreme Court in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). They dispute, however, whether Chase can overcome the procedural default of his Alleyne claim, as he did not raise this claim on direct appeal. Chase argues that his appellate counsel’s failure to raise an Alleyne claim on direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, thereby demonstrating cause and prejudice to excuse any procedural default. We agree. We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court, conditionally grant Chase’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and remand to the district court with instructions to remand to the state sentencing court.

Relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(5) is reserved for extraordinary circumstances. Outcomes, specifically judgments, occasioned by a party’s own inaction or lack of attention are not extraordinary. And a court does not abuse its discretion in denying a Rule 60.02(5) motion when a judgment results from such circumstances. So we affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court found the sole ground raised by the Department for termination against the child’s father of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child or assume financial responsibility pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14) had been established. The court further found that the termination of father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Father filed a timely appeal. On appeal, we vacate the trial court’s order terminating father’s parental rights due to the court’s failure to consider all required elements of the statutory ground for termination.

After seventeen years of marriage, a wife filed a complaint for divorce. The husband answered and filed a counter-complaint for divorce. The trial court granted the wife a divorce, named her primary residential parent of the parties’ minor children, classified and divided the marital estate, ordered the husband to pay the wife $1,941 per month in child support, and awarded the wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $6,000 per month. The husband appealed. We affirm the trial court’s designation of Wife as the primary residential parent and the division of the marital estate as modified. We vacate the award of child support and the amount of alimony and remand for recalculation.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. While employed as a captain in the Cleveland Emergency Medical Services (EMS), Jamie Marquardt allegedly made incendiary comments on his private Facebook page regarding the death of twelve-year-old Tamir Rice, a tragic incident that gripped Cleveland and the nation. Following his dismissal from the EMS, Marquardt brought suit alleging he was terminated in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment free speech rights. Because Marquardt’s social media posts addressed a matter of public concern, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on that basis. Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment below and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.