This case arises from a forcible entry and detainer proceeding. Because Appellant’s principal brief fails to comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, the appeal is dismissed.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Dantis Lakka-Lako, of one count of especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated rape, one count of especially aggravated burglary, and two counts of theft of property. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of fifty years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his confession. He additionally contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for especially aggravated robbery and aggravated rape, and that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is a negligent misrepresentation action in which the plaintiff filed suit against the attorney responsible for transferring her mother’s assets into an irrevocable trust. The plaintiff alleged that she approved the transfer because she was erroneously advised that the terms of the irrevocable trust would require distribution upon her mother’s passing. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissal in favor of the defendant attorney. We affirm.

This case stems from a dispute over a parcel of real property located in Monroe County, Tennessee. Following a partition action and sale of the property, the trial court entered an order dividing the sale proceeds between several parties that the trial court determined had an interest in the property at the time of the sale. One of those parties appeals, arguing that it is entitled to a bigger portion of the sale proceeds. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this divorce action, the trial court entered an order in December 2021, according to the parties’ announced agreement, granting the parties a divorce on stipulated grounds and directing, inter alia, that the marital residence would be sold at auction and that any “marital personal property” upon which the parties could not reach an agreement prior to the auction would be “sold by the court when the [marital residence was] auctioned.” The court also memorialized the parties’ agreement that each would keep the vehicles in his or her possession and be responsible for debts incurred in each of their respective names. In an order entered in April 2022, the court confirmed that the marital residence had been sold at auction to the husband. Following a bench trial, the court found that, with the exception of two personal items belonging to the wife, the marital residence and “the contents located at the property” were all marital property; that the proceeds from “marital property located at the home” were included in the auction sale proceeds; and that the proceeds from the auction should be divided equally between the parties. The wife has appealed. Upon careful consideration, we affirm the trial court’s findings that the marital personal property located at the marital residence had been sold with the marital residence and that the auction sale price reflected the total valuation of both the residence and personal property sold. We also affirm the trial court’s adoption of the parties’ agreement regarding vehicles and debts. However, we vacate the trial court’s classification of the marital residence as marital property and the court’s overall distribution of marital property. We remand for (1) further findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding classification of the marital residence and, if necessary, identification of any increase in value of the marital residence that resulted from the husband’s significant contributions during the marriage; (2) a limited evidentiary hearing to identify, classify, and value the parties’ bank accounts; and (3) reconsideration of the marital property distribution inclusive of the findings on remand and pursuant to the statutory factors provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c) (2021).

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, filed by Arthur A. Allen (“Father”), seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Father, and finding no error, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant of rape of a child for which he received a sentence of 60 years’ confinement as a career offender. On appeal, the defendant claims the trial court erred in allowing the State, over the defendant’s objection, to dismiss the second count of the indictment, aggravated sexual battery, at the close of its proof. Additionally, the defendant asserts that the demonstrative aid used by the prosecutor during jury voir dire constituted misconduct. The State insists that “it is within the State’s prerogative” to dismiss count two and that by failing to object, the defendant has waived his claim relating to the State’s voir dire. Upon our review of the record, the applicable law, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Henry Moore, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction or habeas corpus relief, which petition challenged his guilty-pleaded conviction of evading arrest, alleging that the stop and seizure of his vehicle was unlawful, that his guilty plea was involuntary, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Because the petitioner’s claims are not cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding, the trial court properly denied habeas corpus relief. Because, however, some of the petitioner’s claims are cognizable in post-conviction proceedings and because the petition was not untimely, the trial court erred by summarily dismissing the petition as one for post-conviction relief. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further post-conviction proceedings.

The defendant, Robert Leroy Littleton, III, appeals his Johnson County Criminal Court convictions of first-degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, conspiracy to commit especially aggravated kidnapping, extortion, and conspiracy to commit extortion, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statements. Because the defendant’s motion for new trial was untimely filed, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Donald Gwin, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his jury-trial convictions for aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault, for which he is serving an effective thirty-five-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.