In the course of two separate dependency and neglect proceedings, a mother and father were found to have committed severe child abuse on their two children. In this termination proceeding, the trial court found that the grounds for termination of (1) severe child abuse, and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility of the children had been proven and that it was in the children’s best interest to terminate their parents’ parental rights. The parents appealed. We affirm.

Employee alleges that his termination from a county election commission was based on discrimination. His timely-filed federal case against the State of Tennessee was subsequently dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Twenty-one days after the federal case was dismissed and a total of almost three years after his termination, Employee refiled in state court, raising the same allegations of violations of the Tennessee Human Rights Act and the Tennessee Disability Act against the State. Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent that the federal savings statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), does not apply against a nonconsenting State defendant dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533 (2002), we conclude that Employee’s state court complaint was untimely. We therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment on a different ground than that relied upon by the trial court.

This is a divorce action. Wife appeals the trial court's division of property and debt and asserts that the trial court erred by not classifying and awarding certain real property in accordance with the parties' stipulations. She also appeals the trial court's denial of her request for an extension of the order of protection issued against Husband and the assignment of costs to her. We reverse the trial court's interpretation of the parties' stipulations regarding the classification of real property inherited by Wife. Because this holding impacts the value of the parties' separate property and the marital estate, we remand for reconsideration of the division of marital assets. We affirm the trial court's equal division of marital debt and denial of Wife's request for an extended protective order. We vacate the assignment of costs to Wife and remand the case to the trial court.

In this interlocutory appeal, the defendant municipal board claimed that a document attached to the plaintiffs’ amended complaint was protected by the attorney work product doctrine and therefore could not be relied upon or otherwise utilized by the plaintiffs. The defendant further urged that such protection had not been waived. The trial court disagreed, finding that although portions of the document were protected by the work product doctrine, such protection had been waived. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The appeal is dismissed because Appellant’s brief fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7)(A) and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6(a). In addition, Appellant failed to provide a written transcript of the relevant proceedings despite our order requiring same. The absence of a transcript negates our ability to review the trial court’s substantive findings, and the failure to comply with the rules of briefing puts this Court in the position of having to create Appellant’s arguments, which we decline to do. Appeal dismissed.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Proceeding pro se in district court, Lyle Heyward filed a complaint alleging that prison officials frustrated his attempts to celebrate Ramadan in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). He also alleges that officials retaliated against him for filing grievances in violation of the First Amendment. The district court dismissed Heyward’s claims. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Adam Carson of robbing a bank and tampering with a witness; a district court sentenced him to 20 years in prison; and we upheld his convictions and sentence on direct appeal. In these post-conviction proceedings, Carson argues that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to initiate plea negotiations and by committing several trial mistakes. He also argues that he did not knowingly waive his right to testify. Yet Carson’s ineffective-assistance claims fail on prejudice grounds. Even if a dispute of fact exists over whether he asked counsel to look into a plea deal, only speculation supports his claim that the parties would have reached a deal but for counsel’s inaction. The overwhelming evidence of his guilt also shows that counsel’s conduct at trial did not affect the verdict. Lastly, Carson did not object to his counsel’s statement that he did not want to testify. So our cases require us to presume that he knowingly waived this right. And while Carson now asserts that counsel misrepresented his wishes, he cannot rebut our presumption with this after-the-fact allegation. We affirm.

In a prior appeal, we addressed multiple issues connected to a judgment that was entered following a bench trial. Among other things, we affirmed the trial court’s determination that one of the Defendants in this litigation should be held liable for breach of fiduciary duty, but we also rejected multiple issues raised by the Plaintiffs in pursuit of additional relief. As part of our disposition, we remanded the case for further proceedings with respect to matters of costs and expenses under Tennessee Code Annotated section 35-15- 1004, as well as prejudgment interest. After the trial court entered orders on remand addressing these issues, the Plaintiffs filed the present appeal, chiefly arguing (a) that they are entitled to 100% of their costs and expenses and (b) that the trial court erred in the amount of prejudgment interest it awarded them. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Plaintiffs filed suit against a neighboring church and its pastor, alleging violations of local ordinances, as well as nuisance and trespass. The Defendants responded with a petition for dismissal under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA). After the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ attempt to voluntarily dismiss the pastor, the Defendants, in response to a statement by opposing counsel, filed a motion seeking an order of dismissal of the pastor with prejudice. The trial court denied that motion. Before the scheduled hearing on the TPPA petition could occur, the Defendants appealed the trial court’s denial of their motion for an order of dismissal as to the pastor, purportedly proceeding under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-17-106, a provision of the TPPA that allows for an immediate appeal of a grant or denial of a TPPA petition. Because the order being appealed is not a dismissal or a refusal to dismiss a legal action pursuant to the Defendants’ TPPA petition, which is still pending before the trial court, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Appellant appeals the dismissal of his second lawsuit seeking damages and injunctive relief against four defendants allegedly associated with his criminal prosecution. The trial court dismissed the second lawsuit as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm.