This appeal concerns a jury verdict in a personal injury case. Joanna L. Golden (“Golden”) was jogging in the dark early one morning when she was struck accidentally by a car driven by Cynthia D. Powers (“Powers”). Golden and her husband, Douglas K. Rice (“Rice”) (“Plaintiffs,” collectively), sued Powers in the Circuit Court for Hawkins County (“the Trial Court”), asserting various claims including negligence. The matter was tried before a jury. The jury found Golden to be 80% and Powers 20% at fault. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, which the Trial Court denied. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court arguing that the Trial Court failed to act as thirteenth juror and that the jury’s allocation of fault was unsupported by material evidence. Plaintiffs argue also that the jury was prejudiced against them for their being well-off out-of-towners. We find, first, that the Trial Court independently weighed the evidence and acted properly as thirteenth juror. We find further that the jury’s allocation of fault is supported by material evidence. Finally, Plaintiffs’ claim of jury prejudice is speculative, at best. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs, who are Michigan prisoners, appeal the denial by the Michigan Department of Corrections of their request to “recognize” their “Christian Identity” religion. Plaintiffs’ Christian Identity religion advocates “white separatism,” which instructs that people of different races not mix in “the areas of marriage and worship.” Plaintiffs claim that the Department’s denial of their recognition request violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. (“RLUIPA”), by denying them their rights of group worship and baptism. Following a non-jury trial, the district court ruled that the Department’s decision did not substantially burden plaintiffs’ exercise of their religion under the second of the three-step analysis for evaluating RLUIPA claims. See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 361–62 (2015). We hold that the district court committed error requiring reversal in its ruling. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for consideration and a ruling on whether the Department satisfied the standard of strict scrutiny under RLUIPA’s third step.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. After pleading guilty to controlled substance offenses, Pedro Cavazos and Christopher Serrano both received sentencing enhancements because of prior controlled substance convictions. They argue on appeal that the district court improperly applied these enhancements. We agree that Serrano does not qualify as a career offender so we VACATE his sentence and REMAND for resentencing. But the court properly applied Cavazos’s enhancement so we AFFIRM his sentence.

The Petitioner, Nicholas Todd Sutton, appeals as of right from the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that (1) the evidence of several jurors’ viewing the Petitioner in shackles and handcuffs during his capital trial and sentencing hearing is newly discovered, (2) the Petitioner is without fault for failing to present this evidence previously, (3) equitable tolling of the statute of limitations applies, (4) constitutional considerations require the coram nobis court to address this case on the merits, and (5) the coram nobis court abused its discretion by summarily dismissing the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Robert Elijah Oxendine (“Defendant”) pled guilty to two counts of vehicular homicide and one count of improper passing. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective four-year sentence with one year of incarceration and the balance on probation. Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to split confinement rather than full probation and by using elements of the offense as a factor to enhance the sentence. We affirm the trial court’s imposition of a four-year sentence, but we reverse the court’s imposition of split confinement and remand for entry of amended judgments of conviction placing Defendant on probation.

On August 3, 2017, Clarence Tumage (“Employee”) died as a result of injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment with Dole Refrigerating Co., Inc. (“Employer”). Employee was unmarried at the time of his death, but resided with and had a child out-ofwedlock with Megan Black. It was undisputed that this child, EJT, is entitled to workers’ compensation death benefits as a conclusively presumed wholly dependent child under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-210(a)(2). Employee had two additional children out-of-wedlock, NRT and SMT, with another woman. However, prior to his death, Employee had surrendered his parental rights to NRT and SMT, and his mother had adopted these children. NRT and SMT sought workers’ compensation death benefits as either conclusively presumed wholly dependent children of Employee under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-210(a)(2), or, alternatively, as partial dependents of Employee under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-210(d). The Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims determined that NRT and SMT are not entitled to benefits as conclusively presumed wholly dependent children or as partial dependents. The court awarded EJT benefits equal to fifty percent (50%) of Employee’s average weekly wage. The court denied the motions of the guardians ad litem for EJT and for NRT and SMT for attorney’s fees and deferred any fee determination until after an appeal. NRT and SMT appealed the decision of the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment. We award attorney’s fees on appeal to the guardian ad litem for EJT and remand the case to the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims for a determination of the amount of such fees, together with a determination of what, if any, fees are to be awarded to the guardians ad litem for the prior proceedings in that court.

A Montgomery County Grand jury indicted the Petitioner, Robert Aaron White, for multiple offenses including first-degree, premeditated murder. A petit jury convicted the Petitioner of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder, and he received a sentence of twenty-three years imprisonment. State v. Robert Aaron White, No. M2011- 01985-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 2432372, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 4, 2013). Following denial of his appeal, the Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, alleging, inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective based on the following grounds: (1) failure to investigate the victim’s criminal history and to introduce at trial evidence of the victim’s prior bad acts, (2) failure to investigate and introduce evidence of the prior bad acts of one of the State’s witnesses, and (3) failure to properly move the trial court for an order allowing the Petitioner to cover his tattoos at trial.1 The post- conviction court denied relief by written order, and the Petitioner appealed. Following our review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Johnny Peterson, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

The defendant, Derrick Jerome Miller, appeals his Putnam County Criminal Court jury conviction of reckless endangerment, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a certain document, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the trial court erred by denying him probation. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Taboris Ramon Jones, appeals from the denial of his petition for post- conviction relief, wherein he challenged his jury conviction for possession with intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, that his sentence is unconstitutional, and that he was deprived of a fair trial on the basis of cumulative error. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court.