KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. We deny panel rehearing in this case. We write, however, to observe that Brenda Montgomery raised an interesting argument for the first time in her petition for panel rehearing, after we already had rendered our decision denying her request for resentencing.

Again, though, Montgomery failed to raise this argument in her initial briefing and has brought it to our attention only on petition for panel rehearing. Unfortunately for Montgomery, her argument came too late and is inappropriate for our consideration at this stage. Therefore, we must stand by our original reasoning and disposition in this case, and we write simply to voice our skepticism that a standard sentencing colloquy like the one at issue here should weigh into our harmless-error analysis in future cases.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from a domestic disturbance incident, the parties appeal and cross-appeal multiple rulings of the district court. In Case No. 19-1191, Defendant Officers Gene Derwick and Jordan Dottor interlocutorily appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds with regard to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. They also appeal the district court’s ruling that they spoiled relevant evidence. In Case No. 19-1211, Plaintiff Ehsan Ouza appeals the district court’s ruling that she cannot rely on evidence of her carpal tunnel diagnosis to demonstrate injury from Defendants’ alleged excessive force, and she appeals the district court’s failure to sanction Defendants for spoiling evidence by adopting an adverse inference against them. In Case No. 19-1393, Plaintiff appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Dottor on qualified immunity grounds with regard to her false arrest claims and the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant City of Dearborn Heights on her municipal liability claim. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part the district court’s order, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Dennis Lee Seale, filed a Rule 9 interlocutory appeal seeking our review of the trial court’s ruling that some of the prosecution’s out-of-state witnesses could testify at trial via two-way video conferencing technology. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that four of the prosecution’s witnesses could testify via teleconferencing rather than in person. The Defendant filed an application for an interlocutory appeal, which the State did not oppose, and which the trial court granted. This court determined that this application met the criteria of Rule 9, and granted the appeal. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred because its ruling violated his rights pursuant to the Confrontation Clause of both the Federal and our State constitution. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that this case, as one of first impression in this state, provides this court the opportunity to hold that the standard as articulated in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), should extend to two-way video conferencing technology. As such we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a case-specific and witness-specific determination of whether the denial of the Defendant’s right to confront witnesses is necessary to further an important public interest.

A medical center employee sued the medical center under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“the TPPA”) asserting that his employment was terminated because he refused to remain silent about the medical center’s failure to enact policies to safeguard its employees from workplace violence. The medical center moved to dismiss the employee’s complaint for failure to state a claim, and the trial court granted the motion. We conclude that the employee’s complaint satisfies the TPPA’s “illegal act” requirement because it alleges the violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause and describes activities that implicate important public policy concerns. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal.

Defendant, Jessica M. Thompson, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of her probation. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge. Petitioner Jason Sexton is an Ohio prisoner who wishes to pursue a habeas corpus petition. The district court dismissed his petition as untimely, but he says that was error. We agree, vacate the judgment, and remand the case.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Philip Paauwe was sentenced to a 420-month prison term following his guilty plea to Coercion and Enticement of a Minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The sentencing analysis included application of a five-level enhancement under § 4B1.5(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines due to Paauwe’s pattern of ongoing sexual misconduct. Paauwe argues that application of the enhancement was based on the Guideline’s administrative commentary, not its text, in violation of our recent holding in United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (per curiam). Because Paauwe’s enhancement follows from the plain terms of the Guideline itself, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

A mother and father’s parental rights to two children were terminated on the grounds of abandonment, persistence of conditions, failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, and upon a determination that terminating the parents’ rights would be in the best interest of the children. Each parent appeals; we reverse in part as to certain statutory grounds but affirm the termination of the parental rights of each parent.

COLE, Chief Judge. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the State of Ohio issued a series of orders restricting in-person gatherings. But it left unchanged its ballot-access laws, which require candidates and minor political parties hoping to be listed on November’s ballot to show that they have a modicum of community support by collecting petition signatures from Ohio voters. The law requires that the signatures be collected in person, a task which has become more difficult in the era of social distancing. This case presents us with the question whether the State’s ballot-access requirements, as applied, have become unconstitutionally burdensome in light of the orders restricting in-person gatherings. Binding precedent compels us to conclude that they are not. We therefore affirm the district court.

Grants & Denials List

Week of July 27, 2020 - July 31, 2020