In this interlocutory appeal, the employee appeals the trial court’s order denying his request for medical treatment for alleged injuries to his legs and for temporary partial disability benefits. The employee was assaulted while in the course of his employment and was provided authorized care. He later asserted injuries to additional body parts and reasserted an entitlement to temporary disability benefits. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court found the employee had not presented sufficient evidence to entitle him to the requested benefits. The employee has appealed. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand the case.

The Defendant, Kimberly J. Hill, entered a best interest plea to theft of property valued at $10,000 or more with the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a three-year sentence with six months to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying her request for judicial diversion and in imposing a term of split confinement. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff corporation filed an action for breach of contract, claiming that the defendants had failed to recognize the plaintiff’s ownership in a limited liability company that was allegedly based on an oral agreement between the plaintiff and defendants. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, determining that the plaintiff had failed to present clear and convincing evidence establishing the parties’ agreement that the plaintiff would have an ownership interest in the company. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This is one of five cases on appeal to this Court regarding the proper distribution of liquor-by-the-drink tax proceeds between a county and a municipality within the county. In each case, the county had not approved the liquor-by-the-drink sales, but the city had approved such sales. The Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Revenue, who collects taxes on all liquor-by-the-drink sales, distributed tax proceeds to the defendant cities in accordance with the liquor-by-the-drink tax distribution statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 57-4-306. The statute required the recipient cities to then distribute half of their proceeds “in the same manner as the county property tax for schools is expended and distributed.” Tenn. Code. Ann. § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) (2013). In each case, the recipient city distributed half of its tax proceeds to its own city school system and did not share the proceeds with the county. The counties sued the cities, claiming that the statute required the cities to distribute the tax proceeds as the counties distribute the county property tax for schools, which is pro rata among all schools in the county based on average daily attendance. In the instant case, the trial court granted summary judgment against the county and in favor of the city. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the tax distribution statute plainly required the city to distribute half of its liquor-by-the-drink tax proceeds pro rata among all schools in the county. The city appeals. We agree with the city and hold that the distribution statute directed cities to expend and distribute half of their liquor-by-the-drink tax proceeds for the benefit of the city’s own school system, if any. In this case, because the city has its own school system, it was permitted to use half of its liquor-by-the-drink tax proceeds for its own school system, and it was not required to share those proceeds with the county or the county schools. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the city.

PER CURIAM. The government accused Reshon Tolliver of participating in a nationwide marijuana distribution ring. The conspiracy funneled money and drugs between a supplier in California and a large-scale dealer in Memphis. The government believed that Tolliver helped the California supplier transport marijuana and move money around. Tolliver fought the charges at trial. After four days and several witnesses, the jury acquitted him on the marijuana conspiracy but convicted on the money laundering conspiracy.

For these reasons, the forfeiture calculation passes muster, as does the jury’s verdict and the district court’s trial timing. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Demarcus Lashawn Blackmun, was convicted by a Marshall County jury of the sale and delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, which were merged by the trial court, and received a sentence twelve years’ incarceration. State v. Demarcus Lashawn Blackman, No. M2016-01098-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 3084852, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 20, 2017). He later filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, alleging that trial counsel were ineffective in failing to obtain the criminal history of the confidential informant (CI) and in failing to adequately investigate the crime scene.1 Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Unsatisfied with the judgment it obtained in the general sessions court, the plaintiff appealed to the circuit court. When the plaintiff failed to file a timely motion to set its appeal for trial, the circuit court adopted the judgment of the general sessions court. The plaintiff moved to set aside the judgment, claiming excusable neglect. The court denied the motion. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside. We affirm.

In this conservatorship action, the trial court determined that the evidence clearly and convincingly established that the respondent had a disability but did not establish that the respondent needed a conservator. The petitioner appealed. Having reviewed the evidence presented at trial, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

This is a divorce action. Husband appeals the trial court’s division of marital property and award of alimony to Wife. Discerning no error, we affirm.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the criminal court had authority to grant motions filed by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) and to modify an order dismissing criminal prosecutions several years after the order became final. Carl Allen (“Mr. Allen”) was indicted in November 2010 and February 2011 for violating certain reporting provisions of the Tennessee Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act (“the Registration Act”) applicable to violent sexual offenders. By a written order filed on February 3, 2012, the criminal court granted Mr. Allen’s motion to dismiss the indictments based on its determination that Mr. Allen’s 1995 Florida sexual battery conviction required him to comply only with the Registration Act’s reporting provisions relating to sexual offenders and not those relating to violent sexual offenders. The State did not appeal the February 3, 2012 order; therefore, it became final thirty days after entry. Almost three years later, in December 2014, the TBI returned to the criminal court and filed a motion to intervene in the dismissed criminal cases, citing Rule 24.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, and a motion for relief from the February 3, 2012 order, citing Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The TBI argued that, in expressing the basis of its decision to dismiss the indictments, the criminal court exercised civil jurisdiction by ruling on Mr. Allen’s offender classification under the Registration Act. The TBI asserted that the criminal court lacked authority to determine Mr. Allen’s offender classification and that the portion of its February 3, 2012 order doing so was void and should be vacated. The criminal court agreed with the TBI’s arguments, and by a May 3, 2017 order, partially vacated its February 3, 2012 order. Mr. Allen appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed his appeal without ruling on the merits after concluding that Mr. Allen had no right of appeal in these circumstances. State v. Allen, No. W2017-01118-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 6595352, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2018), appeal granted, (Tenn. May 24, 2019). We hold, as the TBI now concedes, that Mr. Allen had a right to appeal from the criminal court’s May 3, 2017 order that partially vacated its February 3, 2012 order. We also hold that the criminal court was not exercising civil jurisdiction in its February 3, 2012 order when it granted Mr. Allen’s motion to dismiss the criminal indictments. We further conclude that the criminal court had no authority to modify or partially vacate its February 3, 2012 order, except to correct clerical errors, oversights, or omissions in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. Because the criminal court exceeded the authority Rule 36 provides, we vacate the May 3, 2017 order and confirm that the February 3, 2012 order remains intact and final.