This is a case involving the breach of an oral contract to provide excavation work and materials for an airport construction project in Bolivar, Tennessee. The trial court awarded $128,058.09 in favor of the subcontractor against the project’s general contractor. On appeal, the general contractor argued that the oral contract existing between the parties included the subcontractor sharing in certain surveying and testing costs incurred on its scope of work on the project, that it was entitled to a credit for these costs, and that, ultimately, the trial court miscalculated its award of damages. We affirm the trial court’s finding that there was no agreement existing between the parties for the subcontractor to incur any surveying or testing costs and that, as a result, the general contractor was not entitled to a credit for these expenses against the balance of the moneys it owed the subcontractor. However, because the order contains insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as to why the trial court included an additional $5,593.40 in the final judgment beyond the damages sought in the complaint, we vacate that portion of the final judgment and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to reduce the judgment against the general contractor from $128,058.09 to $122,464.69.

The defendant, Michael Wayman, pleaded guilty to sale of a Schedule II controlled substance (Count 1) and delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance (Count 2). The trial court merged the two counts and imposed a sentence of nine years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erroneously denied his request for alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgements of the trial court.

The defendant, Wayne Keith Wallen, appeals the denial of his Rule 36.1 motion. Though conceding the challenged sentence has expired, the defendant, relying on Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251 (Tenn. 2007), argues the trial court erred in dismissing his petition. The trial court, relying on State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200 (Tenn. 2015), found that the defendant’s sentence had expired and that the defendant’s claim required relitigating the case in order to determine whether the sentence was illegal which is not proper under Rule 36.1. Thus, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion. Upon our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Gerald Sluder, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the parties agreed to a five-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve one year in confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of split confinement. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1999, a jury convicted the Petitioner, Rudolph Munn, of killing his college roommate, Andrew Poklemba. State v. Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Tenn. 2001). This court affirmed his conviction of first-degree premeditated murder, see State v. Rudolph Munn, No. 01C01-9801-CCA-00007, 1999 WL 177341, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 1999); however, a dissenting judge would have remanded the matter for a new sentencing hearing. Id. (Tipton, dissenting). The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed that a new sentencing hearing was necessary and held, inter alia, that the Petitioner had a lawful expectation of privacy, and thus, police secret videotaping of the Petitioner’s communications with his parents constituted an illegal seizure under the federal and state constitutions, as well as under the federal and state wiretapping statutes. Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486. Upon remand in 2002, the Petitioner received a sentence of life without parole.1 Sixteen years later, on November 13, 2018, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that one of his trial counsel was “slightly biased” based upon his “unequivocal ties” to the university attended by the Petitioner and the victim at the time of the offense. The Petitioner further alleged that he was entitled to due process tolling of the statute of limitations because he became aware of these ties on or about November 17, 2017. Two days after the petition was filed, it was summarily dismissed by the coram nobis court as untimely and unsupported by due process considerations to toll the statute of limitations. The Petitioner now appeals, and upon our review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Bruce D. Mendenhall, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and abuse of a corpse, for which he received sentences of life and two years, respectively. His sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to one another, as well as to two prior consecutive sentences from Davidson County of life imprisonment for murder and thirty years for three counts of solicitation to commit murder. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the following: (1) the trial court’s reliance on the doctrine of collateral estoppel to deny his various motions to suppress certain evidence, wherein he raised threshold constitutional issues; (2) the trial court’s denial of his motion to exclude 404(b) evidence and the failure to redact his police statement accordingly; (3) the trial court’s denial of his motion to continue based upon the State’s late disclosure of surveillance footage from the truck stop; (4) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions; and (5) the imposition of consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Jay Aaron Jackson, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of one count of coercion of a witness, two counts of domestic assault, and one count of domestic assault by extremely offensive or provocative physical contact. The trial court sentenced Defendant, as a Range II multiple offender, to an effective sentence of seven years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and Brady v. Maryland; (2) the trial court erred by permitting the State to elicit impermissible and prejudicial evidence in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions for coercion of a witness and one count of domestic assault; (4) the trial court erred in sentencing Defendant as a Range II multiple offender; and (5) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight. Following a thorough review, we affirm the convictions for coercion of a witness (Count 1), domestic assault (Count 3), and domestic assault by extremely offensive or provocative physical contact (Count 4) and reverse the conviction for domestic assault (Count 2). Because the sentence in Count 2 was ordered to be served concurrently with Count 1, we affirm the effective sentence of seven years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days’ incarceration.

The petitioner, William E. Eakes, III, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis by the Davidson County Criminal Court, arguing the trial court erred in dismissing the petition because newly discovered evidence exists in his case. After our review, we conclude the petition is untimely and does not present a cognizable claim for coram nobis relief. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Glen Allen Donaldson, appeals his Hamilton County Criminal Court jury conviction of second degree murder, arguing that the trial court erred by excluding certain evidence, admitting into evidence a life photograph of the victim, and denying the defendant’s requested jury instructions on self-defense and provocation; that he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of trial errors; that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and that his sentence was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm.

SUTTON, Circuit Judge. Police officers meant to arrest Roderick Siner, who goes by the alias Marvin Seals. They arrested Marvin Seales instead. Fifteen days later, the State realized the mistake and released Seales. Seales sued Thomas Zberkot (the police officer who arrested him), the City of Detroit (which held him for the first two days), and Wayne County (which held him in jail for about thirteen days after that). By the time of trial, only Officer Zberkot remained in the case, and the jury awarded Seales $3.5 million for wrongful detention under federal and state law. Because Officer Zberkot handled the case for fewer than three hours and because our prior decision in this case held as a matter of law that there was probable cause to arrest Seales given the similarities between him and Seals, we must reverse.