The Defendant, Christopher Layne Spencer, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and violating the sexual offender registration act, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-504 (2018) (aggravated sexual battery); 40-39-211(k) (2019) (sexual offender registry). The Defendant was sentenced to an effective fourteen years for the convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for violating the sexual offender registry, (2) the trial court erred by admitting text messages as evidence, (3) the trial court erred by denying his request for a mistrial, (4) the trial court erred by limiting his closing argument, (5) the prosecutor engaged in improper closing argument, (6) the trial court erred with its jury instructions, and (7) the cumulative effect of the alleged errors entitles him to relief. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Terrell Craft, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder and three counts of aggravated assault, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s omission of a jury instruction on the defense of necessity. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This interlocutory appeal involves the trial court’s denial of the employer’s motion for an extension of time to produce certain cell phone records responsive to a subpoena issued on behalf of the decedent’s surviving spouse. Prior to this motion, the employer filed a motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum seeking the decedent’s work and personal cell phone records. During the hearing, Employer argued the requested information was under the control of a separate corporate entity. The court denied the employer’s motion to quash, noting it offered no proof in support of that assertion. The court further rejected the employer’s arguments that it was unable to comply with the subpoena due to retention policies concerning text messages and lack of knowledge regarding the identity of the users of the requested cellular phone numbers. Finally, the court rejected the employer’s arguments that the records were irrelevant, contained confidential information, and that the production of these records would reveal private communications. The court ordered the employer to provide the requested information by certain deadlines, and that order was not appealed. The employer later obtained two extensions of time to comply with the subpoena, ultimately filing a notice of partial compliance and another motion for an extension. The trial court denied the most recent motion, noting the previous extensions, the employer’s changing position as to why it could not produce the records, and the employer’s failure to provide evidence of its inability to comply. Upon careful consideration of the record, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the motion for an extension of time and remand the case.

For the week of January 15, 2024 - January 19, 2024

Appellant David Hutchins challenges the trial court's denial of his Motion to continue a summary judgment hearing and its denial of his Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's summary judgment. The appeal was referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions oflaw pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm.

The Defendant, Jeffrey Clay Dale, was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of two counts of driving under the influence, third offense, which the trial court merged. See T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401(1) (2020) (driving under the influence of an intoxicant), -401(2) (driving with a blood- or breath-alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more), 55-10-402 (a)(3)(A) (2020) (subsequently amended) (third offense driving under the influence). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with 140 days to be served in jail and the balance on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred in allowing a law enforcement officer to testify about his observations during field sobriety testing of the Defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant is the Mayor of Shelby County. He filed a complaint for divorce, and the Shelby County chancellor originally assigned to the case recused herself. The case was reassigned to another Shelby County chancellor who accepted the case. Six months later, the appellant filed a motion to recuse the chancellor based on the Mayor’s budgetary duties regarding Shelby County government, including the chancery court and the chancery court clerk. The chancellor denied the motion, finding that it was not filed promptly in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. We affirm.

Petitioner, Tavaris D. Bledsoe, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in concluding that he received the effective assistance of counsel. Upon our review, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to prepare a sufficient brief in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7) and Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 10(b). Accordingly, his issues are waived, and the appeal is dismissed.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. After more than a decade of regulatory and judicial proceedings, Sprint Communications concedes that it failed to pay Brandenburg Telephone Company in full for connecting local telephone calls and now owes $2.2 million plus compound interest. This appeal concerns one residual question: the interest rate on the award. Sprint says that Brandenburg’s filed utility tariff sets the interest rate at 8%, and that Sprint is on the hook for $4.3 million in interest. Brandenburg replies that the tariff imposes a rate of 10.66%, bringing Sprint’s bill to $7.1 million in interest. The district court ruled for Sprint. We affirm.

Bobby V. Summers, Petitioner, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition as time-barred. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.