William Langston, Petitioner, was initially indicted for voluntary manslaughter. The State obtained a superseding indictment charging Petitioner with first degree murder. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder. This court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied further review. State v. William Langston, No. W2015-02359-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1968827, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2017), perm app denied (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017). Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of his first retained counsel (“trial counsel”). Following a hearing, the post- conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel failed to convey to him a four-year settlement offer before the State obtained the superseding indictment. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, John D. Hudson, of evading arrest (motor vehicle flight) (count one), criminal impersonation (count two), driving with a revoked license (count three), a first offense seat-belt infraction (count four), and failure to obey a traffic control device (count five). Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II multiple offender to four years for evading arrest, six months for criminal impersonation, six months for driving on a revoked license, thirty days for the seat belt infraction, and thirty days for the failure to obey a traffic control device. The trial court ordered counts one, two, and three to be served consecutively, and a concurrent term of thirty days for the remaining counts, for an effective sentence of five years imprisonment. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing partial consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm.

Defendant, Barenton Barnett, was indicted by the Polk County Grand Jury for theft of property valued at $60,000 or more, a Class B felony. Defendant pleaded no contest to vandalism of more than $2,500, a Class D felony, in exchange for a sentence of three years to be suspended on probation, and Defendant was ordered to pay $8,207 in restitution. Defendant sought to withdraw his plea. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion. Defendant appeals. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A father appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights based on the grounds of (1) abandonment by willful failure to support, (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child. He further challenges the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s termination of the father’s parental rights but vacate the court’s judgment regarding two of the grounds for termination.

The owners of the dominant estate sued the owners of the servient estate of an easement to Tanner’s Bar, a piece of land near a river. The trial court ruled that the easement was an easement appurtenant for ingress and egress only and did not entitle the dominant estate owners to engage in recreational activities at Tanner’s Bar. The trial court further ruled that a member of the dominant estate family had to accompany all invitees to the easement. Having concluded that the intent of the easement was for the dominant estate owners to have the right to enjoy the river at Tanner’s Bar, we reverse the decision of the trial court prohibiting recreational use. We have further determined that the trial court erred in requiring that a dominant estate family member be present with invitees.

In this termination of parental rights case, both parents appeal the trial court’s termination of their parental rights to their son upon numerous statutory grounds and upon its finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. Upon our review, we conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court’s determinations with respect to certain grounds though not others and that termination was in the best interest of the child. Accordingly, we reverse portions of the court’s order finding that certain grounds for termination were established, affirm the remainder of the grounds and the best interest determination, and affirm the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.

A father filed a petition to modify a parenting plan in which he sought to change the primary residential parent or modify the residential schedule. The trial court denied his petition, and he appealed. We hold that the father failed to establish a material change of circumstances to justify any change to the parties’ parenting plan and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Jason Matthew Wyatt, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s order summarily denying relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 and summarily dismissing post-conviction relief. The Petitioner argues the trial court erred in (1) holding that the Criminal Savings Statute in Code section 39-11-112 did not apply to the amendments to the theft grading statute in Code section 39-14-105 and (2) dismissing his Rule 36.1 motion/post-conviction petition without appointing counsel. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Christopher May-Shaw was sentenced to 144 months in prison after he entered a conditional guilty plea to a charge of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The conviction arose from police surveillance of a parking lot near his apartment building and a covered carport next to that building, where May-Shaw parked his BMW, one of his several vehicles. The surveillance lasted for twenty-three days and used a camera affixed to a telephone pole on a public street and cameras in a surveillance van parked in the parking lot. After witnessing May-Shaw engage in several suspected drug deals, the police used a drug-detecting dog to sniff the BMW. The dog indicated the presence of narcotics in the vehicle. Based on the dog sniff and the surveillance, the officers obtained a search warrant for May-Shaw’s apartment and all of his vehicles. The search found evidence of drug distribution, including cash, wrappers, and cocaine. The district court denied his motion under the Fourth Amendment to suppress the evidence from his apartment and vehicles. May-Shaw then entered a conditional guilty plea for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, but he preserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

As explained below, May-Shaw did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the carport such that police surveillance constituted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Nor was the carport within the curtilage of his apartment such that the dog sniff was unconstitutional. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of May-Shaw’s motion to suppress.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, which the trial court granted on the grounds of persistent conditions, severe child abuse, and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to parent. Mother also appeals the trial court’s finding that the termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Finding no error, we affirm.