This is an appeal from two orders entered by the trial court in this post-divorce action. In the first order, the trial court found the mother guilty on three counts of criminal contempt, upon a petition filed by the father, for scheduling and taking the parties’ minor child to two doctor’s appointments and a walk-in clinic in violation of the parties’ permanent parenting plan. The parenting plan granted to the father exclusive decision-making authority over all non-emergency medical decisions for the children. In the second order, the trial court sua sponte modified the parties’ parenting plan, granting the father “tie-breaking authority” to schedule non-school-related extracurricular activities during the mother’s co-parenting time on the condition that if the mother did not agree to a particular activity, the father would pay for and provide transportation to the activities. Neither party had filed a petition seeking to modify the parenting plan. The mother appeals this modification on the grounds that no material change in circumstance existed to justify modification of the parenting plan and argues further that the modification was not in the best interest of the children because it would likely create more disputes between the parties going forward. With regard to the criminal contempt determinations, the mother argues on appeal that her actions in scheduling the two doctor’s visits were not “willful” as required for a finding of criminal contempt and that her action in taking the child to the walk-in clinic was precipitated by a medical emergency, a situation over which the parenting plan did not grant the father exclusive control. Upon thorough review, we discern no reversible error in the trial court’s determination that the mother was guilty of three counts of criminal contempt for violating the permanent parenting plan and accordingly affirm that order in its entirety. Regarding the second order, we find as a threshold matter that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to modify the parties’ parenting plan in the absence of a petition to modify or motion for relief from judgment. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order modifying the parties’ permanent parenting plan.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. This is an indemnification action between Nissan, a car producer, and Continental, a brake parts supplier, for the amount of a jury award from a products liability case in California. After a car accident involving a Nissan vehicle, several plaintiffs brought an action alleging defects in the vehicle’s braking system against Nissan and Continental. After Continental settled and Nissan proceeded to trial, the jury determined that the design of the vehicle’s braking system caused harm to the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them $24 million in damages. During the litigation, Nissan incurred another $6 million in attorney fees and costs.

Following the California jury’s verdict, Nissan brought this action against Continental, seeking indemnification for the jury award and its attorney fees and costs based on a provision in the contract between the parties. Both Nissan and Continental moved for summary judgment. The district court granted Continental’s motion for summary judgment in full. Nissan appeals that ruling. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Continental.

The Petitioner, Omari Davis, pled guilty to possessing heroin with intent to sell or deliver. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range II, multiple offender to serve a term of eighteen years. Thereafter, the Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to seek a competency evaluation. At the hearing, the Petitioner also argued that trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to seek a continuance of the sentencing hearing. The post-conviction court denied relief as to the competency evaluation but did not address the continuance issue. On our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Ahmed G. Mohd Alkhatib, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his motion to vacate his 2006 guilty-pleaded convictions for two counts of facilitation of the delivery of marijuana, for which he received an effective eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence. The post-conviction court treated the motion as a petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the court erred by dismissing the petition after determining it was untimely. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

An employer terminated an employee after she requested unpaid commissions pursuant to her contract. The employee sued her former employer claiming breach of contract, unjust enrichment, retaliatory discharge, and intentional misrepresentation. She also sought punitive damages. The jury found in the employee’s favor on all claims and awarded damages for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and retaliatory discharge as well as awarding punitive damages. The former employer sought post-trial relief, arguing the jury’s verdicts were inconsistent and that the jury’s punitive damages award was in error and excessive. The trial court concluded the verdicts were consistent but did reduce, while not eliminating, the punitive damages award. The former employer appeals, challenging the compensatory and punitive damage awards. We affirm.

This appeal presents two issues. First, we consider whether the District Attorney General’s Office should have been disqualified from prosecuting this case because the District Attorney General previously served as counsel for the accused in a separate case. Second, we consider the propriety of conducting a single trial for multiple offenses under the theory that the separate crimes were all parts of a larger, continuing plan. David Wayne Eady was charged in one indictment with committing multiple robberies in Nashville over the course of a month. Mr. Eady moved to disqualify the District Attorney General’s Office, primarily because the District Attorney General had represented him in a criminal matter approximately thirty years earlier. The prior matter resulted in a conviction that the State sought to use in this case to qualify Mr. Eady as a repeat violent offender for sentencing purposes. The trial court denied the motion to disqualify, noting the limited nature of the District Attorney General’s involvement in this case and the “mandatory nature of the repeat violent offender statute.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-120(g) (2019). Mr. Eady also moved to sever the offenses, which the trial court denied upon finding that the crimes were parts of a common scheme or plan and that the evidence of one offense would be admissible in the trial of the others. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 14(b)(1). Mr. Eady ultimately was convicted as charged of eleven counts of aggravated robbery, two of which later were merged, and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. Upon Mr. Eady’s appeal as of right, a divided panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. State v. Eady, No. M2021-00388-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 7835823, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 14, 2022), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Jan. 31, 2023). The intermediate appellate court was unanimous in rejecting the challenge to prosecution of the case by the District Attorney General’s Office. Id. at *34–35. After noting that there was “no real dispute between the parties that [the District Attorney General] had an actual conflict of interest disqualifying him from participating in [Mr. Eady’s] prosecution,” the court seemed to proceed on the assumption that an actual conflict of interest existed but nevertheless held that this conflict did not require disqualification of the entire office. Id. at *34. In addition, a majority of the court upheld the denial of a severance. Id. at *28–30. One judge dissented, however, concluding that the offenses should have been severed because the evidence did not reflect that the offenses were parts of a larger, continuing plan. Id. at *38–42 (McMullen, J., dissenting in part). We granted Mr. Eady’s appeal to address both issues. As for the motion to disqualify, we agree with the State’s argument before this Court that the circumstances do not establish an actual conflict of interest for the District Attorney General, and we conclude that the trial court correctly denied the motion to disqualify the District Attorney General’s Office. As for the motion to sever, we have determined that the record does not establish that the offenses were parts of a larger, continuing plan. Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying a severance. However, we find the error harmless as to all convictions except the one in count eight. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals in part, reverse it in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant, Shundarius Turner, was convicted by a jury of reckless homicide, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated criminal trespass, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment. He received a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, he claims the trial court erred in excluding a photographic lineup where he was not identified by one of the victims, the evidence was insufficient to support his felony convictions, the trial court’s sentencing decision violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, the trial court erred in excluding a witness from testifying on his behalf, the trial court erred in denying his right to strike a juror for cause, and the cumulative effect of these errors denied him a fair trial. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Bobby Marable II, was convicted by a Gibson County Circuit Court jury of aggravated kidnapping involving bodily injury, a Class B felony, and aggravated assault by strangulation, a Class C felony, for which he is serving an effective thirty-five year sentence. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-304(a)(4) (2018) (aggravated kidnapping involving bodily injury), 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iv) (Supp. 2015) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault involving strangulation or attempted strangulation), -(e)(1)(A)(ii) (classifying aggravated assault involving strangulation as a Class C felony). On appeal, he contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated kidnapping conviction, (2) the trial court erred in its jury instructions on aggravated kidnapping, (3) the court erred in allowing the State to impeach the Defendant with his prior convictions under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609, (4) he is entitled to relief due to the cumulative effect of the court’s errors, and (5) the court erred in classifying him as a Range III, persistent offender for his aggravated assault conviction. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions and the trial court’s judgment for aggravated kidnapping, and we remand the case with instructions for the trial court to correct the Defendant’s aggravated assault judgment to reflect a ten-year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender.

Defendant, Jennifer May Mahaffey, pled guilty to alternate counts of sale of methamphetamine “over 0.5 grams” and delivery of methamphetamine “over 0.5 grams”1 in three cases, 20-027-2, 20-028-2, and 20-029-2. The trial court sentenced Defendant to ten years imprisonment on each count, merged the alternate counts in each case, and ran the ten-year sentences in two of the cases concurrently with each other, and the ten-year sentence in the third case consecutively to the first two, for a total effective sentence of twenty years confinement. The trial court also imposed fines totaling $6,100, and ordered restitution in the amount of $563. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred in ordering restitution to the Henderson County Sheriff’s Department, in imposing fines and restitution without determining her present and future ability to pay, and in imposing partial consecutive sentences. After reviewing the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we discern no reversible error in the trial court’s imposition of partial consecutive sentences, but we determine the order of restitution was in error. Therefore, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court, vacate the orders of restitution, and remand for entry of corrected judgments.

A Shelby County Jury convicted William Heath, Petitioner, of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment. On direct appeal, we affirmed the judgments of the trial court, and the Tennessee Supreme Court declined discretionary review. Petitioner then petitioned for post-conviction relief alleging trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and we affirmed the post-conviction court’s judgment. While Petitioner’s post-conviction petition was pending, he moved for DNA analysis and post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and Petitioner now appeals. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.