HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Benny Lee Hodge, a Kentucky death-row inmate, appeals the denial of his petition for habeas corpus. Hodge’s petition primarily concerns the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel at the sentencing phase. Because the Kentucky Supreme Court applied a standard of prejudice that is contrary to established Supreme Court precedent, counsel’s failure to present mitigation evidence was constitutionally deficient, and there is a reasonable probability that counsel’s failure affected the outcome of Hodge’s sentencing, we reverse the district court and remand with instructions to grant conditional habeas relief as to the penalty phase of Hodge’s trial. Hodge also raises jury-tampering and jury-bias claims, which we conclude are without merit.

MATHIS, Circuit Judge. Zachariah Histed pleaded guilty to possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, and the district court sentenced him to 300 months' imprisonment. Histed appeals his sentence on procedural and substantive grounds, arguing that the district court improperly calculated the drug quantity, erroneously applied multiple sentencing enhancements, wrongfully denied him credit for acceptance of responsibility, and imposed a sentence that was too long. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, vacate Histed’s sentence, and remand for resentencing.

The Smith County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Ralph Edward Overstreet, Jr., for burglary, attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and resisting arrest. A jury convicted Defendant as charged, and the trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted first degree murder conviction. Defendant argues on appeal that: (1) the prosecutor’s previous representation of Defendant created an actual conflict of interest that required disqualification and a new trial; (2) the State violated its discovery obligations by introducing evidence that the State allegedly did not disclose of a prior domestic incident between Defendant and his girlfriend; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted first degree murder. Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of any other conviction. After hearing oral arguments and reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiffs filed a health care liability action against several defendants. Following a hearing on the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the trial court determined that the plaintiffs failed to substantially comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) and that the action was untimely. The plaintiffs appealed to this Court and, following our review, we reverse.

A former Shelby County employee alleges that she was wrongfully terminated by the County and that the Shelby County Government Civil Service Merit Board (CSMB) improperly declined to consider her appeal. The CSMB’s decision not to consider her appeal was based upon its determination that the former employee was administratively removed from her position, not punitively terminated, and, accordingly, the matter was beyond its authority. The former employee sought judicial review of the CSMB’s decision in the Shelby County Chancery Court. The Chancery Court dismissed, concluding that the CSMB did not err on the merits and that the Chancery Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The former employee appeals to this court. Based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we affirm the Chancery Court’s dismissal of the former employee’s petition for judicial review.

Decedent’s son, individually and as personal representative of his mother’s estate, sued several of his siblings and decedent mother’s bank. Among other things, the son alleged that the bank breached its duties to the decedent by disbursing funds out of her checking and savings accounts following her death. Eventually, the bank moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not negligent in its handling of the decedent’s accounts, nor did it breach any contractual duty to either the decedent or her son. The son appeals and, discerning no error by the trial court, we affirm.

This is an appeal of a termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Juvenile Court for Sullivan County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Tara C. (“Mother”) to two of her children, Kamdyn H. and Bentyn H. upon finding that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was mentally incompetent and that it was in the best interest of Kamdyn and Bentyn for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Mother has appealed. Upon our review, we affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Petitioner, Michael White, of five counts of rape in 2005, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifty-five years. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus. He alleged that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear his case because, among other things, the original affidavit of complaint was invalid and that his charges were not supported by probable cause. The habeas corpus court summarily denied the application, finding that the Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim for relief and that he failed to comply with the statutory requirements for requesting the writ. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

In 2005, the Defendant, Ruben D. Pimentel, pled guilty to the offense of first degree murder and accepted a negotiated sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. Thereafter, he filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. He alleged that his sentence was illegal because it violates Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(h)(2), as amended in 2020, which provides that a defendant may be released from a life sentence after sixty years. The trial court summarily denied the motion, finding that the Defendant’s sentence was not illegal. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree with the Defendant and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Farris Lamont Kidd, pleaded guilty to five separate charges, and received an effective fourteen-year sentence. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.