MURPHY, Circuit Judge. The police caught Andy Maya and two accomplices smuggling 50 pounds of marijuana into Kentucky in a BMW transported on a car-hauling truck from out of state. When the police searched Maya’s home, they found a firearm in his bed near over $20,000 in cash and money orders. Maya admitted to a drug-trafficking conspiracy and to possessing the firearm. But he denied possessing the gun “in furtherance of” the conspiracy—an offense that triggers an additional five-year prison term. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). A jury nonetheless convicted Maya of that offense. This appeal raises two questions: Could a rational jury conclude that Maya possessed the firearm “in furtherance of” the drug conspiracy based on evidence that he, among other things, kept his firearm near his drug proceeds? And did the district court properly permit an officer to opine on the significance of the gun’s location near the funds? We hold that a rational jury could find that Maya possessed the gun to assist the conspiracy and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the officer’s testimony. We thus affirm.

The Defendant, Dennis Lee Seale, filed a Rule 9 interlocutory appeal seeking our review of the trial court’s ruling that some of the prosecution’s out-of-state witnesses could testify at trial via two-way video conferencing technology. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that four of the prosecution’s witnesses could testify via teleconferencing rather than in person. The Defendant filed an application for an interlocutory appeal, which the State did not oppose, and which the trial court granted. This court determined that this application met the criteria of Rule 9, and granted the appeal. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred because its ruling violated his rights pursuant to the Confrontation Clause of both the Federal and our State constitution. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that this case, as one of first impression in this state, provides this court the opportunity to hold that the standard as articulated in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), should extend to two-way video conferencing technology. As such we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a case-specific and witness-specific determination of whether the denial of the Defendant’s right to confront witnesses is necessary to further an important public interest.

The Defendant, Jason Doty, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury in count one for aggravated child abuse and in count two for “aggravated child neglect or endangerment” based on injuries that occurred to his three-month-old son. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser offense of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, in count one and the indicted offense of “aggravated child neglect or endangerment,” a Class A felony, in count two. After merging the reckless aggravated assault conviction into the aggravated child neglect or endangerment conviction, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years at 85 percent in the Department of Correction. The Defendant raises the following five issues on appeal: (1) Whether the trial court issued incomplete and misleading jury instructions that violated his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict; (2) Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction; (3) Whether the trial court erred by not allowing the Defendant to cross-examine the State’s child abuse medical expert about a prior dependency and neglect case involving the victim in which a juvenile court magistrate had found the expert’s opinion less credible than the opinion of the opposing expert witness; (4) Whether the jury’s verdicts finding the Defendant guilty of both reckless aggravated assault and aggravated child neglect are mutually exclusive; and (5) Whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we conclude that the conviction in count two must be reversed and remanded for a new trial because the Defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict was violated. The Defendant’s conviction for reckless aggravated assault is affirmed.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother and stepfather petitioned the trial court to terminate father’s parental rights as to mother’s and father’s minor child on the ground that he had willfully abandoned the child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A). Additionally, mother and stepfather petitioned that stepfather be allowed to adopt the child. While it was undisputed that father had abandoned the child, based on his failure to support or visit the child, the trial court found that father had attempted to establish a child support obligation against himself and that he had made numerous, yet unsuccessful, attempts to contact mother in order to visit the child following his release from prison. Accordingly, the trial court found that father’s abandonment was not willful and denied the termination petition. We affirm.

Appellant sought a prescriptive easement over an existing road across Appellees’ property. The trial court granted Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2) motion for involuntary dismissal at the close of Appellant’s proof and held that Appellant’s occasional use of the road to access his property for hunting purposes did not satisfy his burden of proof to establish an easement by prescription. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves retrospective insurance premiums for an assigned risk workers’ compensation insurance policy. The insured employer is a roofing contractor. The insurance company conducted a retrospective premium audit and determined that the roofing contractor owed retrospective premiums based on the fact that its primary subcontractor was uninsured during a portion of the policy period. The roofing contractor refused to pay the increased premium, so the insurance company canceled the insurance policy. The roofing contractor filed this lawsuit against the insurance company, alleging negligence, promissory estoppel, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The insurance company filed a counterclaim for the unpaid balance owed for the premiums under the policy. The insurance company filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims asserted by the roofing contractor and on its own counterclaim. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, dismissed the claims asserted by the roofing company, and entered judgment in favor of the insurance company and against the roofing contractor for $66,212 plus prejudgment interest. However, the trial court denied the insurance company’s subsequent motion to enforce the judgment against the two individuals who operated the roofing company and served as the sole officers and shareholders of the corporation. Both parties raise issues on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the chancery court in part, we reverse in part, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Grants & Denials List

July 13, 2020 - July 17, 2020

Defendant, Buford Cornell Williams, was convicted of selling .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. This court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. Buford Williams, No. M2017-00507-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 6028876, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 12, 2018). Defendant subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a timely motion for new trial. The post-conviction court granted relief for the purpose of filing a motion for new trial which would permit an appeal if the motion was denied. Defendant filed a motion for new trial which was denied by the trial court. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss based on the State’s failure to preserve evidence or exclude evidence from the trial. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Dijana Kilic is a national of Bosnia and Herzegovina and was a lawful permanent resident of the United States. A Michigan court sentenced Kilic to five to twenty years of imprisonment for conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, that made her deportable. See 8 U.S.C. §§1101(a)(43)(G), (U), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Kilic sought removal relief but an immigration judge denied it. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company appeals the district court’s ruling certifying a class of Kentucky homeowners who allege that State Farm improperly withheld labor depreciation from payments due to them under their insurance policies. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class, we AFFIRM the class certification order and REMAND for further proceedings.