Mother and Father divorced and Mother was given custody of their child. Mother remarried and eventually she and Stepfather filed a petition to terminate Father’s rights and allow Stepfather to adopt the child. The trial court found that Father had not visited the child within four months of the filing of the petition and that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. We affirm.

This case concerns the validity of a county resolution prohibiting quarries and rock crushers “within five thousand (5,000) feet of a residence, school, licensed daycare facility, park, recreation center, church, retail, commercial, professional or industrial establishment.” The plaintiff landowners argued that the county failed to comply with the requirements in Tennessee’s county zoning statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-101 to -115. In the alternative, they argued that state law expressly preempted local regulation of quarries. However, the county argued that it was exercising its authority to protect its citizens’ health, safety, and welfare under the county powers statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 5-1-118. The trial court granted summary judgment to the county on the ground that it had no comprehensive zoning plan. This appeal followed. We affirm.

The defendant, David Parr, appeals the Stewart County Circuit Court’s imposition of a fully-incarcerative sentence for his guilty-pleaded convictions of possession of methamphetamine and fentanyl with intent to sell or deliver, asking this court to remand to the trial court for consideration of Community Corrections under Code section 40-36- 106(2)(c). Because the superseding indictments violated the principles of double jeopardy and because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hold the plea submission hearing, the judgments entered on the superseding indictments are void, and we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Marcus Green, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of first degree premeditated murder, attempted first degree premeditated murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. After a sentencing hearing, he received a sentence of life plus one hundred five years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court erred by refusing to bifurcate the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon from the remaining charges, and that his effective sentence is excessive. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jimmiko Driskell, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her second degree murder conviction, arguing that she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and was denied due process of law because she lacked the knowledge to enter a knowing, intelligent and voluntary guilty plea. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Stephen Caudle appeals the grant of summary judgment to his employer in this Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Michigan Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) case, alleging that he was fired in retaliation for attempting to report unlawful employment practices. We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Ginny Elizabeth Parker, was convicted following a bench trial of five counts of forgery, for which she received an effective six-year sentence to serve. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her forgery convictions, specifically regarding whether she acted without authorization; (2) the trial court shifted the burden of service of medical records pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-122(c) from the State to the Defendant; (3) the trial court erroneously admitted proof of a PayPal account that was linked to the victims’ bank account; (4) she is entitled to relief based on cumulative error; and (5) her sentence is grossly disproportionate to her offenses, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Christopher Bolden, of especially aggravated robbery, for which he received a sentence of twenty years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of a speedy trial; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance of his case from that of his co-defendant; (3) the trial court erred in “curtailing [Defendant’s] questions in jury selection”; (4) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s request to cross-examine the victim about “potential bias” related to cases that the State dismissed against the victim while Defendant awaited trial; (5) the trial court erred in admitting Defendant’s prior conviction for robbery “without engaging in the required analysis”; (6) the trial court erred in allowing the State to ask questions about “an irrelevant and prejudicial rap music video”; (7) the trial court erred by refusing to fully bifurcate a charged count of convicted felon in possession of a firearm from all other counts; and (8) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following a thorough review, we affirm Defendant’s judgment of conviction.

The mother in this action filed for divorce and sought to relocate to North Carolina with the parties’ son. Following settlement of all issues aside from the matters of parenting time and child support, the trial court designated the mother primary residential parent and allowed her to move back to her home state. The father appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant filed this declaratory judgment action against his sister, seeking to enforce a contract concerning property owned by the siblings’ parents at their deaths. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the contract was unenforceable, as there was no meeting of the minds due to a mutual mistake of fact. The trial court further found that a conveyance of real property was barred by the statute of frauds. Because Appellant has failed to supply this Court with a transcript or statement of the evidence presented at trial, we must affirm the trial court’s finding that there was no meeting of the minds due to a mutual mistake.