The employee suffered serious injuries when a tree fell on him as he exited a portable toilet located adjacent to the job site where he was working as a painter. The employer denied the employee’s request for medical and temporary disability benefits, asserting the employee’s injuries resulted from a non-compensable “act of God” and did not arise primarily out of his employment. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court denied the employee’s request for benefits, determining the employee failed to demonstrate he was likely to prevail at trial in establishing that his injuries arose primarily out of his employment. The employee has appealed. We affirm the result reached by the trial court and remand the case.

Following a bench trial, the Petitioner, Curtis Johnson, Jr., was found guilty of three counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-four years. This court affirmed the trial court’s judgments on appeal. State v. Curtis Johnson, Jr., No. W2016-02439-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 324455 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jan. 5, 2018), no perm. app filed. The Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, concluding that the Petitioner had not proven Counsel was deficient or shown prejudice. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Grants & Denials List

Week of August 10, 2020 - August 14, 2020

SILER, Circuit Judge. Stevie L. England, a Kentucky prisoner serving a life sentence, appeals from a district court’s judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on three issues raised by England. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). First, England claims that the trial court erroneously admitted his police confession given that he had invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Second, he argues that the trial court’s improper admission of hearsay statements from the deceased victim was erroneously deemed harmless error. Finally, England argues that the prosecution suppressed evidence in violation of Brady. Because the state court did not err in its interpretation or application of federal law, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of England’s habeas petition.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Wilbern Woodrow Cooper petitioned for habeas corpus on the ground that his first-degree felony murder conviction in Michigan state court violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). He contends that a custodial confession he gave in 2010 to the 1978 murder of David McKillop should have been excluded from evidence. We hold that the district court properly denied habeas relief because the Michigan trial court’s admission of the confession was not an error that rose to the level of actual prejudice. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Cooper’s habeas petition.

The Petitioner, Kelvin A. Lee, appeals as of right from the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he contended that his life without parole sentence for his first degree felony murder conviction was illegal because it was imposed for a crime he committed as a juvenile. The Petitioner contends that the petition stated a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, James Alex Greer, was convicted of attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, by a Putnam County Criminal Court jury. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12- 101 (2014) (criminal attempt), 39-13-202(a)(1) (2014) (subsequently amended) (first degree premeditated murder), 39-17-1324 (2014) (subsequently amended) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony). The trial court imposed sentences of eighteen years and six years, respectively, and ordered mandatory consecutive sentencing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(e)(1), for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s mid-trial request to withdraw based upon the Defendant’s attempt to waive the right to counsel and the Defendant’s demand to proceed pro se. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A general contractor hired a subcontractor to install wiring and machinery for a bowling alley. The subcontractor completed the work, but the general contractor failed to pay the subcontractor’s last five invoices. The subcontractor sued the general contractor for breach of contract, quantum meruit, promissory estoppel, and promissory fraud. The general contractor moved to dismiss, asserting that the subcontractor was unlicensed. The trial court granted the motion based on the subcontractor’s failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 62-6-103(b) (2019). Applying the standard of review applicable to a motion for summary judgment, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the quantum meruit claim based upon the statute. We affirm in all other respects.

Ricky D. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his minor child, Jackson D. (“the Child”). In July 2018, Heather M. (“Mother”) and her husband, Jason M. (“Stepfather”), filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Child in the Bradley County Chancery Court (“Trial Court”). Following a trial, the Trial Court found that Mother and Stepfather had proven by clear and convincing evidence the ground of Father’s ten-year sentence entered when the Child was younger than eight years old and that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Discerning no error, we affirm.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Bituminous Casualty Corp., as the insurer for Karst Robbins Coal Co. (“KRCC”), seeks review of a decision by the Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board finding Bituminous responsible for paying a claim under the Black Lung Benefits Act (“BLBA”), 30 U.S.C. §§ 901–45. Bituminous argues that the Department was collaterally estopped from finding that KRCC was the responsible operator under the Act, because an administrative law judge had previously found that another, related company was actually the claimant’s employer. Bituminous also argues that it was entitled to rescind its insurance agreement based on alleged fraud by KRCC, and that delays in the Department’s administrative proceedings violated its right to due process. For the reasons that follow, Bituminous is incorrect on each of these counts, and so we deny its petition for review.