This appeal presents the question of who has the duty to set a case for trial de novo when a defendant appeals a delinquency conviction from juvenile court to circuit court. The then-minor child S.L. (“Defendant”) was charged with rape and incest.1 After a trial, the Blount County Juvenile Court (“the Juvenile Court”) found that Defendant had committed these delinquent offenses. Defendant appealed to the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Circuit Court”) for trial de novo as provided for by statute. Defendant proceeded to do nothing regarding his appeal for around two years. Eventually, the State of Tennessee (“the State”) filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, which the Circuit Court granted. Defendant appeals to this Court arguing that, notwithstanding his long stretch of inactivity, he has a right to trial de novo. We hold that under Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159(c) it was the Circuit Court’s duty—not Defendant’s—to set his case for trial. We reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and remand for Defendant to have his trial de novo, which is to be expedited.

This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights case. In terminating the parental rights of the children’s father, the trial court found that two grounds for termination had been properly established: abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and persistent conditions. The trial court also determined that it was in the children’s best interest to terminate the father’s parental rights. In addition to terminating the father’s rights, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the children’s mother. On appeal, we conclude that considerations of fundamental due process require us to vacate that portion of the final order terminating the rights of the mother. We also conclude that one of the grounds relied upon for terminating the father’s parental rights, persistent conditions, must be vacated due to the trial court’s failure to consider all required elements of the statutory ground. The termination of the father’s parental rights is otherwise affirmed, however, for the reasons stated herein.

The employee, a sales manager at an office supply store, alleged he suffered a right knee injury as a result of performing work activities over a two-day period. After timely reporting his injury, the employee sought medical care at a hospital emergency department and was referred to an orthopedic surgeon who subsequently diagnosed a tear in the employee’s meniscus and recommended surgery. The employer denied the claim, contending the employee did not suffer a compensable accidental injury based upon the medical proof establishing that the employee suffered an acute injury rather than a gradual injury. Following an expedited hearing in which the employee sought medical and temporary disability benefits, the trial court ordered the employer to provide medical benefits, including the recommended knee surgery, and denied the employee’s request for temporary disability benefit

The issue presented is whether the Shelby County Fire Department provided a firefighter with sufficient notice of the reasons for his termination. The Fire Department advised the firefighter that he was facing possible termination for violating two specific Fire Department rules. After further investigation and a meeting with the firefighter, the Fire Department gave him a termination letter that recited the two rules and detailed the factual basis for his termination. The firefighter appealed, and the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board upheld the termination in a written decision that stated the facts and reasons supporting the termination. The trial court affirmed the Board’s decision. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the firefighter did not receive adequate notice of the reasons for his termination. We hold that the Shelby County Fire Department provided the firefighter with sufficient notice to satisfy the requirements of due process. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for consideration of pretermitted issues.

The Defendant, Stevie Williamson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempt to commit second degree murder, a Class B felony; employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, a Class C felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-210 (2018) (second degree murder), 39-17-1324 (2018) (employment of a firearm), 39-17-1307 (2018) (firearm possession by a convicted felon), 39-13-103 (2018) (reckless endangerment). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive terms of twenty years for attempted second degree murder, fifteen years and twelve years for the firearm convictions, and six years for reckless endangerment, for an effective fifty-three-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by admitting evidence of the Defendant’s previous convictions and (2) by imposing consecutive service of the sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Dondre Johnson, was convicted of first degree felony murder and received a life sentence. He filed a post-conviction petition, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not file a motion to suppress the evidence stemming from his seizure. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment denying relief.

A Williamson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Tanya Nicole Slimick, of first degree premeditated murder. The Petitioner appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, numerous aspects of the jury instructions, and the State’s use of a demonstrative aid during closing argument. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions. State v. Tanya Nicole Slimick, No. M2014-00747-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 9244888, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 17, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 6, 2016). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging that her trial counsel was ineffective. In an amended petition, she added claims challenging the jury instructions and asserting prosecutorial misconduct. Thereafter, the Petitioner abandoned her claims as to ineffective assistance of counsel, and the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that the remaining allegations had either been waived or previously determined on appeal. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains her challenge to the trial court’s failure to properly charge the jury and assertion of prosecutorial misconduct. For the first time on appeal, she argues that a juror violated the trial court’s instruction not to communicate via social media during the trial. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This dispute arose from the issuance of a skyline sign permit to a high-rise office- building tenant. The permit allowed the tenant to erect two 495-square-foot signs on the building’s northwest and southeast facades. Another tenant with skyline signs on the northeast and southwest facades appealed the issuance of the permit by filing an application with the Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) for interpretation against the zoning administrator. The complaining tenant contended, inter alia, that its brand was harmed because the juxtaposition of the new and existing signs would blur the relationship between the two tenants and asserted that the new signs caused the building to exceed the maximum signage permitted under the zoning code. The BZA determined that the new signs violated the zoning code and revoked the permit. On a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the Davidson County Chancery Court held that the BZA erred by relying on a zoning map rather than the code’s plain language and found the new signs complied with the code’s requirements. This appeal followed. We have determined the complaining tenant failed to establish standing because it failed to demonstrate that it was aggrieved by the issuance of the permit. There is no competent evidence to show that the signs’ juxtaposition would create public confusion about or signal a business relationship between the two tenants. Accordingly, the record fails to demonstrate that the complaining tenant’s alleged injury “falls within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the [law] in question.” See City of Brentwood v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 149 S.W.3d 49, 55–56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Further, based on the facts of this case, the BZA lacked the ability to provide meaningful redress. For these and other reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, albeit on different grounds, and remand with instructions for the trial court to order the BZA to dismiss the complaining tenant’s application and to reinstate the new sign permit as issued in June of 2017. As for a separate issue that a neighboring homeowners’ association attempted to raise during the BZA hearing—whether the northwest sign exceeded brightness standards—that issue was not properly before the BZA or the trial court. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s decision to remand the brightness issue to the BZA.

Question:

May the General Assembly enact legislation to protect low-income and disabled senior citizens’ access to housing and provide them relief from tax debts and the potential delinquent tax sale of their property?

Opinion:

Yes. The General Assembly has the authority to pass legislation to protect senior citizens’ access to housing and to provide them tax relief, as long as the legislation is consistent with the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions.

Ashley H. (“Mother”) appeals the March 2019 order of the Lawrence County Chancery Court (“Trial Court”) terminating her parental rights to the minor children, Noah H. and Gracie H. Y. (collectively, “the Children”). Bobby H. (“Father”) surrendered his parental rights to the Children prior to trial and did not revoke his surrender. Upon petition of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), the Trial Court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children upon the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to visit prior to her incarceration, abandonment by wanton disregard, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the Children. The Trial Court further found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother timely appealed. We reverse the statutory ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home. We affirm the Trial Court’s judgment in all other respects including the termination of Mother’s parental rights.