The employee filed a petition alleging she suffered a mental injury as a result of work- related events in which she experienced unusual traumatic stimuli while working as a forensics technician for the employer. The employer filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that, even if a mental injury occurred, the employee failed to file her claim within the applicable statute of limitations. The employee responded by asserting that the statute of limitations was tolled until May 2018, when she discovered her mental condition was causally related to her employment, or, alternatively, that her mental injury is a gradual injury to which the “last day worked” rule applies. At a hearing addressing the employer’s motion, the parties agreed that the specific incidents the employee alleged to have precipitated her mental injury occurred in 2011 or earlier, prompting the trial court to question whether it had jurisdiction over the case. However, the court declined to rule on the jurisdiction issue, focusing instead on whether a genuine issue of material fact existed that precluded summary judgment. The trial court denied the employer’s motion, concluding there was a disputed factual issue concerning when the employee knew or should have known that she suffered an injury. The employer has appealed. We vacate the trial court’s order denying the employer’s summary judgment motion and remand the case for the trial court to determine whether the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims has subject matter jurisdiction.

We granted permission to appeal in order to clarify the procedure circuit courts must follow when an original defendant in general sessions court appeals an adverse general sessions judgment to circuit court but then fails to appear for the de novo circuit court trial to prosecute his appeal. In this case, when the defendant/appellant failed to appear in circuit court to prosecute his appeal, the circuit court dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the general sessions court for execution of the general sessions judgment. We hold this was error. Under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 27-5-106 and -107, the circuit court should have instead entered its own default judgment against the defendant/appellant in the amount of the general sessions judgment, subject to execution in the circuit court, and assessed costs against the defendant/appellant and his sureties. We also hold that, after the circuit court dismissed the appeal and remanded to general sessions court, the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction under Rules 59 and 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure to grant the defendant/appellant’s timely motion to set aside its prior order. The decision to grant or deny the defendant/appellant’s post-judgment motion was within the circuit court’s discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to her child on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights to his child on the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. The trial court also found that termination of the mother’s and father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Finding clear and convincing evidence in support of the trial court’s determinations, we affirm.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Shermond Dewayne Dillard, Jr., of aggravated robbery, for which he received a ten-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court should have granted a new trial based on the admission of irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial testimony and improper closing argument by the State. The defendant also contends the trial court erred in sentencing him. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant challenged the trial court’s ruling that determined when interest began to accrue on a promissory note. Appellant argues that the trial court issued a sua sponte ruling without allowing additional evidence to be presented. Because Appellant failed to meet its burden to show reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

The Defendant, Christopher Ray Rickman, pleaded guilty to the offense of possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. As a condition of his plea, the Defendant expressly preserved a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, stemming from his denied motion to suppress. After thorough review, we conclude that the certified question does not meet the requirements of Rule 37(b)(2)(A) and State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988), and, as a result, this court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, James Snipes, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, seeking relief from his conviction of first degree felony murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that he is entitled to a second post- conviction evidentiary hearing due to post-conviction counsel’s deficient performance at the first hearing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Christopher Allen Smith, filed a Rule 35 Motion for Modification of Sentence. The trial court held a bifurcated hearing where it denied Defendant’s Rule 35 motion and revoked Defendant’s probation, ordering his two eight-year consecutive sentences into execution. Defendant now appeals the trial court’s denial of his Rule 35 Motion for Modification of Sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law and discerning no error, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Defendant, Elizabeth Lynn Schmitz, appeals her convictions by a Dickson County jury of attempted theft of property over $500 and hindering a secured creditor. The trial court sentenced Defendant to two-years for hindering a secured creditor and a concurrent term of eleven months and twenty-nine day for the misdemeanor theft, suspended to probation. On appeal, Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support either conviction when the evidence demonstrated that the subject property of both offenses was her own car. Defendant also claims the trial court gave incomplete instructions to the jury. After a full review, we conclude that Defendant is entitled to relief as to the attempted theft of property conviction because Defendant cannot be convicted of attempted theft of something she owned, and we vacate the conviction as to that count. As to the remaining count of hindering a secured creditor, we confirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jawaune Massey, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, one count of possessing twenty-six grams or more of cocaine for resale, one count of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and one count of maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used or sold and his resulting effective sentence of two consecutive life terms. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the Petitioner’s wearing a stun vest at trial. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.