During a botched robbery, sixteen-year-old Tyshon Booker, the Defendant-Appellant, shot and killed the victim, G’Metrick Caldwell. Following extensive hearings in juvenile court, the Defendant was transferred to criminal court to be tried as an adult. At trial, the Defendant admitted that he shot the victim several times in the back while seated in the backseat of the victim’s car; however, he claimed self-defense. A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant of two counts of first-degree felony murder and two counts of especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the process of transferring a juvenile to criminal court after a finding of three statutory factors by the juvenile court judge violates the Defendant’s rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); (2) whether the State’s suppression of alleged eyewitness identifications prior to the juvenile transfer hearing constitutes a Brady violation, requiring remand for a new juvenile transfer hearing; (3) whether the juvenile court erred in transferring the Defendant to criminal court given defense expert testimony that the Defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and was amenable to treatment; (4) whether the trial court erred in finding that the Defendant was engaged in unlawful activity at the time of the offense and in instructing the jury that the Defendant had a duty to retreat before engaging in self-defense; (5) whether an improper argument by the State in closing arguments constitutes prosecutorial misconduct requiring a new trial; (6) whether evidence of juror misconduct warrants a new trial and whether the trial court erred in refusing to subpoena an additional juror; and (7) whether a sentence of life imprisonment for a Tennessee juvenile violates the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This interlocutory appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of the employee’s request for transportation to a medical provider for authorized treatment. The trial court determined the employee was entitled to reimbursement of reasonable travel expenses as allowed by statute, but was not entitled to transportation provided by the employer. The court additionally considered other requests of the employee, which the court treated as motions, but did not grant any of the relief requested in those submissions. The employee has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.

The Petitioner, Michael Shane McCullough, challenges the denial of his petition for post- conviction relief attacking his jury convictions for criminal littering, initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine, and promotion of methamphetamine manufacture. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance due to (1) trial counsel’s failure to interview the arresting officer and investigate the case, especially as it related to the weather conditions on the night of the Petitioner’s traffic stop; (2) trial counsel’s failure to adequately cross-examine the State’s witnesses at trial about the substance found in the ditch; and (3) trial counsel’s (who was also appellate counsel) failure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his Class B misdemeanor conviction for criminal littering. After our review, we conclude that the Petitioner received ineffective assistance with regard to the appropriate classification of his criminal littering conviction; however, the Petitioner’s other allegations of ineffective assistance are without merit. We must reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment and remand the case for correction of the Petitioner’s mitigated criminal littering conviction judgment form to reflect the appropriate Class C misdemeanor classification and a corresponding thirty-day sentence.

This personal injury action concerns an automobile accident. The defendant died shortly after the accident. The estate was opened, administered, and closed before the plaintiff filed suit against the former personal representative within the applicable statute of limitations. The personal representative moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The plaintiff moved to enlarge the time for filing service of process based upon a claim of excusable neglect. The trial court dismissed the action as untimely. We affirm.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Cheryl L. Wallace filed suit against Beaumont Healthcare Employee Welfare Benefit Plan, formerly known as Oakwood Healthcare, Inc. Employee Welfare Benefit Plan; Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company; and Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502(a)(1)(b), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), after she was denied long-term disability benefits under her employer’s employee welfare benefit plan. Defendants Beaumont Healthcare Employee Welfare Benefit Plan and Hartford Life Insurance Company were subsequently dismissed, and the action proceeded against the only current Defendant, Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company. The district court granted Plaintiff judgment on the administrative record. Defendant now appeals the district court’s judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM IN PART and VACATE IN PART the district court’s judgment, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Emilio Torres was a long-time employee at several locations of Vitale’s Italian Restaurant Inc. located throughout Western Michigan. Although Torres and other Vitale’s employees often worked more than forty hours per week, they allege that they were not paid overtime rates for those hours. Instead, Vitale’s required the workers to keep track of their time on two separate timecards, one reflecting the first forty hours of work, and the other, reflecting overtime hours. The employees were paid via check for the first card and via cash for the second. The pay was at a straight time rate on the second card, although it reflected hours worked in excess of forty hours in a week. Therefore, Torres alleges, employees were deprived of overtime pay, and Vitale’s did not pay taxes on the cash payments.

Torres filed suit, seeking damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. The district court dismissed his complaint, holding that the remedial scheme of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., precluded the RICO claim. We agree with the district court that Torres cannot proceed on his claims based on lost wages from the alleged “wage theft scheme.” In addition, Torres may not pursue damages from the alleged “insurance fraud scheme,” given that harms from the latter scheme accrued to the insurance company and not Torres. However, because the FLSA does not preclude RICO claims when a defendant commits a RICO-predicate offense giving rise to damages distinct from the lost wages available under the FLSA, we REVERSE as to Torres’s claim that Vitale’s is liable under RICO for failure to withhold taxes, and we REMAND to determine if Torres adequately pleaded a RICO claim that resulted in damages other than lost wages.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff, a United States citizen child, appeals the district court’s order dismissing his Declaratory Judgment Act claims brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court’s order.

PER CURIAM. Roger Max Austin, a pro se federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to request audio recordings of his arraignment and sentencing hearings. But Austin received the transcripts of those proceedings and has no right to the audio recordings. Thus, we affirm.

The Defendant, Jay Hathaway, appeals the probation revocation order from a February 25, 2019 probation violation hearing. The trial court determined that the Defendant had violated the terms of his probation sentence, applied eighty-five days of time served toward the revocation sentence, and ordered an additional sixty days to serve in jail before the Defendant would be reinstated to a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that he was denied due process because he was not provided an expert on the issue of drug patch testing. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Dyer County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Christopher Ricardo Bonds, of evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that he serve nine months in jail at seventy-five percent release eligibility. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court arbitrarily imposed the percentage of the sentence to be served in confinement. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.