Defendant, Luis Alexis Briceno, was convicted of alternative counts of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (second offense), driving on a revoked license, and violation of the financial responsibility law. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, with seventy-five percent release eligibility, and service of fiftynine days in confinement before release on probation. On appeal, Defendant argues that the Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts erred by denying his request of funding for expert assistance; Rule 13 of the Tennessee Supreme Court is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied in his case; and the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the results of his breath test. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Benjamin Scott Brewer, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for six counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication, four counts of reckless aggravated assault, driving under the influence, violation of motor carrier regulations, and speeding. Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon counsel’s failure to object to witnesses’ descriptions of the crash scene as unfairly prejudicial under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff, Defendant’s former employee, filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act alleging that he had suffered a loss of overtime wages. The trial court entered a judgment denying Plaintiff any recovery. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the trial court’s findings are insufficient. Although under the specific circumstances presented here we would generally remand the case to allow the trial court an opportunity to more clearly state its findings, as well as offer specific findings and conclusions in reference to the appropriate legal standards, the judge who tried this case is no longer on the bench. Accordingly, we are compelled to vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial on the question of whether Defendant improperly denied Plaintiff overtime pay.

This appeal concerns a complaint for health care liability. Although Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) provides for an extension of the applicable statutes of limitations in health care liability actions when pre-suit notice is given, it also specifies that “[i]n no event shall this section operate to shorten or otherwise extend the statutes of limitations or repose applicable to any action asserting a claim for health care liability, nor shall more than one (1) extension be applicable to any [health care] provider.” After a prior lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice, Plaintiff provided new pre-suit notice and refiled in reliance on the Tennessee saving statute and an extension under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c). The trial court dismissed the refiled complaint with prejudice, however, holding, among other things, that Plaintiff could not utilize the statutory extension in his refiled action because he had already utilized a statutory extension in the first lawsuit. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s lawsuit.

A Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel found that a Shelby County attorney’s law license should be suspended for four years based on multiple violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs), including RPC 5.5(a). The attorney appealed part of the hearing panel’s decision, and the trial court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and modified the sanction to one year. The Board appeals the trial court’s decision that the attorney did not violate RPC 5.5(a) by practicing law while his license was suspended. We find that the attorney violated RPC 5.5(a) by continuing to manage and market his law practice; by directly or indirectly communicating with office staff, attorneys, and former clients; and by recruiting and hiring attorneys while his law license was suspended. The hearing panel’s decision that the attorney violated RPC 5.5(a) is supported by substantial and material evidence. We hold that the attorney’s law license shall be suspended for two years, with eighteen months served on active suspension. This sanction is based on the RPC 5.5(a) violation, as well as the hearing panel’s findings that he violated additional RPCs, which he did not appeal, the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (ABA Standards), five aggravating factors, and no mitigating factors. The attorney shall also make appropriate restitution, obtain additional continuing education as ordered by the trial court, and engage a practice monitor during his probated suspension.

In this case involving termination of the father’s parental rights to his children, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence three statutory grounds for termination of the father’s parental rights to all three of his children, and the court found by clear and convincing evidence additional putative father grounds for termination of his parental rights to his youngest child only. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence established that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The father has appealed. Having determined that the trial court found two statutory grounds, abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support, that were not included in the petitioners’ original or amended petitions, we reverse the court’s findings on these two grounds. We must also reverse the four statutory grounds applicable to a putative father inasmuch as the petitioners did not present evidence to establish that the father qualified as a putative father. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including termination of the father’s parental rights based upon the remaining ground and best interest analysis.

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment by wanton disregard; (2) incarceration for a period of ten or more years; and (3) the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s ultimate termination decision.

For the week of July 3, 2023 - July 7, 2023

The Defendant, Marquez Travell Billingsley, pleaded guilty to conspiracy with intent to sell over fifteen grams of heroin in a drug-free zone, a park. In exchange, the State dismissed other charges pending against him. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years, to be served at 100%. Several years later, the Defendant filed a motion to be resentenced pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(h). After a hearing, the trial court denied relief. On appeal, we conclude that an appeal as of right does not lie from a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for discretionary resentencing pursuant to the Drug-Free School Zone Act. Accordingly, the Defendant’s appeal is dismissed.

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) temporarily suspended Delbert Stewart’s private pilot airman’s certificate, but Stewart kept flying his plane. So the FAA permanently revoked Stewart’s airman’s certificate. Still, Stewart kept flying. Now Stewart challenges his criminal conviction for flying without authorization. We AFFIRM.