The Pettioner, Victercika Gilchrease, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her guilty plea convictions for second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault, for which she is serving an agreed, effective twenty-one-year sentence. On appeal, she contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on her ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Lorie Ann Gerbis, was convicted following a bench trial of two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. Specifically, she contends that the State’s evidence was inadequate to establish her identity as the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Micah Joshua Ford, alias Joseph Tolbert, III, appeals the denial of his postconviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. He also argues that he is entitled to a new trial under the doctrine of cumulative error. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

After a long-term marriage, the parties divorced. The trial court, which found the husband’s testimony not to be credible, set the value of the marital property, divided the marital property, and awarded alimony in futuro to the wife. The husband appeals, challenging the credibility finding, the trial court’s valuation of the marital property, the division of property, and the alimony award. We affirm the trial court’s valuation and distribution of the marital property, but we vacate the trial court’s alimony award, remanding for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Bradley Dwight Bowen, appeals from his jury convictions for possession of one-half gram or more of methamphetamine with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver; simple possession of cocaine; possession of drug paraphernalia; and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; for which he received an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s denial of (1) his motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of his detention and (2) his motion to continue requesting additional time to prepare his pro se defense. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiffs filed this breach of contract action against their homeowners association for failure to rectify alleged violations of the neighborhood restrictions. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment establishing that the issues complained of were actual violations of the restrictions. The trial court dismissed the action in favor of the homeowners association and the plaintiffs’ neighbors who joined as interested parties. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a forfeiture action regarding funds seized during a traffic stop. In a prior appeal, this Court vacated and remanded for entry of an order that complied with Rule 58 and Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court entered an additional order on remand, and the appellant has again appealed. Due to deficiencies in the appellant’s brief on appeal, we conclude that he waived consideration of his issue on appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal.

In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, Appellant seeks to appeal from the denial of three separate motions to recuse the trial judge. As to the first motion, we affirm the trial court’s denial of that motion on the basis of Appellant’s failure to comply with Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee. As the second and third recusal motion, we dismiss this appeal, as no effective order denying those motions has yet been entered by the trial court.

This case arises from a dispute between a property owner and his homeowners’ association. The property owner, Pratik Pandharipande, purchased a home in a vacation community on a Tennessee lake, intending to use it as a short-term rental. At the time of the purchase, the property was subject to covenants requiring that the home be used for “residential and no other purposes.” The covenants were amended several years later to allow leases with minimum lease terms of thirty days. Pandharipande contends that neither the original covenants nor the amendments prohibit him from leasing his property for short terms of two to twenty-eight days. His homeowners’ association disagrees on both scores. We agree with Pandharipande that the original covenants requiring residential use of the property do not bar his short-term rentals, but we agree with the homeowners’ association that the amendments do. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the homeowners’ association based on both the original covenants and the amendments. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We affirm the Court of Appeals in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal arises from a health care liability action filed in circuit court by a conservator on behalf of a ward. After a three-week jury trial resulted in a mistrial, the conservator took a nonsuit. The conservator refiled the complaint against only one defendant hospital, asserting that it was vicariously liable for the actions of a doctor based on a theory of apparent agency. The defendant hospital moved for summary judgment on the basis that the conservator had entered into a consent agreement agreeing not to sue the doctor in the refiled suit if the doctor agreed to withdraw his motion for discretionary costs. According to the defendant hospital, this agreement releasing the alleged agent from liability extinguished the conservator’s right to pursue a vicarious liability claim against the principal. In response, the conservator took the position that the consent agreement was not binding because it was never approved by the probate court that appointed her. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendant hospital, finding that the order appointing the conservator authorized her to dispose of property, execute instruments, enter into contracts, pursue legal causes of action, and manage money, thereby authorizing her to enter into the consent agreement. The circuit court found nothing in the order of appointment, the relevant statutes, or caselaw that would impose a mandatory requirement for approval of the settlement by the probate court. Because the conservator had released the alleged agent from liability, the circuit court found that the conservator could not pursue vicarious liability claims against the defendant hospital. The conservator filed a motion to alter or amend, asking the circuit court to consider an “Advisory Opinion” of the probate court on the matter. The circuit court denied the motion, explaining that it respectfully disagreed with the Advisory Opinion of the probate court. The conservator appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.