The Defendant, Darcell Wright, was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault as lesser-included offenses of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, respectively. The trial court imposed sentences of ten years for each conviction and ordered that these terms be served consecutively to one another, as well as consecutively to prior sentences of the Defendant’s. On appeal, the Defendant, relying on principles of double jeopardy, contends that the trial court erred in failing to merge his sentences for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. However, our review of the record reveals that the Defendant failed to raise this issue in a motion for new trial; thereby, waiving full appellate review. Additionally, we conclude that plain error review of the issue is not warranted. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Brenda Merriweather (“Employee”) alleged she injured her left knee in the course and scope of her employment with UGN, Inc. (“Employer”). Following the trial, the trial court determined Employee did not satisfy her burden of proving causation and therefore dismissed the case. Employee appeals. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Following a divorce, husband and wife agreed that wife was to receive monthly alimony payments from husband for eight and a half years. The last four years of payments were contingent upon husband attaining the rank of airline captain. The type of alimony awarded was never specified. Wife later remarried and cohabitated with her new husband. Husband filed for a modification alleging that the alimony was transitional alimony and therefore statutorily modifiable upon wife’s cohabitation with a third person. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36–5–121(g)(2)(C) (2019). Wife instead argued that the alimony awarded was alimony in solido and therefore not modifiable except by agreement of the parties. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36–5–121(h)(2). The trial court held that the expressly conditional nature of the alimony rendered it more properly classifiable as transitional alimony. The court terminated husband’s alimony obligation based upon wife’s remarriage and cohabitation with her new husband. Wife appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Rhodes College expelled Prianka Bose after her organic chemistry professor, Dr. Roberto de la Salud Bea, accused her of cheating on tests and quizzes. Bose says that Bea fabricated these charges after she confronted Bea regarding inappropriate comments and questions Bea had posed to her. Bose brought numerous claims against both Rhodes and Bea, including a Title IX claim against Rhodes and a state law defamation claim against Bea. We agree with the district court that Bose’s Title IX claim cannot succeed, but with respect to the defamation claim, we conclude that the district court erred by holding that Bea’s statements were subject to absolute privilege under Tennessee law. Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part.

The Defendant, Palace R. Chandler, was charged with theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103. Following a bench trial, the Defendant was found guilty and sentenced to a three-year suspended sentence to be served on community corrections. On appeal, the Defendant contends that error exists because there was no proof showing the victim did not consent to the Defendant’s taking the property. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court; however, we remand this case to correct the judgement to reflect the full measure of the Defendant’s pre-trial jail credit.

In this healthcare liability action, the trial court held that the plaintiffs’ sole expert witness was not competent to testify on causation and for that reason granted summary judgment to the defendant. The plaintiffs then filed a motion to alter or amend, proffering causation testimony from a new expert witness. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to alter or amend. This Court granted permission to appeal. A trial court’s decision on a motion to alter or amend is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; this standard of review does not permit the appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. We hold that the trial court’s decision in this case was within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions of the motion to alter or amend and was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. For this reason, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights based on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit and willful failure to support. The father appeals. We reverse the trial court’s finding of willful failure to support but affirm the trial court’s finding of willful failure to visit and its determination that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. Accordingly, we affirm termination of the father’s parental rights.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. We must give credit when it is due. Twice, Frank Richardson has successfully persuaded the Supreme Court to vacate our judgments affirming his conviction and sentence for a string of armed robberies in Detroit. Both times, the Supreme Court remanded Richardson’s case to this court and—though not reversing our decisions on the merits—instructed us to consider whether an intervening Supreme Court decision or new legislation affected his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

We begin by reissuing our earlier decision (with a few non-substantive changes) affirming Richardson’s conviction. As to the most recent remand, we hold that Richardson cannot benefit from the First Step Act because the district court resentenced him more than one year before the Act became law. As a result, we also affirm Richardson’s sentence.

The pro se Petitioner, Tony Young, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence and/or petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner has failed to show that his sentence is illegal or that he is otherwise entitled to habeas corpus relief; therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.