Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Mother filed a petition alleging civil and criminal contempt against the father of her child due to unpaid child support. After several continuances, including based on Mother’s request for an in-person hearing, the juvenile court heard the matter remotely via ZOOM. At the start of the hearing, the trial court denied Mother’s request for a continuance for an in-person hearing. The trial court also ruled that it had the authority to choose whether Mother would prosecute her action as civil contempt or criminal contempt. The trial court ruled that Mother’s petition would be treated solely as a civil contempt matter, but then refused to punish Father for his past willful failure to pay child support because he had made a purge payment. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner, Jason White, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues: (1) the post-conviction court abused its discretion by failing to recuse itself; (2) the post-conviction court abused its discretion by denying Petitioner a full and fair post-conviction procedure; (3) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in numerous areas; and (4) he is entitled to relief based on cumulative error. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court, but remand the case to the post-conviction court for the entry of amended judgments that properly reflect the offenses for which Petitioner was indicted and convicted.

The Defendant, Amanda Jean Phillips, appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to “Set Aside, Amend and/or Correct Improper and Unlawful Judgments.” The Defendant argues (1) that her judgments are void due to noncompliance with the statutes and rules governing the entry of judgment forms and (2) that she is entitled to relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. Following our review, we have determined that we lack jurisdiction to hear the Defendant’s voidness arguments and that the Defendant has waived review of her Rule 36 claim. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Appellant, Mark T. Stinson, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Chancery Court that was entered on January 27, 2023. We determine that the January 27, 2023 order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

The Appellant, Nicholas Kentrell Dickerson, appeals the Fayette County Circuit Court’s orders revoking his probation and imposing his original sentences for various drug convictions and a felony evading arrest. The Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation because (1) the alleged violations were based on new charges that were subsequently dismissed, and (2) the remaining violations were technical in nature and not a valid basis for full revocation under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-311(e)(1)(A) (2022). Upon our review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Joseph Marquis Jeffries, appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts each of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment, and one count each of domestic assault, interference with emergency communications, trafficking for a commercial sex act, promotion of prostitution, and evading arrest, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to adequately explore racial bias during voir dire and (2) failing to seek additional time for the Petitioner to consider the State’s plea agreement. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Lincoln County jury convicted the Appellant, Jason Lee Schutt, of alternative counts of possession of hydrocodone with intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-408(b)(1)(F), -417(a), -417(c)(2)(A). The trial court properly merged the above counts, and following a sentencing hearing, the Appellant was ordered to serve nine years and six months in confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the alleged controlled substance was not verified by chemical analysis as hydrocodone, and that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Eleanor Grace Hoffman, filed a motion to suppress challenging the search of her purse during a traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellant was convicted as charged by a Warren County jury of simple possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Appellant’s application for judicial diversion was granted, and she was sentenced to two concurrent terms of eleven months and twentynine days suspended to supervised probation after service of ten days’ imprisonment. A probation violation order was entered, and the Appellant conceded to violating the terms of probation before the trial court. The trial court revoked her probationary judicial diversion sentence, entered judgments of conviction for simple possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, and ordered the Appellant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days’ imprisonment, with the possibility of furlough to an inpatient drug treatment facility after service of ninety days’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress. Alternatively, the Appellant argues that the trial court erred in revoking her diversionary probation and ordering service of her original sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress and revocation of the Appellant’s probation but remand for the trial court to make findings concerning the consequence imposed for the revocation.

This is an appeal of the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Davidson County (“Juvenile Court”) seeking the termination of the parental rights of Horace L. (“Father”) to his minor daughter Amayzha L. (“the Child”). The Juvenile Court found that DCS had established by clear and convincing evidence the following statutory grounds: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, (2) persistence of conditions, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. Determining that DCS presented insufficient evidence to establish that the Child was removed from Father’s home or physical or legal custody, we reverse the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and persistence of conditions. We affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Father’s parental rights.