The genesis of this case lies in the investigation into a city’s police department and subsequent termination of the appellant, a former police department employee. After the appellant was terminated, his counsel sent a public records request to the city, one of the appellees herein, pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act. Through this public records request, the city was asked for copies of, among other things, “investigative material” related to the appellant. Although some records were initially produced in response to the public records request, other records were not provided until after litigation was initiated by the appellant in chancery court. Certain “investigatory” records that had formerly been in the possession of an attorney hired by the city to investigate the police department were not ever produced. Although the parties dispute whether such “investigatory” records would be subject to disclosure under the Tennessee Public Records Act, such records had, according to the findings of the chancery court, been destroyed by the time the city received the public records request at issue herein. Upon the conclusion of the trial litigation, the chancery court also found that “all requested documents that exist had been provided” and determined that the city “did not willfully refuse to disclose documents and records.” In light of its determination that the city did not act willfully, the chancery court held that attorney’s fees would not be awarded in this case. For the reasons stated herein, the chancery court’s judgment is affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

An owner and a contractor executed a standard form construction agreement. The contract identified the “Contractor” as a corporation and two individuals. Only one of the individuals signed the contract, but he did so as president of the corporation. After a dispute arose with a supplier, the owner filed a third-party complaint against the individual who signed on behalf of the corporation. The individual moved to dismiss and/or for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that he was not a party to the contract. The court agreed and dismissed the claims against him with prejudice. We reverse.

Defendant, Charles Felix Bell, Jr., appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probationary sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to sell. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Matthew F. Beasley, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probationary sentence for aggravated assault and ordering him to serve the balance of his ten-year sentence in confinement. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

COLE, Circuit Judge. In August 2020, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) and the Cincinnati Police Department (CPD) participated in a joint federal task force to arrest Mason Meyer. While fleeing from CPD officers, Meyer lost control of his vehicle and crashed into a restaurant, killing Gayle and Raymond Laible and severely injuring Steven and Maribeth Klein. The Laibles’ estate and the Kleins brought this lawsuit alleging that three CPD officers were negligent in their execution of the high-speed car chase.

The CPD defendants in this action—Sergeant Donald Scalf, Sergeant Timothy Lanter, and Officer Brett Thomas—allege that they were federal employees immune from common-law tort actions due to their participation in the federal task force to arrest Meyer. The district court denied the officers’ motion for immunity under the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2679(b)(1), (d)(1), (d)(3). We reverse the district court’s denial of immunity for Scalf because he was a federal employee acting within the scope of his employment during the chase. We affirm the district court’s denial of immunity as to Lanter and Thomas because neither were federal employees at the time of the incident.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines repeatedly instruct district courts to increase a defendant’s sentence if the defendant has one or more prior convictions for a “crime of violence.” See, e.g., U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1; 4B1.1. They define “crime of violence” to mean, as relevant here, an offense that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another[.]” Id. § 4B1.2(a). In United States v. Gloss, 661 F.3d 317 (6th Cir. 2011), we interpreted language identical to this so-called “elements clause” to cover the Tennessee crime of facilitating aggravated robbery. Id. at 318–20.

Viewing itself bound by Gloss, the district court in this case treated Al Dorsey’s prior convictions for facilitating aggravated robbery as “crimes of violence.” Dorsey now offers two reasons why we need not follow Gloss. He first asserts that Gloss conflicts with an earlier decision holding that facilitation offenses (unlike aiding-and-abetting offenses) do not require defendants to harbor an intent to commit the crime that their conduct facilitated. See United States v. Vanhook, 640 F.3d 706, 713–14 (6th Cir. 2011). He next asserts that Gloss conflicts with a later Supreme Court decision holding that the elements clause does not reach reckless uses of force. See Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420, 429 (2021) (plurality opinion); id. at 445–46 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Dorsey is wrong on both counts. Because we must follow Gloss, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Kip Dylane Buie, pled guilty to second degree murder and attempted second degree murder. He received an effective forty-year sentence. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his plea counsel was ineffective during the plea process and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appealed to this Court. On our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this personal injury case, Appellants, Husband and Wife, alleged that Appellee’s dog collided with Husband’s bicycle causing him to crash and sustain injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee dog owner, finding that Appellants failed to meet their burden to show that Appellee’s dog was involved in the accident. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judge. The legal questions in this appeal arise from a bitter fight pitting a son against his father and stepfamily over a family business. Scott Gammons claims that Adroit Medical Systems, Inc., Grazyna Gammons (his stepmother), Kelley Patten (his stepsister), and Gene Gammons (his father) (collectively, the defendants) diverted company funds for Grazyna and Kelley’s personal benefit without accounting for the tax consequences. According to Scott, the defendants fired him because he reported their alleged financial malfeasance to the Internal Revenue Service. He further claims that if the defendants are not removed from the business, they will continue misappropriating company funds. Scott brought an action seeking recovery under federal and state whistleblower statutes and state common law. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on all five of his claims, reasoning that Scott had obtained a legally baseless emergency conservatorship over Gene and used it to mount a corporate takeover. After the defendants regained control of the family business, that coup—irrespective of any whistleblowing—motivated their decision to fire Scott, defeating Scott’s claims as a matter of law. We affirm.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Chappelle Gales’s mother passed away while residing in a nursing home. Gales attributes her mother’s death to inadequate care, so she sued the facility for medical malpractice under state law. Gales hired an expert witness to testify on her behalf. But the district court excluded the expert’s testimony due to his unfamiliarity with local medical standards. And without expert testimony to support her claims, the district court held, Gales’s suit could not proceed. Finding no abuse of discretion by the district court, we now affirm.