A Lauderdale County jury convicted the defendant, Darius Markee Alston, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, and asserts the trial court erred by: allowing testimony of his co-defendant’s nickname, allowing improper opinion testimony, denying his motion for a mistrial, and not severing his trial from his co-defendant’s trial. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a nuisance case. Appellant alleges that Appellee created a nuisance when he caused: (1) debris and gravel to drain onto her land; and (2) a foul sewage odor to permeate her land. The trial court dismissed her claim. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is the second appeal of this case involving a dispute between two limited liability companies (and an individual with interest in both companies). In the first appeal, this Court remanded the case for the trial court to consider and make appropriate findings concerning the applicability of the doctrines of unjust enrichment and unclean hands. On remand, the trial court held that Appellee had met its burden to show that Appellant would be unjustly enriched if it were allowed to retain Appellee’s construction costs in addition to the stipulated value of the lots, and the profits from the sales of the homes constructed on those lots. The trial court further held that Appellee was not barred from recovery under the doctrine of unclean hands. The trial court also awarded Appellant a portion of its claimed attorney’s fees and costs. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is the second appeal of this case involving a local zoning board’s denial of Appellants’ permit to replace a static billboard with an LED digital billboard. The zoning board denied Appellants’ initial application for a permit, and the chancery court affirmed. In the first appeal, this Court vacated the chancery court’s order on its holding that the chancery court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Our holding rendered the board’s decision a final judgment. The instant appeal arises from Appellants’ second application for an LED digital billboard on its property. The board again denied the application, and Appellants appealed to the chancery court. The chancery court held, inter alia, that Appellants’ second application was barred as res judicata. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a health care liability case. Appellant brought a pro se action against two licensed counselors alleging injuries arising from the altering and concealment of counseling records of Appellant’s minor children. The trial court dismissed the complaint, under Tennessee Rule Civil Procedure 12.02, for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-121, 122. We conclude that Appellant’s claims relate to the provision of health care services and are subject to the procedural requirements in Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-101 et seq. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s complaint.

Week of April 20, 2020 - April 24, 2020

In this estate matter, the trial court determined that when calculating the value of the decedent’s net estate for purposes of determining his widow’s elective share, insurance proceeds and retirement benefits that were distributed via beneficiary designation forms and were not distributed pursuant to the decedent’s last will and testament would not be included in the net estate value pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 31-4-101(b). The widow’s estate has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 31-4-101(b) (2015) and the court’s method of calculating the widow’s elective share by declining to include any assets that passed outside probate in the value of the decedent’s net estate. We vacate, however, the trial court’s valuation of the decedent’s real property, and we remand this issue to the trial court for further determination. Once such value has been established, it should be incorporated into the trial court’s calculation of the widow’s elective share, utilizing the same methodology as was employed by the court in the original calculation. We decline to award attorney’s fees to the widow’s estate on appeal.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellant mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for failure to visit and wanton disregard; (2) failure to substantially comply with the requirements of the parenting plans; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. Discerning no error, we affirm.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. The Armed Career Criminal Act increases the sentence for felons who possess firearms from a 10-year maximum to a 15-year minimum if the defendant has three prior convictions that qualify as “violent felonies.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), (e). The Act defines “violent felony” to include “burglary.” Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Supreme Court has long used a “categorical approach” to determine whether a state burglary conviction counts as a conviction for “burglary” under the Act—an approach some Justices have come to recognize is “difficult to apply.” Quarles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872, 1881 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring); cf. United States v. Burris, 912 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (principal op.). This case shows how the difficulties answering this esoteric legal question can affect real people’s lives. In 2007 a jury convicted David Brown of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). United States v. Brown, 443 F. App’x 956, 958 (6th Cir. 2011). At that time our caselaw treated Brown’s three Tennessee aggravated-burglary convictions as violent felonies, so we upheld his 180-month sentence under the Act. Id. at 959– 60. Years later the parties agreed that changes to our caselaw showed that Brown’s burglary convictions did not, in fact, qualify as violent felonies. The district court thus granted Brown relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He was resentenced and released from prison. Since his release, however, the Supreme Court has intervened and changed our caselaw yet again. While Brown says that his convictions still do not qualify as violent felonies, we disagree. So we must reverse the district court’s decision granting Brown relief under § 2255 and remand for the court to reinstate his original sentence.

The Petitioner, Michael Waddell, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of second degree murder and the accompanying thirty-seven-year sentence, contending that the post-conviction court erred by holding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.