A jury convicted the Petitioner, Eric L. Parker, of aggravated domestic assault by reckless conduct, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender, to four years of incarceration. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. State v. Eric L. Parker, No. E2013-02339-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 5483015, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 29, 2014), no perm. app. filed. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Appellant, Kimberly Miller, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder. The convictions were merged, and she was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying her convictions. Specifically, the Appellant contends that the evidence “does not show that it was [the Appellant’s] conscious desire to kill the victim in this case, nor that she acted in concert with the shooter, or that she was an active participant in the shooting.” Therefore, she could not be found criminally responsible for the first degree premeditated murder of the victim. The Appellant also contends that “the evidence unquestionably established that [the Appellant] did not share the intent of [the victim’s] assailants nor did she actively participate in any facet of the armed robbery and subsequent shooting”; therefore, she cannot be held criminally responsible for the felony murder of the victim. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant-Appellant, Octavious Wright, for the rape of A.B.,1 a person more than three years of age but less than thirteen years of age (Count 1); the aggravated sexual battery of A.B., a person less than thirteen years old (Count 2); the rape of A.G., a person more than three years of age but less than thirteen years of age (Count 3); and the aggravated sexual battery of A.G., a person less than thirteen years of age (Count 4). Prior to trial, the charges pertaining to the two victims, A.B. and A.G., were severed, and the trial proceeded as to Counts 1 and 2.2 After the proof was presented at trial, the trial court3 instructed the jury that the offense of aggravated sexual battery charged in Count 2 was a lesser included offense of rape of a child charged in Count 1, and a nolle prosequi was entered as to Count 2. At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Wright as charged in Count 1, and the trial court subsequently imposed a thirty-five-year sentence. On appeal, Wright argues: (1) the trial court erred in excluding from evidence a Tennessee Child Protective Services investigative report on the grounds that the report was inadmissible hearsay, not relevant, and speculative; and (2) the exclusion of this investigative report violated his due process right to present a defense. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jamar Scott, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that he has newly discovered evidence of innocence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the error coram nobis court denying the petition.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jorge Pena, was convicted of three counts of rape of a child and three counts of aggravated sexual battery, for which he received an effective sentence of forty years imprisonment. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in qualifying a local police officer as an expert in Spanish language translation and admitting his translation of pretextual phone calls between the Defendant and the victim’s mother at trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tony Levon Johnson, Jr., was convicted by a Madison County jury of burglary of a vehicle, a Class E felony, and theft of property under $1,000, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to an effective term of two years, with 240 days of “shock incarceration” in the Madison County Jail before release to Community Corrections. On appeal, the Defendant argues, and the State agrees, that the trial court erred in ordering a sentence of continuous confinement before release to Community Corrections. Because the Defendant’s sentence of continuous confinement is prohibited by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-122, we reverse the sentence of incarceration, modify the sentence to Community Corrections, and remand to the trial court for entry of judgments in accordance with this opinion.

This case involves a violation of an ex parte order of protection. The order required the respondent to refrain from contacting the petitioner in any way, including electronic communication. The trial court found the respondent in criminal contempt for violating the order by contacting Petitioner over “amateur radio” on three separate occasions. Respondent appealed, asserting the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case and that he did not receive sufficient notice of the criminal contempt charges. We affirm the trial court and remand.

Question

Considering marijuana is federally classified as a Schedule I controlled substance, would state-licensed pharmacists face any adverse legal consequences if they provided counsel and guidance to patients regarding the medical use of cannabis as contemplated by the proposed Tennessee Clinical Cannabis Authorization and Research Act?

Opinion 

The Cannabis Act would immunize pharmacists acting in good faith from adverse administrative actions and civil liability under state law. And, although the Cannabis Act does not immunize pharmacists from state criminal liability and does not—and could not—immunize pharmacists from adverse administrative and criminal consequences under federal law, pharmacists acting in good faith pursuant to the state medical cannabis program are highly unlikely to face criminal prosecution or adverse administrative action by federal officials.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Petitioners, four inmates housed in the low-security Elkton Federal Correctional Institution and its satellite facility FSL Elkton (collectively “Elkton”), on behalf of themselves and others housed or to be housed there, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to obtain release from custody to limit their exposure to the COVID-19 virus. They sought to represent all current and future inmates, including a subclass of inmates who—through age and/or certain medical conditions—were particularly vulnerable to complications, including death, if they contracted COVID-19. The district court entered a preliminary injunction on April 22, 2020, directing Respondents Mark Williams, Elkton’s warden, and Michael Carvajal, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) (together “BOP”), to (1) evaluate each subclass member’s eligibility for transfer out of Elkton by any means, including compassionate release, parole or community supervision, transfer furlough, or non-transfer furlough within two weeks; (2) transfer those deemed ineligible for compassionate release to another BOP facility where testing is available and physical distancing is possible; and (3) not allow those transferred to return to Elkton until certain conditions were met.

We hold that jurisdiction was proper under § 2241, although § 2241 does not permit some of the relief petitioners seek. However, because the district court erred in concluding that petitioners have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their Eighth Amendment claim, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. We thus vacate the injunction.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Keli Dunnican appeals a judgment of conviction for the charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (Count I); possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D) (Count II); and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count III). Dunnican argues that the district court plainly erred in allowing the government to introduce under Federal Rule of Evidence 902(14) certain data extracted from his cellular telephone. He also contends that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the government to introduce under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) certain text messages from his cellular telephone, allowing Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Special Agent Shaun Moses to offer expert opinion testimony that the marijuana found in Dunnican’s car appeared to be packaged for distribution, denying Dunnican’s motion for judgment of acquittal, denying his motion for a new trial following the dismissal of a jury member, and imposing a 21-month upward variance on Dunnican’s sentence.

Because we find no error in the district court’s rejection of Dunnican’s Rule 902(14) argument, and we determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings related to his other arguments, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment in full.