Defendant, Jeannette Jives-Nealy, was convicted by a jury of theft over $60,000 and money laundering. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty-four years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it failed to sever the two counts of the indictment; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear evidence of prior bad acts under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (4) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and (5) the trial court erred by ordering Defendant to pay restitution to a victim, who had been paid in a previous civil court settlement. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for entry of an amended judgment for money laundering.

The Defendant, Joshua Fisher, appeals his conviction for first degree premeditated murder for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Defendant’s prior threats and acts of violence against the victim pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

We granted review in this case to determine whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(f) violates the separation of powers clause in the Tennessee Constitution. The statutory provision allows defense counsel to conduct ex parte interviews with patients’ non-party treating healthcare providers in the course of discovery in a healthcare liability lawsuit. We hold that section 29-26-121(f) is unconstitutional as enacted, to the limited extent that it divests trial courts of their inherent discretion over discovery. We also conclude that the statute can be elided to make it permissive and not mandatory upon trial courts. As such, we hold that the elided statute is constitutional. We vacate the trial court’s qualified protective order entered in this case and remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration based on the guidance set forth in this opinion.

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises from a civil forfeiture proceeding in which the district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment based on Claimant-Appellant Addonnise Wells’ lack of standing. We AFFIRM.

SUTTON, Circuit Judge. William Straser alleges that the City of Athens, Tennessee violated the Fourteenth Amendment when it enforced a zoning ordinance against him based on his Christian beliefs. That sounds ominous. But the evidence to support the claim arose only when Straser complained about the fine, and a City employee explained that the City enforced it against everyone, including a Muslim neighbor who recently violated the ordinance as well. A government that enforces its laws equally against those of different faiths honors—it hardly violates—the neutrality imperative of the Fourteenth Amendment. We affirm the district court’s rejection as a matter of law of this claim and two others. We affirm.

MARIAN F. HARRISON, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judge. Leavitt Family Limited Partnership (“LFLP”) and Toma & Associates, L.P.A., Inc. (“Toma”) (collectively “defendants”) appeal from the bankruptcy court’s decision granting judgment in favor of Paul D. Orlandi (“debtor”), determining that the defendants violated the discharge injunction and awarding attorney fees and costs. For the reasons that follow, the Panel affirms in part and reverses in part.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. The parties have presented irreconcilable versions of the material facts underlying Plaintiff Chris Davis’s malicious prosecution claim. When there is evidence to support each version of the parties’ dueling allegations, summary judgment is not appropriate—even when the evidence includes self-serving statements from the parties. In light of that conflicting evidence, we REVERSE the district court’s award of summary judgment to Defendant James Gallagher on Davis’s malicious prosecution claim. We AFFIRM in all other respects.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Randall Ray Ward, of two counts of promoting prostitution and one count of trafficking a person for a commercial sex act. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. He also argues the trial court erred in failing to merge the convictions regarding S.C.1 and in failing to give the jury an instruction on accomplice testimony. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s convictions but remand for merger of Counts three and four.

The State appeals the trial court’s order granting the Defendant’s, Brian Sherrill, motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a warrantless search of his vehicle. The Defendant argued that the arresting officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that his truck’s brake light was malfunctioning. The State replied that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant for either the brake light offense or an alleged seatbelt violation. The trial court addressed the brake light offense and concluded that the “totality of the circumstances” did not support the stop. After the trial court granted the Defendant’s suppression motion and dismissed the indictment, the State appealed. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court erred by not considering the State’s alternative theory attempting to establish that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion of a seatbelt violation. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

Alfred R. Mason, Defendant, pled guilty to various drug offenses and received a sentence to be served on community corrections. After a violation warrant was filed and Defendant admitted to the violation, the trial court revoked community corrections and ordered Defendant to serve his sentence. Defendant appeals from the revocation of his community corrections sentence arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) ordering Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence instead of resentencing him and (2) failing to award Defendant credit for time served on community corrections. After our review, we affirm the revocation of Defendant’s community corrections sentence and remand to the trial court. On remand, the trial court should enter amended judgment forms to reflect credit for time successfully served on community corrections prior to the issuance of revocation warrants.