The Petitioner, James Moore, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted first degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-six years’ imprisonment. He now appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief, arguing that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to: (1) subpoena records that might have shown the victim’s intoxication; and (2) adequately advise the Petitioner about testifying. Alternatively, he argues that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s deficiencies entitles him to relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Christopher Laron Matthews, Defendant, appeals the trial court’s consecutive alignment of twelve-year sentences for sale of methamphetamine in Case No. 27504 and Case No. 27505 for an effective twenty-four-year sentence. The trial court based the consecutive sentencing on its finding that Defendant was an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive. We affirm.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights based on Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(l4). Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns a lawsuit challenging the Tennessee Education Savings Account Pilot Program, Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-2601, et seq. (“the ESA Act”). A group of parents and taxpayers from Davidson and Shelby Counties (“Plaintiffs”) sued state officials (“State Defendants”) in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). In their operative amended complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that the ESA Act violates the Tennessee Constitution and state law by diverting taxpayer funds appropriated for public schools in Davidson and Shelby Counties to private schools, resulting in unique harm to these localities. A group of parents with children eligible for the ESA Act (“Bah Defendants”) and another group (“Greater Praise Defendants”) (all defendants collectively, “Defendants”) intervened in defense of the ESA Act. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted on grounds that Plaintiffs lack standing and their claims are not ripe for judicial review. In reaching its decision, the Trial Court found that the ESA Act has not caused the affected counties any unequal hardship. Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their first, second, and sixth causes of action only. We conclude that the Trial Court erred by deciding factual disputes over the impact of the ESA Act on Plaintiffs at the motion to dismiss stage. Plaintiffs alleged enough in their amended complaint to establish standing both as parents and taxpayers. Plaintiffs’ claims also are ripe for judicial review. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Trial Court as to Plaintiffs’ first, second, and sixth causes of action and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Syeda C. (“Mother”) and Hosea T. (“Father”)2 (Mother and Father collectively, “Parents”) are the biological parents of Gabrella T. (the “Child”). The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) petitioned the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County (the “Juvenile Court”) for an adjudication that the Child was dependent and neglected in the care of Parents and for an award of temporary legal custody of the Child to DCS. The Juvenile Court granted DCS’s petition, adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected, and awarded temporary legal custody of the Child to DCS. Mother appealed the Juvenile Court order to the Shelby County Circuit Court (the “Circuit Court”). Mother failed to appear at the hearing in the Circuit Court on her appeal; upon oral motion made by DCS, the Circuit Court dismissed Mother’s appeal. Mother now appeals to this Court. Upon thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.

This is an appeal of a trial court's valuation of a marital asset, division of a marital estate, and award of alimony in solido as a result of the divorce of Eric Wayne Barton ("Husband") and Mechelle Scholmer Barton ("Wife"). In its 2018 Final Judgment of Divorce ("2018 Judgment"), the Chancery Court for Blount County ("the Trial Court") found that Husband's 100% interest in Vanquish Worldwide, LLC, ("Vanquish Worldwide") was marital property and that Vanquish Worldwide's outstanding claim for potentially $32 million against the U.S. Government ("Government Claim") was marital property. The Trial Court accordingly awarded to Wife a portion of the Government Claim. In Husband's first appeal, this Court reversed the Trial Court's finding that the Government Claim was marital property and its awarded portion to Wife. This Court, concluding that the Government Claim was nevertheless relevant to an accurate valuation of Vanquish Worldwide and the total value of the parties' marital business interests, instructed the Trial Court on remand to revalue Vanquish Worldwide, and in doing so, to consider the Government Claim. On remand, the Trial Court found that Husband had dissipated $12 .3 7 5 million of the Government Claim proceeds by using the funds to satisfy a personal judgment against him. The Trial Court accordingly added the dissipated $12.375 million to its $4 million valuation of Vanquish Worldwide. Husband has appealed, contesting the Trial Court's consideration of the Government Claim proceeds in its valuation of Vanquish Worldwide, as well as its overall division of the marital estate, award of alimony in solido, and placement of a lien and an assignment in trust to Wife on Husband's ownership interests in his numerous LLCs, including Vanquish Worldwide. We affirm the Trial Court's finding that Husband dissipated marital property and its valuation of Vanquish Worldwide but modify the Trial Court's judgment to the extent it awarded interest on Wife's award of alimony in solido. The balance of the Trial Court's judgment is affirmed, including its division of the marital estate and award of alimony in solido to Wife. We further decline to award Wife attorney's fees on appeal.

In this divorce appeal, the husband challenges the trial court’s classification of real estate as marital property. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. After being arrested for public intoxication, Timmy Mosier resisted being escorted to the booking area of the Crockett County Jail. In response, Crockett County Deputy Joseph Evans pulled Mosier to the ground, which he hit head-first. Mosier brought federal civil-rights and state-law tort claims against Evans and Crockett County. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the civil-rights claims and their partial motion to dismiss the negligence claims. Mosier argues that the district court erred in granting each of those motions. For the reasons below, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. In late 2019, William Ashford (“Ashford”), a police officer employed by the University of Michigan-Dearborn (“UM-D”), spoke with a reporter at The Detroit Times about his concerns that the UM-D police department was mishandling a student’s allegation that one of her professors had sexually assaulted her. After his supervisors at the University, including then-Vice Chancellor Jeffrey Evans (“Evans”) and UM-D Police Chief Gary Gorski (“Gorski”), learned that he had taken his thoughts about the case to the media, they launched an inquiry into his actions in November 2019. At the conclusion of their investigation, UM-D suspended Ashford for ten days without pay. Ashford sued UM-D, the University of Michigan, Evans (in his individual and official capacities) and Gorski (in his individual and official capacities), bringing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 First Amendment claim1 that he had been unconstitutionally retaliated against for engaging in protected speech. Ashford sought to have the suspension removed from his employment record, as well as monetary damages.

The defendants argued in a motion for summary judgment that Ashford’s suit against the university and its officers in their official capacities was barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, and that the officers in their individual capacities were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied their motion with respect to both sovereign and qualified immunity. In this interlocutory appeal, the defendants ask this court to reverse the district court’s decision. We AFFIRM the district court’s ruling on sovereign and qualified immunity.

Plaintiff’s attorneys appeal the trial court’s imposition of sanctions against them in the amount of $68,617.28 and the denial of their second motion to disqualify the trial court judge. We affirm the trial court’s discretionary decision to impose sanctions, but we vacate the amount of sanctions awarded and remand for the trial court to calculate the reasonable amount of monetary sanctions in keeping with the procedures and considerations outlined in this opinion. We have determined that Plaintiff’s attorneys’ issue regarding the trial court’s denial of their second motion to recuse is moot. Finally, we decline to award attorney’s fees on appeal.