Dennis Freeny, Defendant, claims that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his sentences in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court.

In 2013, a Henderson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Charlie Clark, of rape. The Petitioner was sentenced to serve twenty-five years as a Range III, persistent offender in the Tennessee Department of Correction. See State v. Charles Anderson Clark, Jr., No. 2014-00445-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7204525, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Dec. 17, 2014) no perm. app. filed. In November 2018, the Petitioner filed, pro se, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was improperly sentenced as a Range III offender without proper notice in contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40- 35-202(a). The habeas corpus court denied the petition because the Petitioner’s claim, even if true, would make the judgment voidable and not void. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he was not provided with proper notice of the State’s intent to seek enhanced punishment before sentencing. After review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce entered on November 4, 2019, and an order denying a motion for a new trial entered on January 17, 2020. Because the husband did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order denying the motion for a new trial, we dismiss the appeal.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellants, mother and father, appeal the trial court’s termination of their parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment; (2) failure to substantially comply with the requirements of the parenting plans; (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal from their custody; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Question

Because of the COVID-19 health crisis, the Governor has exercised his authority to declare a state of emergency in Tennessee and to issue a series of executive orders governing the State’s emergencyresponsetotheCOVID-19pandemic. Dotheseexecutiveordersserveastheexclusive regulation of the State’s emergency management in response to the pandemic, and to what extent, if any, may local governmental entities take actions or issue orders that conflict with the Governor’s executive orders?

Opinion

The General Assembly has vested the Governor with exclusive responsibility and authority to assume control over all aspects of the State’s response to an emergency such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Tenn.CodeAnn.§58-2-107(a)(1). BecausetheexecutiveordersthattheGovernor issues pursuant to that authority have the force and effect of law, Tenn. Code Ann. § 58-2- 107(a)(2), the Governor’s directives in response to an emergency supersede and preempt any action taken by political subdivisions of the State.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. This case arises at the intersection of two essential constitutional rights: the right of a woman to control her pregnancy, on the one hand, and the right of the state to exercise its “police power” during an emergency, on the other. More specifically, we ask, does the Constitution permit a state to bar doctors from performing abortion procedures for a three-week period—as part of a widespread temporary ban on “elective” and “non-urgent” surgeries—based solely on the state’s assertion that such a bar is necessary to combat effectively an ongoing public health crisis? The Governor of Tennessee thought so, and accordingly adopted such a temporary ban on April 8, 2020, in response to the ongoing COVID- 19 global pandemic. The district court, however, disagreed, and accordingly issued a preliminary injunction on April 17, enjoining Tennessee from enforcing its general ban on elective and non- urgent surgeries against doctors performing abortion procedures. The State then filed this emergency appeal, and also requested that we immediately stay the district court’s injunction pending review.

We do not uphold an injunction against state action lightly, much less during a public health crisis like the one our nation is experiencing now. It is imperative in such circumstances that judges give legislatures and executives—the more responsive branches of government—the flexibility they need to respond quickly and forthrightly to threats to the general welfare, even if that flexibility sometimes comes at the cost of individual liberties. Affording flexibility, however, is not the same as abdicating responsibility, especially when well-established constitutional rights are at stake, as the right to an abortion most assuredly is. And, here, although we have great respect for the challenges Tennessee faces as it responds to this novel public health crisis, we agree with the district court that the State’s response, in this one respect, unduly curtailed constitutional liberty, and that judicial intervention was thus warranted. By the same token, however, we also conclude that, when it comes to the precise scope of the district court’s injunction, the district court went too far in asserting its authority. Consequently, we AFFIRM the district court’s order issuing a preliminary injunction but direct the district court to MODIFY the preliminary injunction in the manner described below. We also DENY the State’s request for a stay pending appeal as MOOT.

Alfred Whitehead, Petitioner, appeals from the post-conviction court’s order denying relief. On appeal, Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of trial counsel’s failure to object to “inflammatory and prejudicial statements” made by the State during opening statement and closing argument. We agree that the statements were improper and that trial counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to object, but we hold that Petitioner failed to “show that there [wa]s a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Keith Harris Pearson, Defendant, admitted to violating the terms of his probation, and the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). On appeal, Defendant claims that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court.

As a result of firing upon several law enforcement officers and actually killing one officer, the defendant, Treveno Campbell, was indicted for one count of first-degree murder (Count 1), five counts of attempted first-degree murder (Counts 2, 4, 6, 8, 10), six counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (Counts 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12), possession of marijuana with intent to sell (Count 13), and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver (Count 14). After a trial, a jury convicted the defendant of second degree murder (Count 1), two counts of attempted second degree murder (Counts 2 and 10), two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (Counts 3 and 11), one count of possession of a firearm with intent to go armed (Count 12), possession of marijuana with intent to sell (Count 13), and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver (Count 14). Counts 5, 7, and 9 were dismissed. As a result of his convictions, the defendant received an effective sentence of forty years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant raises numerous issues, including the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine; the trial court erred in allowing Officer Goodwin to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights; the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on the State and a two witnesses referencing gang activity; the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the defense of self-defense; the trial court erred in denying his request for an instruction on mistake of fact; the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict; the trial court erred in sentencing him; and cumulative error. After a review of the record and the briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentences.

Petitioner, John Brent, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment for his convictions. Defendant’s convictions and sentences were affirmed by this court on direct appeal. State v. John Brent, No. W2013-01252-CCA-R3- CD, 2014 WL 5342610, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2015). Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. Following evidentiary hearings, the post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.