Grants & Denials List

March 9, 2020 - March 13, 2020

The Defendant, Toscar Smith, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s revocation of his nine-year probationary sentence for his conviction for aggravated assault. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering his sentence into execution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Tyran Rollins, of aggravated robbery, and he was sentenced to serve eight and a half years in prison. The Defendant appeals his conviction, asserting that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict and that the composition of the jury violated his constitutional rights. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict and that the issue regarding the composition of the jury has been waived. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Samuel Gregory Dorsey, filed a post-conviction petition seeking relief from his conviction of attempted aggravated sexual battery, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

An organization of developers brought suit against Williamson County seeking a declaratory judgment that an impact fee imposed on new developments to fund improvements to schools throughout the county exceeded the authority granted to the county by the legislature, or alternatively, that Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-3-413(b) exempted the organization’s members from paying the impact fee because their property rights vested prior to adoption of the impact fee. The trial court granted summary judgment to the county, concluding that the impact fee did not exceed the authority granted to the county and that Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-3-413(b) did not apply because the impact fee did not constitute a development standard. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a petition to terminate the parental rights of a father to his child for the purposes of adoption. The petitioners, the child’s mother and her new husband, alleged that the father had abandoned the child both by willfully failing to visit and by willfully failing to support. Following a trial, the court concluded that the petitioners had failed to show that the father’s failures to visit or to support were willful. So the court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the petitioners contend that the evidence was clear and convincing that the father willfully failed to support his child. After a review of the record, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Jason Small claims that his employer, Memphis Light, Gas and Water, violated federal disability and civil-rights law when it reassigned him to a new position. The district court rejected his claims as well as his motion to enforce an alleged settlement agreement. We affirm.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Climmons Jones, Jr. filed a Title VII race-discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against Federal Express Corporation (FedEx) 252 days after FedEx terminated his employment. The EEOC then issued Jones a right-to-sue letter, and he sued FedEx in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. The district court granted FedEx’s motion to dismiss, holding that Jones’s suit was untimely because he filed his charge outside the 180-day time frame generally required for filing with the EEOC under section 706(e)(1) of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(e)(1). We hold that Jones timely filed his charge because EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Company, 486 U.S. 107 (1988), requires this result. We also excuse Jones, a pro se litigant, for not arguing before the district court the particular grounds on which we rest our holding, because the resolution we reach is beyond doubt in light of Commercial Office Products and other relevant legal authority. And injustice would result if we did not address Jones’s argument on appeal, given the circumstances of his case, including that he is a pro se litigant and he allegedly relied on advice given by the EEOC that the 300-day filing period would apply. We therefore REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, filed by M.E. Buck Dougherty (“Father”), seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case involving modification of a parenting plan. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Father we find that the order of the Chancery Court for Fayette County (“Trial Court”) did not sufficiently comply with Rule 10B. We, therefore, vacate the Trial Court’s January 30, 2020 order and remand this case to allow Father to amend his petition and for the Trial Court to either grant the motion or enter an order that states in writing all the grounds upon which the motion is denied.

Defendant, Jeffrey Van Garrett, was charged with one count of possession of oxycodone, a Schedule II substance, with intent to sell or deliver. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, which was denied by the trial court. Thereafter, Defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement under Rule 11(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, in which he pled guilty to the charge with an agreed four-year sentence as a Range I offender to be served on probation. Defendant attempted to reserve three certified questions of law under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, challenging the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. After review, we conclude that this Court does not have jurisdiction to address the certified questions because the certification did not meet the requirements of State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988). The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.