The Defendant, Michael Ryan Boggs, was indicted for theft of property valued at more than $10,000 and less than $60,000, a Class C felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class E felony; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14- 103(a), -14-105(a)(4), -14-402, -14-403(a), -17-1307(b)(1)(B), -17-1324(a). Following a jury trial, the Defendant was acquitted of the firearms offenses and convicted of the theft of property and aggravated burglary offenses. The trial court imposed a sentence of ten years on each count, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence relative to his identity as a perpetrator of the burglary, arguing that the accomplice testimony was incredible and not adequately corroborated. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this post-divorce proceeding, the trial court dismissed a Husband’s petition to modify or terminate the transitional alimony he was obligated to pay on the basis of the provision of the parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement that made the alimony obligation non- modifiable. Husband appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

Charles L. Jones, III, Petitioner, appeals from the denial of habeas corpus relief from his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole after he pled guilty to second-degree murder. After a review, we affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief.

James Demoss, Defendant, pleaded guilty to one count of voluntary manslaughter and two counts of aggravated assault. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the manner of service of the effective fifteen-year sentence was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant’s sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to serve his sentence in incarceration rather than granting an alternative sentence. Because the trial court failed to articulate adequate reasons for denying an eligible defendant an alternative sentence, the abuse of discretion standard with a presumption of reasonableness does not apply on appeal, and this court can either (1) conduct a de novo review to determine whether there is an adequate basis for denying an alternative sentence; or (2) remand for the trial court to consider the requisite factors in determining whether to grant an alternative sentence. We determine that the record on appeal is sufficient for this court to undertake a de novo review, and after a de novo review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the denial of an alternative sentence.

This appeal arises from an action to remove the decedent’s son as the executor of the estate. The action also sought to remove the decedent’s son as the nominated trustee of two testamentary trusts; however, the trustee never assumed his duties because neither trust was ever funded. The decedent’s wife was the principal beneficiary of the estate and both testamentary trusts. The action was initiated by the conservator for the decedent’s wife who alleged, inter alia, that the executor/trustee failed to distribute any property or income to the wife and used the assets for his personal benefit. The conservator also alleged that he improperly used the estate’s assets to satisfy a bank loan that encumbered real property he jointly owned with the decedent for which he and the decedent were liable. The conservator claimed the bank loan was not a lawful debt of the estate because the bank failed to file a claim against the estate within the time limits set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-307. In response, the executor/trustee contended the action to remove him was barred by the one- year statute of limitations for breach of trust actions. He also contended the debt to the bank was properly paid in accordance with the law of exoneration. After a hearing, the trial court found that the law of exoneration did not apply and held that the estate was not obligated on the debt to the bank because the bank did not timely file a claim against the estate. Additionally, the trial court removed the decedent’s son as both the executor and trustee based on his persistent failure to administer the estate and appointed a successor executor and successor trustee. The successor executor filed an inventory and accounting for the estate, and the former executor filed an objection. At the hearing that followed, the former executor submitted into evidence a document entitled “Land Agreement” and claimed that the agreement was enforceable against the estate as a contract to make a will. The trial court determined that the Land Agreement was a contract to make a will, but the claim was time barred. In its final order, the court assessed damages against the former executor and awarded the conservator her attorney’s fees. The former executor appealed, arguing that (1) the action was barred by the statute of limitations for breach of trust actions, (2) the Land Agreement was enforceable against the estate, (3) the debt to the bank was properly paid under the law of exoneration, and (4) he was not liable for attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects.

The only issue in this workers’ compensation appeal is whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees. An employee sustained a compensable injury to her back at work. The settlement agreement resolving her workers’ compensation claim required her employer to pay her future medical expenses. When her employer refused to pay for prescribed pain medication, she filed a petition for contempt and to compel payment. After her employer reversed its denial of payment, the trial court awarded her $7,500 in attorney’s fees. We affirm the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for determination of reasonable attorney’s fees to be awarded to the employee for this appeal.

This workers’ compensation appeal requires us to determine whether Employee elected to receive workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to Texas law and is, therefore, precluded from recovering in Tennessee under the doctrine of election of remedies. The trial court applied the election of remedies doctrine based on the Employee’s filing of a Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation Form-041, titled “Employee’s Claim for Compensation for a Work-Related Injury or Occupational Disease” (“Claim for Compensation”) with the Texas Department of Insurance (“TDI”), his filing of a “Request to Schedule, Re-Schedule, or Cancel a Benefit Review Conference (BRC)” (“Request to Schedule a Benefit Review Conference” or “Request”) with the TDI, his consultation with an ombudsman in the Texas Office of Injured Employee Counsel, and his “knowing and voluntary” acceptance of temporary total and medical benefits issued pursuant to Texas law. The trial court therefore determined that Employee was precluded from recovering workers’ compensation benefits in Tennessee. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. After careful consideration, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Pamela Moses, appeals the trial court’s denial of her “Motion for Expiration of Sentence,” which the trial court essentially treated as a motion for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the motion.

Petitioner, Kendall Joy, appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis in which he alleged that his guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the error coram nobis court.

The Petitioner, Dennis Judge, pleaded guilty to sexual battery by an authority figure, and the trial court sentenced him to the agreed sentence of four years of Community Corrections. More than a year later, the Petitioner filed a motion requesting that the trial court allow him to file an untimely petition for post-conviction relief and also a petition for post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court found that due process did not require a tolling of the statute of limitations, and it dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the post- conviction court’s judgment.