In this case involving termination of the father’s parental rights to his child upon a petition filed by the child’s mother and stepfather, the trial court determined that five statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Following the father’s initial appeal, this Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded for entry of specific findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k). On remand, the trial court entered a judgment confirming its prior determinations with added specific findings and conclusions. The father has again appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a post-judgment request for medical treatment. The employee settled his claim for a left shoulder injury in June 2021, and his settlement provided for “authorized future medical expenses that are directly related to the work injury.” Thereafter, a physician recommended a total shoulder replacement, which the employer denied following a utilization review. The Medical Director of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation disagreed with the “non-certification” recommended by the utilization review physician and ordered that the treatment be approved. The employer then filed a petition for benefit determination, arguing that the need for a total shoulder replacement did not arise primarily from the work accident. Following a hearing, the trial court concluded the employee had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the need for a total shoulder replacement arose primarily from the work accident, and the employee appealed. Upon careful consideration of the medical evidence and the record as a whole, we affirm the trial court’s order and certify it as final.

In this appeal, we consider the interplay and applicability of two statutes that relate to suffrage rights of Tennessee residents previously convicted of infamous crimes in other states. Although the Tennessee Constitution recognizes the importance of the right of its residents to vote, the Constitution also allows the General Assembly to restrict the right of a person to vote “upon a conviction by a jury of some infamous crime, previously ascertained and declared by law, and judgment thereon by court of competent jurisdiction.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 5. Ernest Falls, a resident of Tennessee since 2018, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in Virginia in 1986, an infamous crime under the laws of Tennessee. In 2020, Mr. Falls was granted clemency in Virginia by then-Governor Ralph Northam. The grant of clemency reinstated Mr. Falls’ rights of citizenship in Virginia, including his right to vote. Subsequently, Mr. Falls attempted to register to vote in Grainger County, Tennessee, in June of 2020. The Grainger County Election Commission denied his restoration of voting rights request and cited “Incomplete/Insufficient Document(s)” as the reasoning for the denial. Mr. Falls and a co-plaintiff, who was left off the voter rolls under similar circumstances, filed a lawsuit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County, arguing that Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-19-143(3) requires the state to re-enfranchise persons convicted of out-of-state infamous crimes as soon as said persons are “pardoned or restored to the rights of citizenship by the governor or other appropriate authority of such other state.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143(3) (2014). Respondents, three public employees sued in their official capacity, countered that Mr. Falls also is required to comply with requirements set forth in another statutory provision, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-202, which requires that persons convicted of infamous crimes pay outstanding court costs, restitution, and child support obligations before they can be re-enfranchised. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202 (2018). The Chancery Court granted summary judgment in favor of the three state officials, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment with Mr. Falls acting as the sole remaining plaintiff. Like the Court of Appeals, we affirm the grant of summary judgment and conclude that, in order to regain the right of suffrage in Tennessee, Mr. Falls and other similarly situated individuals must comply with both section 2-19-143(3) and the additional requirements set forth in section 40-29-202.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. This case arises from the suicide of Juan Quintana, II, a fifteen-year-old, at a facility operated by defendants Spectrum Juvenile Justice Services and Spectrum Human Services, Inc. (collectively, Spectrum) in Highland Park, Michigan. Representatives of Quintana’s estate sued Spectrum based on Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The complaint alleges that Spectrum functioned as a state actor and violated Quintana’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when its personnel failed to visually check on him as required by state contract. The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ suit on the ground that the complaint did not plausibly allege state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We respectfully disagree, as explained below. We therefore REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.

Regina Bryant, a pro se Ohio plaintiff, appeals the district court’s judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) on her federal employment-discrimination and retaliation complaint. Bryant moves the court for appointment of counsel on appeal. This case has been referred to a panel of the court that, upon examination, unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a). For the reasons that follow, we deny Bryant’s motion for appointment of counsel and affirm the district court’s judgment.

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment and DENY Bryant’s motion for appointment of counsel.

The Appellant challenges the circuit court’s grant of an order of protection, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the finding that the Appellant stalked the Appellee. Because the order of protection has expired by its own terms, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

The Appellant challenges the circuit court’s grant of an order of protection, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the finding that the Appellant stalked the Appellee. Because the order of protection has expired by its own terms, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

The Defendant, Dale Anthony Wilbourn, was convicted of the offenses of evading arrest and making an improper turn. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective term of six years to be served in custody. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for evading arrest and that the trial court erred in not imposing an alternative sentence to incarceration. On our review, we respectfully disagree with the Defendant and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Courdarrius Perkins, of first-degree felony murder and aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a concurrent sentence of life imprisonment for felony murder and five years for aggravated robbery. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the underlying felony on the felony murder charge and compounded the error by failing to require the State to elect the facts for the underlying felony. He also contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the felony murder charge because the evidence is insufficient. After reviewing the record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Darrick Hicks, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated assault and theft of property valued at more than $1,000. He was sentenced to an effective term of three years, which was suspended to probation after service of six months in custody. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to sustain his conviction for theft of property. Based on our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court, but we remand the case for correction and entry of judgments.