RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. This case presents an unfortunate situation in which, despite the fact that the habeas petitioner has an unquestionably valid claim on the merits, procedural grounds preclude our ability to grant him relief. That petitioner, Lamarr Robinson, was convicted of various offenses by a Michigan trial court in 2011 and sentenced under Michigan’s then-existing sentencing scheme. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence, and the Michigan Supreme Court declined to hear his case. Robinson then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, which the district court denied.

On appeal to this court, Robinson’s sole claim is that a series of judicial decisions postdating his sentencing have established that his sentence was imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The state of Michigan does not contest that conclusion, but it does persuasively argue that Robinson is not entitled to habeas relief because he failed to exhaust his sentencing claim in state court. For the reasons set forth below, we VACATE the portion of the district court’s decision dealing with Robinson’s sentencing claim and REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Coleman Miller’s passing gave birth to a dispute over his life insurance proceeds. Coleman’s life insurance policy arose from his federal service and is governed by the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954. Because Coleman failed to designate a policy beneficiary, the federal government distributed Coleman’s life insurance proceeds to his only child, Courtenay Miller, in accordance with the statutorily directed federal distribution scheme. Coleman’s former spouse, however, claimed entitlement to the proceeds pursuant to a separation agreement signed at the time of the couple’s divorce.

Eventually, Courtenay filed a complaint in federal court for declaratory relief. Finding the absence of a substantial question of federal law, the district court dismissed the complaint for a lack of jurisdiction. We agree and AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

The Defendant, Marvin Stinnett, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, three counts of aggravated assault, one count of reckless endangerment and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of thirty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions for attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Ernest Ervin, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of burglary of a motor vehicle. The trial court imposed a sentence of six years as a Career Offender to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting surveillance video without sufficient authentication and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Atu Campbell, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary. Because the trial court failed to provide the Defendant with an evidentiary hearing, the State concedes error. Upon our review, we reverse the determination of the trial court and remand for a hearing on the allegations raised in the Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

The Defendant, Terence Dewayne Borum, pleaded guilty to burglary, vandalism, and theft of property valued at more than $500 and after an appeal of the trial court’s initial ten-year sentence on probation received a twelve-year sentence on remand. He filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 alleging that his sentence was illegal because the trial court improperly sentenced him as career offender. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion after determining that the sentence was not illegal and that this issue had been determined in a previous appeal. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by denying relief because he was improperly sentenced as a career offender. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an action to pierce the corporate veil. In a previous action in which the limited liability company was the only defendant, the plaintiffs received a default judgment for breach of contract in the amount of $709,500. The same plaintiffs subsequently filed this action against the sole member of the now-defunct limited liability company to pierce the corporate veil and hold the defendant personally liable for the unsatisfied judgment. Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, determining that the undisputed facts weighed against piercing the corporate veil, and the plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.

This is a dispute regarding the ownership of a gravel lane used to access a 95-acre tract of land; Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s dismissal of their suit to quiet title to the property or, alternatively, for a declaration that they acquired ownership of the road through adverse possession. The trial court held that Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-2-110 barred Plaintiffs from pursuing their claim of ownership because there was no proof that they had paid taxes on the property at issue for twenty years, as required by the statute; finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

The employee alleged she suffered work-related injuries to her neck, right arm, and shoulder while lifting a heavy box. She was evaluated by several physicians and eventually released to return to work with no permanent medical impairment. Following a trial, the court awarded temporary disability benefits and future medical benefits but declined to award any permanent disability benefits. The employer has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s order and certify it as final.

This is the second appeal of this termination of parental rights case. Appellants appeal the trial court’s termination of their parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1); and (2) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3). Because it does not appear that the trial court exercised its independent judgment in reaching its decision, we vacate the judgment and remand for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k) (2017). Such findings and conclusions must also be a product of the trial court’s own independent judgment.