In this interlocutory appeal, the employee appeals two orders: one excluding her expert witness and one denying her request to amend a scheduling order. The employee suffered an injury to her right shoulder and arm while moving a client’s lift chair. She later contracted an infection, which she alleged to be related to her work duties. The employer accepted the right shoulder and arm injury but denied that the infection was primarily related to the employee’s work. After the issuance of a dispute certification notice, the trial court issued a scheduling order setting certain deadlines, including a deadline for the parties to provide expert witnesses’ reports. Following a motion by the employee, the trial court modified its order and provided new deadlines. The employee did not provide her expert report by the specified date and instead filed a motion requesting a new scheduling order. The employer filed a motion to exclude the employee’s expert witness. Following a hearing, the trial court issued two orders: one granting the employer’s motion to exclude the expert witness and one denying the employee’s motion for an amended scheduled order. The employee has appealed both orders. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand the case.

The court received a petition for rehearing en banc. The original panel has reviewed the petition for rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition were fully considered upon the original submission and decision. The petition then was circulated to the full court.* Less than a majority of the judges voted in favor of rehearing en banc. Therefore, the petition is denied.

The Defendant, Stacy M. Miller, was convicted by a Meigs County Criminal Court jury of three counts of first degree felony murder, criminally negligent homicide, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and theft of property valued at less than $1000. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree felony murder), 39-13-212 (2018) (criminally negligent homicide), 39-13-305 (2018) (especially aggravated kidnapping), 39-13-402 (2018) (aggravated robbery), 39-14-103 (2018) (theft). The trial court merged the three first degree felony murder convictions and imposed an effective life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her first degree felony murder convictions and (2) the trial court erred in failing to merge the criminally negligent homicide conviction with the first degree felony murder conviction and to merge the theft conviction with the aggravated robbery conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments reflecting the requested mergers of convictions and for correction of the judgment form in Count 6 to reflect the correct conviction offense, aggravated robbery.

The pro se petitioner, Dan E. Durrell, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Hamblen County jury convicted Defendant, Raymond D. Arwood, of one count of sexual exploitation of a minor involving more than fifty images. The trial court imposed a sentence of ten years as a Range II, multiple offender to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to suppress certain photographs and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal from the termination of parental rights, the mother does not challenge the grounds for terminating her rights. Rather she argues that the evidence was less than clear and convincing that termination was in the child’s best interest. After a review of both the statutory grounds for termination and the best interest determination, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a conservatorship proceeding. The issues on appeal concern the assessment of the fees of the attorney ad litem in the amount of $1,060. The trial court assessed the fees against the petitioners and the respondent, jointly and severally. The petitioners appeal, contending that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-125, the court had no discretion but to assess the fees of the attorney ad litem against the respondent. The petitioners and the estate of the respondent also challenge the assessment of the fees against the respondent on other grounds. We have determined that the trial court was statutorily required to assess the fees of the attorney ad litem against the respondent and that it lacked the discretion to assess the fees against the petitioners. We have also determined that the petitioners have no standing to challenge the assessment of the fees against the respondent and that the issues raised by the estate of the respondent lack merit. Thus, we reverse the assessment of the fees of the attorney ad litem against the petitioners but affirm the assessment of the fees against the respondent.

For the week of September 11, 2023 - September 15, 2023

The petitioner, Rodney Earl Jones, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Antonio Donte Jenkins, a.k.a. Antonio Donte Gordon Jenkins, of second degree murder and felony reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of twenty-seven years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for second degree murder. He also asserts that the trial court erred by (1) instructing the jury on criminal responsibility; (2) failing to declare a mistrial after a State’s witness testified that the Defendant had an outstanding warrant; (3) allowing portions of a witness’s testimony from the juvenile transfer hearing to be read into evidence; (4) allowing evidence that had not been presented during trial into the jury room during deliberations; and (5) imposing an excessive sentence. We respectfully conclude that the jury should not have been instructed on criminal responsibility and that the error was not harmless. For this reason, we vacate the Defendant’s conviction for second degree murder and remand for a new trial. Finally, although we also affirm the Defendant’s conviction and sentence for reckless endangerment, we remand for entry of an amended judgment reflecting that this sentence is not currently aligned consecutively to any other sentence.