Petitioner, James William Mabe, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Cededrick Ivory, was indicted by a Shelby County Grand Jury for first-degree premeditated murder in the shooting death of Anthony Travis (count one), the attempted first-degree murder of Malik Muhammad (count two), and unlawful employment of a firearm during the commission of first-degree murder (count three). Prior to trial, the State dismissed counts two and three. The Appellant was convicted as charged by a Shelby County jury of first-degree premediated murder (count one) and sentenced to life in prison. In this appeal as of right, he raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction of first-degree premeditated murder; (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the prosecutor to correct the testimony of a state witness; and (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding the dates of prior charged offenses during the cross-examination of two state witnesses.1 Upon our review, we must remand this case for entry of separate judgment forms reflecting a dismissal of counts two and three. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this premises liability case concerning a customer’s fall inside of a restaurant, video surveillance footage from a security camera in the restaurant was not preserved, precipitating the filing of a sanctions motion by the Plaintiffs for spoliation. Although several sources of evidence existed pertaining to the condition of the restaurant flooring where the customer fell, and although the trial court concluded that the Plaintiffs were not prevented from proving fault in this case in the absence of the video evidence, the trial court ultimately entered significant sanctions against the Defendants, including holding that it was conclusively established for purposes of trial that the Defendants had actual or constructive notice that the floor where the fall occurred was “slick” because of a substance or because of a general and continuing condition, as well as striking the Defendants’ affirmative defenses of comparative fault. Upon the filing of an application by the Defendants, we granted an extraordinary appeal under Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s sanctions order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

MATHIS, Circuit Judge. In the middle of the day, Donald Wilson fired nine shots at an occupied, moving vehicle, striking the driver multiple times. He claims he did so in self-defense. But Wilson was a felon at the time; therefore, it was unlawful for him to possess a firearm or ammunition. Wilson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition and received an above-Guidelines sentence of 46 months’ imprisonment. Wilson appeals, arguing that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Pertinent here, he asserts that his self-defense claim should have precluded the district court from relying on U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) to enhance his sentence. Because the district court failed to make factual findings regarding Wilson’s self-defense claim, we vacate Wilson’s sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. In September 2018, Michigan State Police officers arrested Janice Brown without a warrant for alleged witness intimidation. She was jailed for approximately 96 hours and was not brought before a judge for a probable cause hearing during that time. None of the officers involved in her arrest requested a warrant or took any other action relating to her detention. Brown sued the officers for unreasonably seizing her without probable cause and detaining her without due process of law, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The officers moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied their motion, and they appealed. We AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part.

In a private petition for termination of parental rights, the petitioner alleged multiple grounds for termination: (1) abandonment for failure to visit; (2) abandonment for failure to support; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court found the Father’s parental rights should be terminated based upon these three grounds and that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm the trial court’s ruling as to the termination grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support. Because the trial court did not make findings of fact concluding that placing legal and physical custody with Father would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child, we must vacate the trial court’s ruling as to the failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody ground. We affirm the trial court’s conclusion that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child.

In this real property dispute, the petitioner brought an action to quiet title to and remove the respondent from a parcel of improved real property located in Cumberland County. Following a bench trial, the trial court ordered that the title of the property be fully vested in the petitioner. The trial court also ordered the respondent to vacate the premises within ten days. Following a damages hearing, the trial court entered an order awarding to the petitioner $8,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000 in attorney’s fees. The respondent has appealed, and the petitioner has raised an issue alleging that this is a frivolous appeal. Because we are unable to discern from the trial court’s judgment any consideration of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 factors (“RPC 1.5 factors”), we vacate the award of attorney’s fees and remand for the trial court to make a new determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee award to the petitioner based on the RPC 1.5 factors. We deny the petitioner’s request for damages on appeal. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

The appellant challenges the trial court’s termination of her parental rights. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence established four grounds for termination of parental rights including (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) persistent conditions; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also found clear and convincing evidence established that termination was in the children’s best interests. The appellant challenges the trial court’s findings as to both the existence of grounds for termination and the conclusion that termination was in the best interests of the children. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a jury verdict awarding damages to a plaintiff injured in a car accident. The plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of her medical bills. Because the plaintiff failed to present expert proof that her medical expenses were necessary, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the bills. The jury verdict is affirmed.

Plaintiffs filed this inverse condemnation suit against numerous defendants, alleging that their involvement with a construction project on an interstate highway resulted in increased surface waters and flooding of Plaintiffs’ home and property. The trial court dismissed all of the claims at various stages of the litigation. In a prior appeal, this Court affirmed the dismissal of multiple claims, but we vacated the trial court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings for two defendants because the trial court’s order stated that its decision was based on “the entire record” and cited an exhibit to the complaint. See Harvey v. Shelby Cnty., No. W2018-01747-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 3854297, at *4-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2019). We remanded for consideration pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Id. at *6. After some limited discovery on remand, the trial court granted motions for summary judgment filed by the two remaining defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.