This is a healthcare liability action resulting from injuries sustained by a guidewire left in the plaintiff’s neck following a procedure. The defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with notice requirements in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29- 26-121(a)(2)(E). The trial court dismissed the action without prejudice, and the plaintiff appealed. We affirm.

The Defendant, Carlos Williamson, pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and evading arrest and agreed to allow the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence. The trial court subsequently ordered the Defendant to serve concurrent twelve-year, three-year, and four-year sentences, respectively, in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it applied two enhancement factors to his sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In 2009, a Blount County jury convicted the Petitioner, Anthony Todd Ghormley, of two counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of especially aggravated burglary, and three counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of 105 years. See State v. Anthony Todd Ghormley, No. E2010-00634-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 171940, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 20, 2012), no perm. app. filed. On March 13, 2019, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his indictment was void because it failed to include the requisite level of mens rea for the charged offenses and that the affidavit of complaint had been improperly amended. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains his claims and argues that the trial court improperly dismissed his petition. After review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. This is a case about the Flint Water Crisis. From 2014 to 2015, City of Flint and Michigan State officials caused, sustained, and covered up the poisoning of an entire community with lead- and legionella-contaminated water. The crisis started in April 2014 when the City began delivering Flint River water to its predominantly poor and African-American residents, knowing that it was not treated for corrosion. In a matter of weeks, Flint residents reported that there was something wrong with the way the water looked, tasted, and smelled, and that it was causing rashes. In response, the City treated the water with additional chlorine—exacerbating the corrosion in the old water lines. The corrosion contaminated the water with hazardous levels of lead and caused an outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease. State and City officials failed to stop the delivery of Flint River water and obstinately assured the public that the water was safe, when they knew it was not. Now, Flint residents can expect to see their children permanently developmentally stunted. It has been six years since the start of the crisis and corroded pipes still infect the water and poison the people of Flint. The question before us is whether these Defendants-Appellants allegedly responsible for the crisis are immune from suit.

We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the motions to dismiss with respect to every Defendant-Appellant except Treasurer Dillon. We REMAND for the district court to decide whether Dillon should be dismissed in light of its decision in Brown v. Snyder (In re Flint Water Cases), No. 18-cv-10726, 2020 WL 1503256, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2020).

The Petitioner, Luis Jorge Diaz, was convicted of six counts of aggravated sexual battery and subsequently sentenced to twenty years in confinement. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-504. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, the Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, that trial counsel was ineffective because of his failure to communicate multiple plea offers from the State to the Petitioner. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner filed a timely appeal. Following our review, we affirm.

Following surgery to remove a cancerous kidney, part of a gelport device was left inside the patient. The patient and her husband brought this health care liability action against multiple defendants, including the surgeon who removed the kidney and the radiologist who initially failed to detect the foreign object. The defendants admitted fault, so the trial focused solely on causation and damages. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded $4 million in noneconomic damages to the patient for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life and $500,000 in noneconomic damages to her husband for loss of consortium. The trial court initially applied the statutory cap on noneconomic damages to the total damages award and entered a judgment of $750,000 in favor of both plaintiffs. In response to the plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend, the trial court issued a revised judgment of $750,000 in favor of the patient and $500,000 in favor of the husband. But the court refused to address the plaintiffs’ arguments premised on the constitutionality of the statutory cap, ruling that the issue had been waived. The court also denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial or for a remittitur. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred in refusing to consider the plaintiffs’ constitutional issue. But because we also conclude that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages is constitutional and was applied properly and that the defendant is not entitled to a new trial or a remittitur, we affirm.

In this appeal from a final decree of divorce, the husband contends the trial court abused its discretion in awarding spousal support. He challenges the type, amount, and duration of the alimony awarded. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

The Defendant, Buddy Wayne Mooney, was convicted by a Henderson County Circuit Court jury of possession with intent to sell 0.5 gram or more of methamphetamine, a Class B felony; possession with intent to deliver 0.5 gram or more of methamphetamine, a Class B felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and unlawful possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a) (2018) (subsequently amended) (possession of methamphetamine), 39-17-1324 (2018) (subsequently amended) (possession of a firearm), 39-17-425 (2018) (possession of drug paraphernalia). The trial court merged the two possession of methamphetamine convictions and imposed a ten- year probationary sentence, and it imposed sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days in jail for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction and three years in the Department of Correction for the weapon possession conviction. The court ordered the sentence for possession of methamphetamine to be served consecutively to the sentence for possession of drug paraphernalia. The court imposed the sentence for firearm possession consecutively to the sentence for methamphetamine possession but concurrently to the sentence for possession of drug paraphernalia. The effective sentence was thirteen years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his felony convictions and (2) that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that the gun found inside the Defendant’s car had been stolen. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A preschool teacher terminated from her employment at a church preschool brought multiple claims against the church, the school, the director of the school, and a church committee. After the teacher presented her evidence to a jury, the court granted motions for a directed verdict as to all defendants except the church and on all claims except common law retaliatory discharge and promissory estoppel. The teacher claimed that the director terminated her employment in retaliation for her complaints about safety issues at the school and that she relied on a promise by the chair of a church committee that a probation report would be removed from her personnel file. The jury found in favor of the church on both counts, and the trial court entered judgment in favor of the church. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

Homeowners sued their builder, asserting claims for violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977 (“TCPA”), among others. The builder counterclaimed for attorney’s fees, contending that the TCPA claims were frivolous, without legal or factual merit, or brought for the purpose of harassment. The trial court denied the builder’s motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and the builder moved to amend its counterclaim to add a claim for attorney’s fees based on the parties’ purchase and sale agreement. The homeowners nonsuited their claims against the builder before the trial court heard oral argument on the motion to amend, and the trial court subsequently denied the builder’s motion to amend. The homeowners then moved to dismiss the builder’s counterclaim, and the trial court granted the motion. The builder appeals the trial court’s denial of its motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, the denial of its motion to alter or amend, and the dismissal of its counterclaim. We dismiss the appeal of the denial of the builder’s motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and we affirm the trial court’s denial of the builder’s motion to amend and its dismissal of the builder’s counterclaim for attorney’s fees.