The Defendant, Iesha Jones, was convicted by a Hamilton County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder; voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony; especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree felony murder), 39-13-211 (2018) (voluntary manslaughter), 39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated robbery), 39-13-103 (2018 (subsequently amended) (reckless endangerment). The trial court merged the first degree felony murder and voluntary manslaughter convictions and imposed a life sentence. The court also imposed sentences of twenty years for especially aggravated robbery and two years for reckless endangerment. The court ordered concurrent service of the sentences, for an effective life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, (2) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence, (3) the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, and (4) the court erred in denying her requested jury instructions regarding self-defense and defense of others. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. It is well known that the U.S. Constitution incorporates the “sovereign immunity” from private lawsuits that the states possessed before the founding. This federal constitutional immunity covers claims filed against the states in federal court, see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57–73 (1996), claims filed against them in their own courts under federal law, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730–54 (1999), and claims filed against them in another state’s courts, see Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1493–99 (2019).

But a state’s sovereign immunity does not end with the federal Constitution. When a plaintiff pursues state claims against state defendants, these defendants may also invoke the state’s own common-law or constitutional rules of sovereign immunity. In this case, we must consider Kentucky’s sovereign-immunity law, which grants “pure” immunity to some state actors and “governmental” immunity to others. To help develop ports, Kentucky gives its localities the power to create riverport authorities. The plaintiff in this case brought state claims against a riverport authority’s executive director. The district court held that Kentucky would not grant sovereign immunity to this director when sued in her official capacity. We reverse because she is entitled to Kentucky’s “governmental” form of sovereign immunity.

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. La Bamba Licensing, LLC (“La Bamba”) filed suit against La Bamba Authentic Mexican, Inc. (now known as “La Villa Rica Mexican Cuisine, Inc.”) for trademark infringement and unfair competition in violation of the Lanham Act and for common law unfair competition, alleging that La Villa Rica infringed La Bamba’s registered trademark “LA BAMBA.” The district court granted summary judgment in favor of La Bamba. The district court then granted La Bamba an award of profits, costs, and attorneys’ fees. La Villa Rica appeals the award of profits and attorneys’ fees. We AFFIRM.

Tenant appeals the trial court’s decision to grant landlord a judgment under a holdover provision in a commercial lease. Because we conclude that landlord voluntarily relinquished its claim under the holdover provision, we reverse the trial court’s judgment of damages, late fees, and attorney’s fees, but affirm the trial court’s decision to deny tenant’s motion to amend her complaint. We remand this case for the determination of the sole issue agreed to be heard by the parties.

This appeal concerns a long-running domestic matter. Heather R. Wilder (“Mother”) and Joseph C. Wilder (“Father”) were issued a final judgment of divorce by the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) in 2010. Issues concerning child support have persisted since then. In the most recent chapter, the Trial Court allowed Mother’s attorney to withdraw five days before trial but denied her request for a continuance. The Trial Court subsequently entered its final order. Mother appeals. We find that the Trial Court abused its discretion in denying Mother a reasonable continuance. We vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for a new trial to be conducted after Mother has had a reasonable continuance in which to try to retain counsel or otherwise prepare for trial pro se.

The notice of appeal filed by the appellants, Nathan Lynn Bryant and Melissa Bryant, stated that appellants were appealing the judgment entered on September 27, 2022. Inasmuch as the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The trial court found Appellant/Father in civil contempt for alleged failure to comply with discovery propounded by Appellee/Mother. The trial court also dismissed Father’s petition to modify visitation and child support on the ground that Father’s petition constituted an abusive civil lawsuit. We reverse the trial court’s findings of civil contempt and abusive civil lawsuit. However, because the parties’ child has reached majority, we conclude that Father’s petition to modify is moot. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Father’s petition on the ground of mootness.

A congregation within the Presbyterian Church sought to disaffiliate from its presbytery while retaining ownership of its real property. The presbytery argued that the congregation did not own the real property outright but rather held it in trust for the benefit of the national body of the Presbyterian Church. Following a hearing on competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that the congregation owned the property outright. Thus, it denied the presbytery’s motion and granted the congregation’s motion. The presbytery timely appealed to this Court. Following careful review, we reverse.

A father petitioned to change the primary residential parent and for immediate physical custody of his child based on the mother’s allegedly inappropriate behavior. The court granted Father an ex parte order of immediate physical custody. At the show cause hearing, the court determined that the mother had engaged in a pattern of emotional abuse of the father and the child such that her parenting time should be limited. After a final hearing on the father’s petition, the court found a material change of circumstances had occurred and that it was in the child’s best interest to modify the permanent parenting plan. The court then adopted a modified parenting plan that named the father the primary residential parent and limited the mother’s parenting time. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

The State of Tennessee sought the enforcement of a prior administrative order against the Appellant related to the Appellant’s violations of the Tennessee Water Quality Control Act of 1977, requesting civil penalties, damages, and injunctive relief. The State filed a motion for summary judgment, and the Appellant sought a continuance based on parallel criminal proceedings. The trial court denied the motion for a continuance and granted summary judgment to the State. On appeal, the Appellant asserts that the chancery court and administrative tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction and that the chancery court erred in denying his motion for a continuance. We conclude that any challenge to personal jurisdiction has been waived and that the chancery court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a continuance. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.