Steve M. Jarman (“defendant”) was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for the death of his girlfriend, Shelly Heath (“victim”). At trial, the State was permitted to introduce evidence that the defendant allegedly assaulted the victim two years prior to her death, an act for which he was tried and acquitted. The defendant appealed his conviction, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed based, in part, on the acquitted-act evidence being used at trial. We accepted the State’s appeal to consider two issues: (1) whether the rule announced in State v. Holman, 611 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. 1981), which prohibits the use of acquitted-act evidence against a defendant at a subsequent trial, should be overruled, and (2) if so, whether the trial court properly admitted the acquitted-act evidence as a prior bad act under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). After a thorough review of the case law in this area and the record before us on appeal, we expressly overrule our decision in Holman to the extent that it prohibits the use of acquitted-act evidence against a defendant in a subsequent trial under all circumstances. Additionally, we hold that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to admit the acquitted-act evidence, pursuant to Rule 404(b), under the theory that it was relevant to show the defendant’s intent. We also hold that additional errors in admitting threats made by the defendant against the victim or the victim’s sister, not at issue in this appeal, were harmless. For reasons stated herein, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision and reinstate the defendant’s conviction.

Grants & Denials List

June 29, 2020 - July 2, 2020

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Karen Kenney asserts claims under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. Those claims turn on her allegation that her former employer, Aspen Technologies, Inc., terminated her employment in retaliation for her complaints regarding Aspen’s alleged discriminatory hiring practices. The district court granted summary judgment to Aspen, finding that Kenney failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. We AFFIRM.

Petitioner, Quinton A. Cage, appeals the denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief in which he argues that he was deprived of a fair trial. Because we determine that Petitioner has failed to file a timely notice of appeal or provide a reason as to why the timely filing of the notice of appeal should be waived, the appeal is dismissed.

The petitioner, Miguel Saenz, appeals the dismissal of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition as time-barred. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, Dwight Michael Alston, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. The Petitioner maintains that trial counsel was ineffective for advising him not to testify and for failing to investigate and raise issues regarding the competence of the Petitioner’s son. Additionally, the Petitioner asserts that the post- conviction court erred in finding that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise issues on appeal that were included in the motion for new trial. The Petitioner also argues that the post-conviction court erred in not allowing a continuance or bifurcated hearing so that appellate counsel could be present to testify. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

August Hedrick suffered injuries to his back and shoulder in the course of his employment with Penske Truck Leasing Corporation (“Employer”). The trial court found that Mr. Hedrick is permanently and totally disabled as a result of these injuries. Employer concedes that Mr. Hedrick suffered work-related injuries but argues that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s judgment as to permanent and total disability. The appeal has been referred to this Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. After reviewing the evidence, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. In 2003, 15-year-old Juan Ramon Valadez Bonilla came to the United States illegally. When Valadez did not appear at his removal hearing, an immigration judge ordered him removed in his absence. In 2019, after the government charged him with illegal reentry, Valadez sought to rescind his earlier removal order on the ground that he had not received notice of his hearing. The Board of Immigration Appeals found that Valadez failed to prove the lack of notice, relying on his long delay in seeking to rescind the removal order after he learned of it. Because the Board did not abuse its discretion in reaching this conclusion, we must deny Valadez’s petition for review.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Fletcher Darnell Small, a Michigan prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. In his complaint, Small alleges that, without provocation, Officer Brock brandished a knife, threatened to kill Small, and motioned in a manner suggesting how Brock would use the knife to kill Small. This occurred on several occasions, causing Small to seek “treatment and counseling” for “paranoia, mental distress, [and] psychological stress.” DE 1, Compl., PageID 3.

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order dismissing Small’s complaint and remand for further proceedings.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Petitioner-Appellant Andrea Byers1 appeals the district court’s order enforcing multiple IRS third-party summonses seeking her records and dismissing her petitions to quash these summonses. An IRS agent, seeking Byers’s records in furtherance of an investigation into whether she is liable for internal revenue violations, served the summonses on four financial institutions. When Byers moved to quash these summonses, the government moved to dismiss Byers’s petitions and to enforce the summonses, and the district court ruled in the government’s favor in an oral decision. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.