The employee sustained a compensable injury while working at a manufacturing plant through a temporary staffing agency. After the work accident, she returned to work for a period of time at different work sites until her temporary assignments ended. Thereafter, she received some temporary disability benefits. When those benefits were terminated, she sought additional benefits. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court ordered the employer to pay additional temporary partial disability benefits, and the employer has appealed. We modify the amount of temporary partial disability benefits owed but otherwise affirm the trial court’s interlocutory order and remand the case.

The employee appeals from the trial court’s denial of workers’ compensation benefits. The employee asserted that a slip and fall suffered at work aggravated pre- existing degenerative conditions in his left shoulder and neck, causing injuries that are compensable under Tennessee’s workers’ compensation laws. After a trial, the trial court reviewed the testimony at length and held that the employee had failed to establish a compensable injury. The employee’s appeal has been referred to this Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for oral argument and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Anita Cagayat seeks an order from this Court reversing the district court’s dismissal of her claim brought pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and remanding the matter back to the district court. The district court dismissed Cagayat’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act allegation for failure to state a plausible claim to relief, reasoning that the exhibits attached to her complaint contradict the factual allegations therein that are central to the claim. Because we find that the exhibits Cagayat attached to her complaint do not utterly discredit the factual allegations central to her 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8) claim and because those factual allegations give rise to a plausible violation of § 1692f(8), we reverse the district court’s holding and remand the matter for reconsideration in light of this opinion.

The Defendant, Freddie L. Smith, was convicted upon his guilty pleas of four counts of identity theft, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-150 (2018). The Defendant pleaded guilty as a Range II offender and agreed to an effective eight-year sentence. The manner of service of his sentence was reserved for the trial court’s determination. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing incarceration rather than an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Over twenty-five years ago, William Matney Putman, Petitioner, pled guilty to first- degree felony murder, attempted robbery, and aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole. See William Matney Putman v. State, No. E2004-02192-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1996634, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2005), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2005) (“Putman I”). The post- conviction court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s second petition for post-conviction relief. After review, we affirm pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant, Carrington Owens, was convicted by a Montgomery County Circuit Court jury of four counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony; twenty-three counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony; and twelve counts of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (Supp. 2007, 2010, Supp. 2011) (rape of a child), 39-17-1005 (2006) (subsequently amended) (especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor), 39-13-504 (2018) (aggravated sexual battery). He is serving an effective thirty-seven- year sentence for his convictions. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence from a search of his home and that he was denied the right to confront his accuser face-to-face. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Carey R. Faught, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his jury trial convictions of aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during a dangerous felony, reckless endangerment, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and his effective forty-eight-year sentence. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his claim that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to challenge an impermissibly suggestive photograph lineup. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Williamson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Mark A. Crites, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a multiple offender to twelve years of incarceration. The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed the conviction and sentence. See State v. Mark A. Crites, No. M2014-00383-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 3508042 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 4, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2015). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, claiming he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner appeals the denial, maintaining that his counsel was ineffective. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Grants & Denials List

March 2, 2020 - March 6, 2020

The Defendant, LaCurtis Odom, was indicted on one count of premeditated first degree murder, a Class A felony; one count of first degree felony murder, a Class A felony; one count of theft of property valued at more than $1,000, a Class D felony; one count of criminal attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and one count of unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-202, -14-103, -17-1307. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life plus eighteen years, twelve years of which were to run consecutively to the Defendant’s sentence in a previous case. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for premeditated first degree murder, felony murder, and attempted especially aggravated robbery; (2) that relative to the murder charges, the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser- included offense of reckless homicide; and (3) that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.