SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge. In Gray v. City of Detroit, we observed that “[s]uicide is a difficult event to predict and prevent and often occurs without warning.” 399 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2005). That is the sad reality in this case. Angela White overdosed on blood pressure medication while a pretrial detainee at Defendant-Appellee Wayne County’s Jail (“County” or “Jail”) and died. White had been permitted to keep 45 pills on her person pursuant to Wayne County Jail’s “Keep on Person” (“KOP”) program, which allows inmates to keep with them certain drugs for self-administration. In this § 1983 action White’s former fiancé, Jacob Andrews, alleges that the Jail’s KOP policy and inmate intake policy violate the constitutional rights of inmates and pretrial detainees like White who are emotionally unstable and potentially suicidal. The district court granted summary judgment to the County, holding that the facts did not establish municipal liability or deliberate indifference toward White. This appeal follows.

For these reasons, as well as those articulated in its detailed opinion, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

The Defendant, Kavaris Lequan Kelso, was indicted on one count each of aggravated burglary, premeditated first degree murder, and first degree felony murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202, -14-403. The Defendant was convicted as charged after a jury trial, and the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life plus six years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury on duress. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Quandavier Hicks (“Quandavier”) died from a single bullet to the chest after Cincinnati police officers Doris Scott, Justin Moore, and Benjamin Schneider entered his apartment through an unlocked door. Ruby Hicks (“Hicks”), administrator of Quandavier’s estate, filed suit in the Southern District of Ohio, naming Scott, Moore, Schneider, and the City of Cincinnati as defendants. She asserted federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful entry, excessive force, and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, as well as state-law claims for wrongful death and battery. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants based on federal qualified immunity and immunity under Ohio law. Hicks appeals those decisions. We find that the district court erred by granting qualified immunity to Scott, Moore, and Schneider on the unlawful entry claim. Accordingly, we reverse as to that claim, affirm as to the excessive force, deliberate indifference, and state-law battery claims, and remand for the district court to evaluate the municipal liability and wrongful death claims consistent with this opinion.

The Appellant, Anton Carlton, is appealing the trial court’s summary dismissal of his third post-conviction petition. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

On April 21, 2016, the Defendant, Christopher Caldwell, was convicted of three felony offenses in Davidson County and sentenced to fifteen years in Community Corrections. On October 20, 2016, he was convicted in Sumner County of two felony offenses and sentenced to twelve years in Community Corrections, consecutive to the Davidson County sentences. The Defendant violated the terms of his Davidson County sentence and was ordered to serve one year and then return to Community Corrections. More than eight months later, after learning that the Defendant had also violated the terms of his Sumner County sentence and had been ordered to serve that sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction, the Davidson County trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his Davidson County sentences in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Because the Davidson County trial court’s original disposition of the Community Corrections violation was final, and no additional warrant alleging a new violation of Community Corrections had been filed, the Davidson County trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the service of the Davidson County sentences in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The State concedes this point. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the Davidson County trial court’s June 21, 2019 order requiring service of the Defendant’s Davidson County sentences in the Tennessee Department of Correction.

This appeal concerns healthcare liability. A husband and wife filed an action against six medical care providers alleging negligence in the medical treatment of the wife. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit on the basis of noncompliance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), which requires that pre-suit notice include a HIPAA1 compliant medical authorization allowing a healthcare provider receiving a notice to obtain complete medical records from every other provider that is sent a notice. The plaintiffs’ authorization allowed each provider to disclose complete medical records to each named provider but did not state specifically that each provider could obtain records from each other. The trial court held that the authorization failed to substantially comply with the statute’s requirements. The plaintiffs appealed. We hold that Plaintiffs’ method of permitting Defendants access to Mrs. Combs’s medical records substantially complied with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)E). We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

A person who is injured because of an unfair or deceptive act or practice that affects the conduct of any trade or commerce has a cause of action under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977 (“the Act”), Tennessee Code Annotated sections 47- 18-101 to -132 (2013 & Supp. 2019). We granted review to determine whether the Act applies to the business aspects of a health care provider’s practice. The plaintiffs were injured in car accidents and received hospital medical services. The hospitals did not bill the plaintiffs’ health insurance companies but filed hospital liens against the plaintiffs’ claims for damages arising from the accidents. The hospital liens were for the full amount of the hospital bills with no reduction for the plaintiffs’ health insurance benefits. The plaintiffs sued the hospitals, asserting the filing of undiscounted hospital liens was an unlawful practice under the Act. The trial court dismissed the case, ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Act did not apply to a claim in which the underlying transactions involved medical treatment. We hold that the Act applies to health care providers when they are acting in their business capacities. The plaintiffs, who were consumers of medical services, may state a claim under the Act against the hospitals for conduct arising out of the hospitals’ business practices. We reverse and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

A jury convicted the Appellant, Jawara Jones, of possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, driving on a revoked license, and tampering with evidence. He received a total effective sentence of fifteen years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, he contends (1) that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce proof of a prior unindicted sale of cocaine, (2) that the trial court erred by allowing a police officer to testify as an expert witness, and (3) that the trial court erred in sentencing the Appellant. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jemel Johnson, was convicted by a Sumner County Criminal Court jury of two counts of attempted sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class D felony, two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and assault by extremely offensive or provocative conduct, a Class B misdemeanor, for acts involving two foster children. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (2018) (attempt); -13-101(A)(3) (2010) (subsequently amended) (assault); -13-502 (2018) (aggravated rape); -13-527 (2018) (attempted sexual battery by an authority figure). He received a sentence of twenty-five years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court violated his constitutional right to due process by failing to produce a trial transcript sufficient to provide appellate review; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated rape; (3) the trial court erred by admitting the victims’ hearsay statements; (4) the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examination the Defendant’s wife about her blaming the victims; (5) the trial court erred by not allowing the victims’ school principal to testify about specific instances of conduct by one of the victims; (6) the trial court erred by questioning the Defendant’s wife in an argumentative manner, resulting in prejudice to the Defendant; and (7) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on sexual battery by an authority figure as a lesser included offense of aggravated rape. We affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for entry of corrected judgments in Counts One and Two.

This pro se appellant appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his lawsuit. We affirm.