KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Jeopardy attaches to an “offence,” for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, only when a court or jury has power to determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence as to that “offence.” Here, an Ohio trial court dismissed a manslaughter charge against Travis Soto, pursuant to his agreement to plead guilty to another charge. Ten years later, in connection with the same incident, the State charged Soto with murder. We agree with the Ohio Supreme Court and the district court that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar that prosecution.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. While facing charges for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c), Defendant David Pennington improperly communicated with witnesses in the case against him. Pennington’s § 1594(c) charge alleged that he participated in a conspiracy to engage in human trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), 1591(b)(1). The government then charged Pennington with witness tampering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), and dismissed the § 1594(c) conspiracy charge when Pennington pleaded guilty to the witness-tampering charge. When the district court sentenced Pennington, it applied the U.S. Sentencing Guideline that corresponds with his witness-tampering conviction, which prompted a series of cross-references to other guidelines. The final guideline in that chain, U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1, applies to certain human-trafficking offenses and supplies two possible base-offense levels. U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 2G1.1(a) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2021). Subsection (a)(1) provides a base-offense level of “34, if the offense of conviction is 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1)”; subsection (a)(2) provides a base-offense level of “14, otherwise.” U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1(a)(1)–(2). Despite the fact that Pennington had not been convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1), and no other guideline permitted a court to treat Pennington as if he had been, the district court used subsection (a)(1)’s base-offense level of thirty-four as its starting point. This was an error. Accordingly, we VACATE Pennington’s sentence and REMAND to the district court for resentencing under the properly calculated Guidelines range.

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. In this consolidated appeal, which follows a remand for resentencing, two convicted bank robbers challenge the district court’s decision to redo the guidelines calculations and sentencing proceedings entirely, and to apply a new sentencing enhancement that was not considered or applied in their original sentencing. We affirm.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. On its surface, this appeal concerns an award of attorney fees. It presents, however, issues of ripeness, standing, and mootness that have gone unaddressed through more than five years of litigation. John Doe was an undergraduate student at the University of Michigan (“the University”) who was accused of sexual assault in 2018. Before the University’s investigation had concluded and before any discipline had been issued, he filed a lawsuit alleging that the University’s disciplinary procedures for cases involving sexual assault violated his due-process rights. The district court granted him a preliminary injunction enjoining the disciplinary process from moving forward, and the University appealed, arguing that Doe did not have standing to file his lawsuit and therefore the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. We remanded for reconsideration in light of our decision in Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018), in which we held that the University’s disciplinary procedures violated due process, and in light of the University’s new disciplinary policy implemented in response to that decision. The district court granted in part and denied in part the University’s motion to dismiss and granted in part Doe’s motion for partial summary judgment. The University appealed again, renewing its jurisdictional arguments. Before the appeal could be heard, the complainant decided she no longer wished to participate in the disciplinary process. We determined that the appeal had become moot and vacated the district court’s order granting summary judgment. Doe then moved for attorney fees, which the district court granted, and the University appealed once again. We hold that Doe had standing to sue to seek the release of his transcript, but that the district court lacked jurisdiction over his remaining claims. We further hold that Doe was the prevailing party only as to his due-process claim seeking the release of his transcript. We therefore VACATE the district court’s order and REMAND for recalculation of attorney fees.

Petitioner, Billy Joe Nelson, appeals as of right from the Coffee County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for aggravated kidnapping, carjacking, robbery, and aggravated rape. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel based upon counsel’s failure to (1) move to suppress the evidence obtained by Petitioner’s arrest, the search of his girlfriend’s mother’s home, and the search of a cell phone he shared with his girlfriend; (2) move to suppress the victim’s identification of Petitioner on a surveillance recording as impermissibly suggestive; (3) investigate DNA evidence or contest the chain of custody of the victim’s rape kit and the DNA standards for the victim and Petitioner; (4) introduce a voice exemplar of Petitioner to prove that the perpetrator’s voice in the background of the victim’s 911 call was not his; and (5) use telephone records to cast doubt on the State’s timeline of events and establish that a witness had reason to lie about Petitioner’s involvement in the offenses. Petitioner also alleges that the State withheld exculpatory evidence relative to the victim’s rape kit and DNA standards for the victim and Petitioner. Following our review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Angela Montgomery, was convicted in the Rutherford County Circuit Court of six counts of rape of a child, for which she received an effective sentence of forty years’ imprisonment to be served at one hundred percent. This court affirmed her convictions, and she filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court granted relief. The State then appealed, claiming for the first time that the petition was untimely. This court remanded the case to the post-conviction court to determine whether the Petitioner was entitled to due process tolling of the one-year statute of limitations. The post-conviction court held that she was not and denied the petition as untimely. The Petitioner now appeals contending that she is entitled to due process tolling because, despite her repeated requests, trial counsel failed to provide her with a copy of the trial transcript. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Robert Joseph Atkins, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of second degree murder, tampering with evidence, and unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon and received an effective thirty-one-year sentence. On appeal, he claims that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his murder conviction, (2) the trial court erred by admitting testimony about his prior assault of the victim, (3) the trial court erred by admitting an unauthenticated video into evidence, (4) the trial court should have granted a new trial because a police officer, who testified at trial, was the subject of an internal affairs investigation, (5) the trial court committed plain error by allowing the medical examiner to testify outside her area of expertise, and (6) he was denied his right to a fair trial under the cumulative error doctrine. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted Defendant, Brian Allen Armstrong, of two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and one count of possession of a prohibited weapon. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective term of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred in denying his requested jury instruction on the defense of necessity. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this interlocutory appeal, the employer contends the employee did not meet his burden of proof at the expedited hearing for entitlement to medical benefits. The employee injured his right wrist when closing the door to a shipping container. The employer initially accepted the injury as compensable and provided medical treatment, including surgery. Following surgery, the employee continued to have swelling in his wrist and noticed issues with grip strength and dropping objects. After additional testing, the employee’s authorized physician diagnosed carpal tunnel syndrome and recommended another surgery, which the employer denied. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court found the employee was likely to prevail at trial and issued an order requiring the employer to provide the surgery. The employer has appealed. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand the case.

For the week of August 14, 2023 - August 18, 2023