The petitioner, Doyan Anderson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal requires us to determine the scope of a real estate licensee’s duty under the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosures Act codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § § 66-5-201 et seq. to advise their client to disclose conditions of improved real property. We hold that a licensee’s duty under the Act encompasses a duty to advise his or her client/seller to disclose known material defects. We affirm denial of Plaintiff/Sellers’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of breach of statutory and contractual duties. In light of the undisputed facts of this case, we find Defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the question of breach and remand for entry of a judgment consistent with this Opinion.

Mother and Father had been divorced for less than two years when Mother and her new husband petitioned to terminate Father’s parental rights. A few weeks before trial, Father was arrested, and he did not appear for the trial. In Father’s absence, the chancery court concluded that two statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence: abandonment by willful failure to visit and abandonment by willful failure to support. The court also concluded that the evidence was clear and convincing that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. As part of its analysis, the court applied the missing witness rule based on Father’s failure to testify at trial. And the court applied the doctrine of unclean hands to “repel[] [Father] at the courthouse steps from receiving any relief that he has requested in this cause.” We conclude that neither the missing witness rule nor the doctrine of unclean hands was applicable and that their application was fundamentally unfair to Father. We further conclude that the evidence of the two grounds for terminating Father’s parental rights was less than clear and convincing. So we reverse.

This appeal involves a trip and fall premises liability case filed against a supermarket by one of its customers. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant because the plaintiff’s evidence did not tend to show the defendant had either actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition that would give rise to a duty to either warn the plaintiff of the condition or remove the condition. For the following reasons, we agree that the defendant lacked actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition in its store, and affirm the trial court’s award of summary judgment.

Father appeals from the termination of his parental rights. We reverse the trial court’s finding that Father willfully failed to support the child in the four months prior to his incarceration, as well as the trial court’s decision regarding abandonment for willful failure to visit and support in the four months prior to the filing of the termination petition. We affirm the grounds of willful failure to visit in the four months prior to incarceration and failure to visit by a putative father. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.

Petitioners appeal from the transfer of their guardianship action from chancery court to juvenile court. Because Petitioners have appealed a non-final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether an amended pleading that seeks to vacate an arbitration award that was delivered to the parties more than 90 days earlier relates back to the date of the original pleading pursuant to Rule 15.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure when the original pleading only sought to modify the arbitration award. A dispute arose when an employer terminated the employment contract of its chief financial officer. The parties submitted the dispute to arbitration pursuant to the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act (“the Act”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-301 to -320. After the arbitrator issued a monetary award in favor of the corporation, the employer filed a petition to confirm the award in chancery court. Within 90 days of the delivery of a copy of the award to the employee, which is the limitation period set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-314(a) of the Act, the employee timely filed an answer to the petition in which he sought modification of the award with respect to prejudgment interest only. Otherwise, the employee admitted all material allegations in the petition. Significantly, the employee did not seek to vacate the award. After waiving any claim to prejudgment interest, the employer filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings to confirm the arbitration award in all other respects. Before the hearing on the motion, but more than 90 days after a copy of the award was delivered to the employee, the employee filed a Rule 15 motion to amend his answer to assert a counterclaim to vacate the award on grounds not previously raised. The trial court denied the employee’s Rule 15 motion to amend the answer as futile on the ground that it was not a timely application to vacate the final award and awarded the employer judgment on the pleadings. The employee appeals, contending the court erred because an amended pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading pursuant to Rule 15.03. We have determined that strict adherence to the 90-day limitation furthers the primary objectives of the Act, which is to bring the arbitration process to a speedy and final resolution. Furthermore, the limitations provided by Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-5-312 and -313(b) are more specific than the general relation- back provision of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to amend the answer as futile on the ground that the employee did not file a timely application to vacate the final award, and we affirm the entry of judgment on the pleadings in favor of the employer.

The Appellant, William J. Wagner, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to driving under the influence (DUI), third offense, and reserved a certified question of law concerning whether the State had jurisdiction to prosecute him for the offense because the offense was committed on federal property. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the certified question is not dispositive of the case. Therefore, this court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal, and the appeal is dismissed.

Grants & Denials List

April 6, 2020 - April 10, 2020

SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge. After paying union dues for twenty-four years to UAW Local 600 (“Union”), Lloyd Stoner (“Stoner”) decided in February 2018 to resign from the Union.1 The Union failed to promptly notify Stoner’s employer, Ford Motor Company (“Ford”), allegedly due to a clerical error. Ford therefore continued to deduct dues from Stoner’s paycheck for two months and remit them to the Union. This prompted Stoner to file an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board (“Board”). The Board held that the Union’s failure to promptly process Stoner’s resignation of union membership violated Section 8(b)(1)(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (the “Act”), in two ways: first, by “restraining” Stoner’s right to withdraw from the Union, and, second, by breaching the Union’s duty of “fair representation.” The Union has filed a petition for review of that decision, and the Board has filed a cross-application for enforcement.