A Robertson County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Tevin Mantez Harris, of second degree murder and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of twenty-two years to be served at one hundred percent and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing witnesses to testify about his being Muslim and his “viewpoint” toward Christianity and that his twenty-two-year sentence is excessive because the trial court misapplied an enhancement factor.

The Defendant, Jonathan Michael Atha, was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated rape, four counts of aggravated robbery, and three counts of aggravated kidnapping, for which he received an effective sentence of fifty years’ incarceration.

The plaintiffs have appealed from an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The trial court also directed the entry of a final judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. Because the ruling is not appropriate for certification as a final judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, we dismiss the appeal.

This appeal concerns the alleged formation of a contract for the sale of real property. The court ruled that text messages concerning the sale of the property did not constitute a present offer and acceptance sufficient to form a contract for the purchase of the property at issue. We affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, filed by Nancy Neely (“Petitioner”), seeking to recuse the trial judge in these companion cases involving a conservatorship and an estate. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioner, and the answer ordered by this Court, and finding no error in the orders of the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”) denying recusal, we affirm.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to clarify application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The plaintiff filed this legal malpractice action against an attorney who represented her in her divorce. She asserts that the attorney’s actions so compromised her position in the divorce proceedings that she was forced to settle on unfavorable terms. After the attorney filed a motion for summary judgment, the trial court applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel.

Cheryl Lynn Williams (“Employee”) alleged that she sustained a compensable injury and/or an occupational disease as a result of exposure to mold during the course and scope of her employment with SWS LLC d/b/a SecureWatch (“Employer”). Employer filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the one-year statute of limitations barred Employee’s claim. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Employee has appealed.

A Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel found that an attorney should be disbarred after she was convicted of bank fraud. On appeal, the circuit court held that the hearing panel’s decision was arbitrary and imposed a five-year suspension. We reverse. The hearing panel’s decision was supported by substantial and material evidence and was neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. The circuits have extended habeas law far beyond the limits set by Congress. How far? The simple answer is not far enough to help William Wright. The more complicated answer follows.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Thomas Jefferson once counseled his nephew Peter Carr on how to think: “Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal every fact, every opinion.”1 This case calls upon us to do just that. We must decide whether Abdul Latif Jameel Transportation Company Limited (“ALJ”), a Saudi corporation, may rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) to discover facts from FedEx Corporation (“FedEx Corp.”), a U.S.-based corporation, for use in a commercial arbitration pending in a foreign country. Under § 1782(a), a federal district court may order discovery “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal” upon application by “any interested person.” Jefferson used the word “tribunal” in a metaphorical sense to refer to the mind. We must decide whether Congress used the words “foreign or international tribunal” in a literal sense that includes the commercial arbitration involved here.

The interpretive question is an issue of first impression in the Sixth Circuit, although the Supreme Court provided guidance for interpretation of § 1782(a) in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004). Upon careful consideration of the statutory text, the meaning of that text based on common definitions and usage of the language at issue, as well as the statutory context and history of § 1782(a), we hold that this provision permits discovery for use in the private commercial arbitration at issue. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of ALJ’s application and REMAND for the district court to determine, in the first instance, whether the application should be granted under four discretionary factors the Supreme Court outlined in Intel to guide that determination.