For the week of July 17, 2023 - July 21, 2023

In 2012, Robert and Elizabeth Ann Lewis created a revocable trust and transferred thereto their rental property business as well as real estate. Several years later, after Robert was deceased and Elizabeth had become incapacitated, one of the Lewis’ sons, acting as Elizabeth’s attorney-in-fact, created a new trust with terms different from that of the original. A different Lewis sibling, Kim Williams, disputed the son’s authority to create the second trust pursuant to both the terms of the original trust and his power of attorney. Kim Williams claimed, inter alia, that the son breached several fiduciary duties in creating the second trust. Following discovery and an unsuccessful mediation, the Chancery Court for Rhea County (the “trial court”) denied Ms. Williams’ motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment. Ms. Williams appeals. Having reviewed the record and arguments of the parties, we conclude that the trial court’s ruling is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part, and the case remanded for further proceedings.

In this post-divorce dispute, the wife filed a petition for criminal contempt. After testimony was heard, the parties announced in broad terms that they had reached a settlement. Thereafter, the parties could not agree on the terms of the settlement. At a hearing on the husband’s motion requesting approval of his proposed order, the court dismissed the petition on grounds of double jeopardy. We have determined that the trial court erred in dismissing the case and remand for further proceedings.

Citizens sought to stop the construction and operation of a soccer stadium at The Fairgrounds Nashville. The plaintiffs advanced a plethora of legal theories in support of their claims that the soccer development violated the Metro Charter. After a month-long trial, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. On appeal, the plaintiffs raise two issues: (1) whether the trial court’s orders were final; and (2) whether the court erred in ruling that the Metro Charter did not require a public referendum before any demolition and new development could occur at the Fairgrounds. We conclude that the court’s orders were final. But, because the challenged demolition and construction have already happened, we dismiss this appeal as moot.

This is an appeal from an order requiring a trustee to provide an updated accounting to a beneficiary at the beneficiary’s expense. Because the order does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This appeal concerns the criminal gang-enhancement statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-121, and specifically what is required in an indictment to sufficiently plead and provide notice under the statute. Dashun Shackleford (“Defendant”) was arrested for aggravated robbery as to four individuals in September 2016, along with his friend and fellow gang member, Jalon Copeland. Defendant’s indictment contained twenty counts: four alternative counts each of aggravated robbery against four victims and four corresponding counts of criminal gang offense enhancement. The gang-enhancement statute requires the State to give notice in separate counts of the indictment of the enhancement applicable under the statute. The indictment also alleged that Defendant was a “Crips” gang member and listed the convictions of fifteen alleged fellow Crips members to prove Defendant’s gang had a “pattern of criminal gang activity,” as also required by the gang-enhancement statute. A Knox County jury convicted Defendant as charged. The trial court merged the aggravated robbery convictions into four counts and imposed a total effective sentence of twenty years to be served at eighty-five percent. In this case, the gangenhancement conviction increased Defendant’s aggravated robbery convictions from Class B felonies to Class A felonies. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his gang-enhancement conviction. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed, taking particular issue with the allegation in the indictment that Defendant and the other gang members listed therein were plain Crips. In the gangenhancement phase of trial, the proof established that the majority of the gang members listed in the indictment, including Defendant, were members of several different subsets of the Crips gang, with only one of the listed men identified as a plain Crip. The intermediate court concluded that the State failed to prove that Defendant’s subset gang had engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity and failed to comply with the notice requirements of the gang-enhancement statute. In doing so, the court also, sua sponte, determined that a fatal variance existed between the indictment and proof at trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals, therefore, reverted Defendant’s aggravated robbery convictions to a classification lower in the absence of the gang enhancement. After review, we conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in its decision. The gang-enhancement statute is worded broadly and does not require the State to specify in the indictment a criminal defendant’s gang subset nor that the defendant is in the same gang subset as the individuals whose criminal activity establishes the gang’s “pattern of criminal gang activity.” Defendant waived all other issues by failing to properly raise them before the trial court or on appeal. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the trial court’s judgments are reinstated.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Michigan State University (MSU) required its employees to receive a vaccine against the disease. Plaintiffs, who are MSU employees, objected. They claimed their naturally acquired immunity to COVID-19 should exempt them from the vaccine policy. That reasoning did not persuade MSU, which imposed disciplinary action against them for not getting vaccinated. The complaint below alleged that MSU violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and that the university’s vaccine mandate was preempted by federal law. The district court granted the university’s motion to dismiss. We agree with the district court that, as alleged, the university’s vaccine policy neither violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights nor was preempted by federal law. We therefore AFFIRM.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of an insurer’s motion for summary judgment. The case, which arose in a construction industry setting, involves multiple contractors and multiple insurers. The primary issues addressed during the summary judgment hearing were whether the immediate employer’s workers’ compensation insurance policy had lapsed for non-payment of premium the day before the work accident and, consequently, whether that insurer was entitled to dismissal from the case. Having determined there were disputed issues of material fact regarding whether the policy had lapsed, the trial court denied the insurer’s motion, and the insurer appealed. Upon careful consideration of the record, arguments of counsel, and relevant precedent, we conclude the trial court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a coverage dispute between an employer and its insurer under the circumstances presented here, but we nevertheless affirm the trial court’s order denying the motion for summary judgment and remand the case.

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Following an incident in which both she and a state trooper were shot, Tiffany Renee Miller pleaded guilty to (1) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and (2) possession of a stolen firearm. The district court, after applying the cross-reference to attempted murder from the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.), sentenced Miller to 240 months of imprisonment. This is the statutory maximum based on the firearms offenses to which she pleaded guilty. Miller appeals her sentence, arguing that it is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

Petitioner, Marshall G. Tate, appeals from the Franklin County Circuit Court’s order denying him post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he pleaded guilty to driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .08 percent or more (DUI per se). Petitioner also argues counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.