The Defendant, Hank Cooley, Jr., appeals from his best interest, guilty-pleaded convictions for felony evading arrest risking death or injury, driving on a revoked license (second offense), reckless driving, disobeying a traffic signal, violation of the light law, speeding, and failure to exercise due care. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-603(b)(3)(B) (2018) (subsequently amended) (evading arrest), 55-50-504 (2020) (driving on a revoked license), 55-10-205 (2020) (reckless driving), 55-8-110 (2020) (subsequently amended) (disobeying a traffic signal), 55-9-402 (2020) (subsequently amended) (violation of light law), 55-8-152 (2008) (speeding), and 55-8-136 (2020) (failure to exercise due care). The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends the court erred by denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by Martin Walker ("Petitioner"), an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction ("TDOC"). Petitioner seeks review of the decision by the Tennessee Board of Parole ("Board") to deny him parole. He raises numerous challenges to the propriety of the Board's action and procedures. Finding no error, we affirm.

Neighbors sued to invalidate zoning ordinances that would allow two real estate development projects to be built at significantly taller heights than prior zoning regulations allowed. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim in part because it found that the passage of two zoning ordinances gave the developers vested property rights under the Tennessee Vested Property Rights Act of 2014 (VPRA). We conclude the trial court erred in its application of the VPRA, but we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim.

A homeowner, displeased with the work performed by a handyman, brought suit, seeking damages and relief under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The handyman counterclaimed for the value of the oral contract for services, asserting the homeowner breached the contract by improperly terminating it. The circuit court denied relief to both parties, and the parties appeal. We conclude that the circuit court did not err in determining that there was no enforceable contract, precluding relief for the handyman. Likewise, the homeowner is not entitled to relief because the evidence does not preponderate against the circuit court’s finding that there was no misrepresentation and that the handyman rendered services to earn certain prepaid amounts. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

This is an appeal of the trial court’s order denying the employee’s motion to compel compliance with an earlier order for ongoing temporary disability benefits. While at work, the employee was physically assaulted by a customer who then struck the employee with a vehicle and dragged her several feet when attempting to leave the employer’s parking lot. The employee suffered an injury to her back and received workers’ compensation benefits. Upon reaching maximum medical improvement for her back injury, the employer stopped paying temporary disability benefits. Thereafter, the employer authorized a psychiatric evaluation, and the employee was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and restricted from work. The employee requested an expedited hearing to reinstate temporary total disability benefits, and the trial court determined that although the employee suffered physical injuries, her mental injury did not arise primarily from the physical injuries, rendering Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(1)(E) inapplicable. Accordingly, the court ordered the employer to pay past and ongoing temporary total disability benefits, and that order was not appealed. Subsequently, 104 weeks after the accident, the employer ceased payment of temporary benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(1)(D)(ii), which limits such benefits to a maximum of 104 weeks “after the date of injury” for mental injuries “where there is no underlying physical injury.” The employee filed a motion to compel the employer’s compliance with the prior order, asserting she was entitled to continuing temporary benefits. The employer argued that the employee was conclusively presumed to be at maximum medical improvement pursuant to the applicable statute. In a decision on the record, the trial court denied the employee’s motion, and the employee has appealed. Upon careful consideration of the record and arguments of counsel, we affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.

This is an appeal from a case arising in the Shelby County General Sessions Environmental Court. For the reasons stated herein, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review this appeal. Moreover, we are unable to transfer this appeal because it was not timely filed for the appropriate court that has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and it is, therefore, dismissed.

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to her two children. Following a trial, the juvenile court found that six grounds for termination had been proven and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Based on these findings, the mother’s parental rights were terminated. The mother appeals. Of the six grounds the juvenile court found had been proven, we affirm four of them but reverse two. We also affirm the determination that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of her parental rights.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. The Black Lung Benefits Act authorizes benefits for coal miners who have “pneumoconiosis.” The Department of Labor’s regulatory definition of this term covers an obstructive lung disease such as emphysema if the disease arises from coal-mine work. Over two decades ago, the Department responded to criticisms of this broad definition in a regulatory “preamble” to its final regulation. The preamble interpreted the then-existing scientific studies to establish that coal-mine work can cause obstructive diseases, either alone or in combination with smoking. The administrative law judge who awarded benefits in this case repeatedly relied on this preamble to discredit a coal-mine operator’s three experts. In this petition for review, the operator argues that the judge wrongly treated the preamble as legally “binding.” We disagree. The judge simply found the preamble more persuasive than the experts. So we deny the operator’s petition for review. But we caution administrative law judges that their conclusions may lack substantial evidence if they over-rely on the preamble for propositions that it does not contain.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. Kathy Griffin, a California-based celebrity and social activist, sent a series of tweets to her two million Twitter followers asserting that Tennessean Samuel Johnson, the CEO of Tennessee-based VisuWell, had engaged in homophobic conduct. She encouraged her followers to make him “online famous” and tagged his company. She then asked his employer to “remove[]” him from the Board of Directors and threatened that the “nation w[ould] remain vigilant” if it did not. Within a day of her first tweets, the company fired Johnson and removed him from the Board. Johnson and his wife sued Griffin in federal court in Tennessee, claiming (among other things) that she tortiously interfered with his employment. Griffin argued that her tweets did not subject her to the State’s personal jurisdiction, and the district court dismissed the case. We disagree and reverse.

The State of Tennessee appealed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s order granting the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence recovered during the search of her car. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred because probable cause existed to search the Defendant’s car based on a police dog’s signal for the presence of narcotics. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for reinstatement of the charges.