The Petitioner, Jerry P. Haley, appeals from the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his convictions for aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated criminal trespass and his effective sixty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This is an appeal from a final judgment in a conservatorship case. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate court within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

In this appeal of a compensation order granting summary judgment to the employer, the employee argues there are multiple disputed questions of material fact regarding whether the injury arose primarily out of his employment. The employee was working as a manager of an automobile repair store in July 2021 when he and a co-worker began discussing the possible sale of a gun. Subsequently, the co-worker accidentally shot the employee, causing extensive injuries. The employee sought workers’ compensation benefits, and the employer filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the injury did not arise primarily out of the employment as purchasing a personal weapon and the presence of a gun were not risks inherent to managing an automobile repair shop. The employee argued there were questions of material fact regarding, among other things, whether the injured employee asked to see the gun, whether the employer knew that its employees regularly brought guns to work, and whether the employee handled the gun in an effort to disarm it for the safety of the store and general public. The trial court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment, and the employee has appealed. Following careful review of the record and the arguments of counsel, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the case for additional proceedings.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, acting pro se, entered guilty pleas to various felony offenses and received an effective sentence of six years’ imprisonment. A few weeks later, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, claiming they were unknowing and involuntarily entered because he was not advised of the consequences of the guilty pleas.1 Following a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s motion. For the first time in this appeal, the Defendant claims that his waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; therefore, his subsequent guilty pleas were constitutionally invalid. The Defendant additionally claims the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and determining that his guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered. Upon our review, we conclude that the trial court’s investigation of the factors bearing upon the Defendant’s knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel complied with Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004). We further conclude that the Defendant failed to establish that manifest injustice required the withdrawal of his guilty pleas. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Joseph Jerome Griggs, appeals from the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his aggravated rape conviction, for which he is serving a twenty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the post- conviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal follows the dismissal of the appellant’s claim for damages in the Tennessee Claims Commission. The appellant, who was injured during a class she participated in while enrolled as a student in the occupational therapy program at the University of Tennessee Health Science Center, submits that the Commission’s failure to find her professor negligent was in error. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The trial court terminated parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for the child. The court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. We agree and affirm.

In this divorce case, Husband/Appellant appeals the amount and duration of alimony in futuro awarded to Wife/Appellee. Husband also appeals the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Wife for Husband’s alleged failure to comply with discovery. We conclude that the amount of alimony in futuro exceeds Wife’s need. As such, the award of alimony in futuro is modified to $3,451.00 per month and shall terminate upon Wife’s death or remarriage, or Husband’s death in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121(f)(3). We vacate the trial court’s award of $20,000.00 in attorney’s fees to Wife and remand for the trial court to enter an order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding this issue pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01.

This is a post-divorce action in which both parents seek to modify the permanent parenting plan and the father seeks to reduce his financial support obligations. The mother filed her Petition to Modify Permanent Parenting Plan in which she requested, inter alia, a reduction of the father’s parenting time and that she be awarded sole decision-making authority for the non-emergency medical and educational decisions for the parties’ two minor children. The father filed his Counter-Petition to Modify the Parenting Plan seeking, inter alia, that he be awarded the tie-breaking vote for all medical decisions for the children; that joint decision-making authority for educational decisions be maintained between the parties; that his financial obligations be modified, including child support as well as previously agreed-upon additional educational and medical expenses; and that he be awarded more parenting time. Following a trial that spanned 10 days, the trial court found in a 53-page memorandum opinion and final order that neither party proved a material change of circumstance that justified modification of the parenting schedule. However, the court found the parents’ inability to successfully co-parent under the existing joint decision- making provision adversely affected the children’s non-emergency healthcare and educational needs. The court also found that it was in the children’s best interests that the “[m]other have sole decision-making authority over their non-emergency healthcare and day-to-day education, free of any interference or delays by the father and without being required to consult with him in advance.” The court denied the father’s request to modify child support as well as his request to modify responsibility for educational, medical, and extracurricular expenses. The father appeals. We affirm the trial court in all respects. We also find that the mother is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses she incurred in defending this appeal and remand this issue to the trial court to make the appropriate award.

For the week of November 6, 2023 - November 10, 2023