Neighbors sued to invalidate zoning ordinances that would allow two real estate development projects to be built at significantly taller heights than prior zoning regulations allowed. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim in part because it found that the passage of two zoning ordinances gave the developers vested property rights under the Tennessee Vested Property Rights Act of 2014 (VPRA). We conclude the trial court erred in its application of the VPRA, but we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim.

Father appeals the trial court’s finding of abandonment by wanton disregard as a ground for termination of his parental rights, as well as its finding that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

The Plaintiff brought a premises liability claim after falling off his own ladder while at the Defendant’s residence. The Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing he had no duty to warn and could avoid liability under principles of comparative fault. The Plaintiff countered that the Defendant was actually his employer and that the Defendant’s decision not to provide workers’ compensation insurance prevented the Defendant from being able to raise a comparative fault defense. Furthermore, the Plaintiff argued that the Defendant did have a duty to warn. The trial court granted the Defendant summary judgment finding no duty to warn and that even if a duty existed that Plaintiff’s claim failed as a matter of law based upon comparative fault principles. The Plaintiff appealed to this Court. We affirm.

This is an appeal of the termination of a father’s and mother’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Sevier County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking the termination of the parental rights of Justin S. (“Father”) and Alyse C. (“Mother”) to their minor son Edward C. (“the Child”). The Juvenile Court found that DCS had established by clear and convincing evidence the following statutory grounds for each parent: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, (2) persistence of conditions, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. The Juvenile Court further found that termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Although we vacate the statutory ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home due to insufficient findings of fact as it relates to Mother, we affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment in all other respects, including termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on four grounds. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services does not defend two of the four grounds, so we reverse as to those grounds. We affirm the ground that Mother is unable to parent the children due to her present mental condition. Because the trial court’s order does not contain sufficient findings of fact, we vacate the trial court’s findings that the mother failed to manifest a willingness and ability to parent and that termination is in the children’s best interests.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. An unfortunate series of errors by a Kentucky trial court coupled with inmate Albert Jones’s failure to appeal those mistakes resulted in Jones serving a longer sentence than he was promised by prosecutors. In that respect, the Commonwealth of Kentucky seems to have wronged Jones. The case before us, however, is not the vehicle for remedying that wrong. Defendants—state corrections officials—neither caused nor contributed to Jones’s over-incarceration, nor could they unilaterally remedy the matter, which was dictated by two court orders. Because Jones comes well short of showing that defendants deliberately failed to act (or took only ineffectual action), let alone caused Jones’s allegedly improper sentence, defendants are entitled to an award of qualified immunity. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court.

A Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner, Richard Williams, III, of several offenses, including attempted first degree murder. He later filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after finding that it was untimely and that principles of due process did not toll the running of the statute of limitations. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court did not adequately consider the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on his ability to access the prison library and, therefore, to timely file his petition. We respectfully disagree and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Glen Edward Miller, pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and two counts of kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced him to a twelve-year effective sentence, to be served on probation after one year of confinement. In response to the Defendant’s second proven probation violation, the trial court ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal from this judgment, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence; (2) the evidence is insufficient to prove that he violated his probation; and (3) the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Nicole L. Lindholm, appeals the trial court’s imposition of an effective five-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction for her convictions for aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony, which followed the trial court’s revocation of her probationary sentence on judicial diversion. The Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence and erred by denying her request for probation. Based on our review, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

A Hawkins County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher James Funk, Sr., of driving under the influence of an intoxicant and possessing a firearm while under the influence of alcohol. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days after service of forty-eight hours in custody. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying both his motion to suppress and his subsequent motion for an interlocutory appeal. The State asserts that the Defendant waived any issue regarding his motion to suppress by failing to file a motion for a new trial. It also argues that the denial of an interlocutory appeal may not be challenged in a later direct appeal. On our review, we agree with the State and respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgments.