The parents of a severely abused child appeal the termination of their parental rights. When the child was less than five months old, his primary care physician became alarmed upon discovering that his head circumference had grown at an abnormal rate. Upon being admitted to the hospital for tests, the medical staff noted retinal hemorrhaging and the presence of blood in his cerebrospinal fluid, both of which indicated inflicted trauma. A pediatrician with a subspecialty in child abuse examined x- rays that revealed healing fractures in the anterior lateral aspect of multiple ribs, which also indicated child abuse. When investigators from the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) interviewed the parents, the father admitted to observing the mother hitting the child in the head and covering his face with a blanket to muffle his cries. The mother told investigators she squeezed and shook the child, but it was the father who struck the child in the head. DCS placed the child in foster care, and both parents were charged with aggravated child abuse. While the parents remained incarcerated, DCS filed a petition to terminate their parental rights on two grounds, severe child abuse pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(4) and 37-1-102(b)(27) and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Following a trial, the court found that both grounds had been proven and that termination of the parents’ rights was in the child’s best interest. We reverse the trial court’s ruling that DCS proved the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility; however, we affirm the trial court in all other respects. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of both parents’ parental rights.

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights on grounds of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, persistence of conditions, and willingness and ability to assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the children. Mother appeals both the grounds for termination and that termination was in her children’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.

We accepted certification of the following questions of law from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee regarding the constitutionality of Tennessee’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102: “(1) Does the noneconomic damages cap in civil cases imposed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102 violate a plaintiff’s right to a trial by jury, as guaranteed in Article I, section 6, of the Tennessee Constitution?; (2) Does the noneconomic damages cap in civil cases imposed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102 violate Tennessee’s constitutional doctrine of separation of powers between the legislative branch and the judicial branch?; (3) Does the noneconomic damages cap in civil cases imposed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102 violate the Tennessee Constitution by discriminating disproportionately against women?” Upon review, we answer each of the District Court’s questions in the negative.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., the Supreme Court made clear that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine—which prohibits the lower federal courts from reviewing appeals of state-court decisions—applies only to an exceedingly narrow set of cases. 544 U.S. 280 (2005). This putative class action brought under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Michigan consumer laws “is not the rare one that threads the Rooker-Feldman needle.” Van Hoven v. Buckles & Buckles, P.L.C., 947 F.3d 889, 892 (6th Cir. 2020). We therefore reverse its dismissal on Rooker-Feldman grounds and remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner, Jeffery Yates, appeals from the summary dismissal of his latest petition for habeas corpus relief challenging the judgment for his 2003 aggravated robbery conviction. Petitioner claims that an amended judgment entered by the trial court which ordered the sentence to run consecutively to his prior sentences is void. The habeas corpus court found that the amended judgment was not void and that Petitioner had failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Matthew Whitehair, Petitioner, was convicted of one count of simple assault, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, two counts of sexual battery, five counts of attempted incest, one count of incest, one count of statutory rape by an authority figure, and one count of sexual battery by an authority figure. Petitioner was found not guilty of two counts of incest and two counts of statutory rape by an authority figure. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Matthew Whitehair, No. M2014-00883-CCA- R3-CD, 2016 WL 880021, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016). Subsequently, Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged various instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel, among other things. After a lengthy, multi-day hearing, the post- conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief. After our review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to relief. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Ronnie Wharton, appeals the Sumner County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he has deemed an illegal sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Davidson County jury convicted Petitioner, Juan Vargas, of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. Petitioner filed a pro se Post-Conviction Petition, and after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues that ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct require a new trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Charles Travis Maples, appeals the denial of his petition for post- conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2013 Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of three counts of the sale of cocaine in a drug-free school zone. In this appeal, the petitioner claims, as he did below, that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Ed Loyde, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery and resulting effective sentence of thirty-five years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post- conviction court.